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This main aim of this work is to develop a “design for safety” based risk assessment technique 
for the offshore platforms in order to facilitate decision making. This is achieved through detailed 
examination of related risks, and review of relevant literatures and traditional safety assessment 
methods leading to the development of a new knowledge-based risk assessment method 
(KBRAM) through the research methodology process. 
The methodology involves detailed definition of the research aim and objectives, further 
literature review on risk analysis and the related topics of safety assessment and safety 
management systems. This process laid the foundation for the establishment of a framework for 
the integration of design for safety and fuzzy reasoning approach to model the risk assessment 
procedure for offshore platforms. 
The research procedure requires collection of data which was obtained from the industry in this 
instance. The collection methods involve surveys visit interviews and questionnaires which 
together constitute vital information required for test running the model and conduct preliminary 
validation studies with regard to offshore platform risk assessment to enable provision reaching 
some conclusions. 
The results obtained through testing of KBRAM using data collected from the industry show the 
determination of risk level classification has been improved compared to the one obtained using 
same data on the traditional fuzzy two-input parameter risk assessment method (TPRAM) due to 
the addition of a third parameter in the KBRAM. 
In conclusion, the above result satisfy the research aim of facilitating decision-making process 
based on reduced cost of safety due to more efficient risk evaluations. 
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This chapter gives the rundown of the main purpose of this research and presents a brief 
justification of the need for a comprehensive and structured methodology for the investigation 
and analysis of hazards associated with the offshore platforms. In this chapter also some 
historical developments related to safety management have been enumerated as a build up to the 
main research work. Further reviews include the safety of offshore oil and gas facilities, previous 
accident and incident reports, and governments post accident reports which are also highlighted 
in this chapter. 
The issues identified through the reviews mentioned above led to changes in the way health and 
safety concerns are administered particularly in the industrialised nations. The Chapter also 
enumerated the basis for this research and concludes with summary of the thesis structure and its 
contents. 
1.1 Background 
Historically, the beginning of industrial revolution brought with it both social and economic 
consequences which have been the source of concern in many nations. These concerns generated 
a lot of clamour for changes which resulted in the formation of International labour organisation 
(ILO) in the year 1919. The organisation has among other functions, for example the 
responsibility for the compilation of systematic statistics of hazardous activities and their 
resultant consequences. This development clearly highlighted the enormous cost of accidents to 
society and provided the basis for the development of preventive strategies which made 
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significant contribution towards improvement of health and safety legislations. The organisation 
produced the first worldwide projection of an annual estimate of about 264 million occupational 
accidents and fatalities of over 350,000 (Takala, 2006). 
In 1988 an offshore facility named Piper Alpha (UK) suffered a monumental disaster which 
recorded a fatality of 167 deaths out of the 229 people on board. This accident necessitated the 
need for urgent changes in offshore health and safety management. Accordingly, these changes 
led to the establishment of offshore installation (Safety Case) regulations in the UK. The safety 
case is a written document which stipulates how a company demonstrates an effective safety 
management system is in place on any particular offshore installation. The responsibility for the 
monitoring of the implementation of this was assigned to Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in 
1991. This study however, will concentrate on the safety implementation phase of the safety 
management system. 
Safety analysis in this context can be described as the study of the consequences of engineering 
system failures in relation to possible harm to people and/or damage to environment or property 
including financial assets (HSE, 1999). 
In consideration of the magnitude of the offshore safety problems, it is clear that safety studies 
require continuous efforts aimed at eliminating or reducing hazards (Lois et al, 2004). The task of 
safety analysis in this context will mainly concentrate on the prevention and/or mitigation or 
control of risks through the entire life of the project. This clearly resides within the concept of 
safety management. 
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However, it is pertinent to note that risk management is not about complete removal of risks but 
to encourage explicit decision making process, which will be used to mitigate the potential effects 
of certain risks and facilitate approvals for the project. The consensus of opinion among the 
experts on risk is unanimous in accepting the inadequacy of software only solutions to the risk 
management problem (Raftery, 1993). 
Chapman (1991) described risk as a measure of exposure to the possibility of economic or 
financial loss or gain, physical damage or injury or delay as a consequence of the uncertainty 
associated with the pursuance of a particular course of action. This may necessitate the need for 
more innovations in risk management. 
This management will involve risk analysis as a means of encouraging innovative deployment of 
various techniques not only to conduct the systematic analysis procedures but also to deal with 
the uncertainty problems relating to the risk information. This process involves the risk 
identification, evaluation, control, recommendation, and implementation. The various techniques 
for risk assessment based on recent experiences brought more significant gains as well as offer 
more benefits to the industry in the long term (Cooper & Chapman, 1987). 
In the light of the above development risk analysis techniques are increasingly being deployed to 
assess risk and minimise losses in several industries such as railways, nuclear, chemical 
processing, oil & gas etc. 
These tremendous benefits brought about by risk management efforts can be summarised as 
follows (An, 2003a): 
 Resulted in substantial reduction in the exposure to risk. 
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 Introduced proactive risk response mechanism through planning. 
 Established the foundation for making explicit decisions on project. 
 Provided clearer opportunity for identification of peculiar risks associated with any given 
project. 
 Explored the full potentials of risk personnel based on skills and experience. 
 Encouraged production of high quality documentation on project risks at corporate level 
for continuous update and improvement. 
 Provided better opportunities for collation of reliable data for further research and 
improvement in the area of analysis of risks. 
In conducting this review, it is considered that risk is inherent in all oil and gas development 
projects, coupled with other influential factors such as unstable political or commercial landscape 
and planning. Risk may also be influenced by other factors such as size or complexity of the 
project, environment, execution period, and operative competence. Project targets are often not 
met despite the project manager‟s efforts aimed at lowering the risks due to other unpredictable 
events normally referred to as “force majeure” (Wang & Ruxton, 1998). This scenario prevents 
making general predictions thereby necessitating risks management approach for each individual 
project depending on its peculiarity. 
Therefore, risk management has to be considered very vital for the successful project delivery, 
though often constrained of inadequate work processes and software tools. An overall 
understanding of the different risk factors and how they affect the project necessitate the need to 
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clearly define project performance goals as critical factors for the achievement of successful 
project management and decision-making. 
Project Risk Management (PRM) involves a process of systematic approach for analysing and 
managing threats as well as project opportunities that are likely to increase the possibilities of 
attainment of typical project objectives such as cost, time schedule, and operational availability 
right from the early design stages. The PRM techniques will be used to facilitate the 
identification of major risk drivers and their effects on the project objectives. This process offers 
great opportunity for the development of suitable risk strategies and plan of action required to 
successfully manage and mitigate project potentials (Wang & Ruxton, 1997). 
Following the above, the choice between these techniques which depends on the quality of the 
information available and the kind of decisions PRM supports. Frequent use of PRM is typically 
based on using risk parameters such as the probability of failure event and its consequence, which 
account for threats and opportunities. The high level of uncertainty usually related with the 
information pose serious challenge to the safety analyst thereby necessitating the need to be more 
proactive in seeking direct decision support through probabilistic analyses or other alternatives 
especially in offshore developments. 
Offshore oil and gas development projects are characterised by large investments, tight time 
schedules and the evolving technology through sometimes unproven conditions. These challenges 
result in higher risk exposure and along with which come more opportunities to be exploited in 
terms of safety management (Khan, 2002b). 
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1.2 Offshore Project Challenges 
The design and installation of offshore platforms involve a very complicated process with 
attendant risks to people, environment and property or economic assets. The traditional methods 
of carrying out risk assessment during installation and construction or after occurrence of 
accidents proved to be costly and often saddled with lack of flexibility for alternative remedial 
options (Khan, 2002b). 
It also must be noted that offshore field development is a complex activity involving uncertainties 
from a wide range of sources. These uncertainties often comprise both potentially hazardous 
events and their attendant undesirable consequences in one hand and on the other presents 
opportunities for desired consequences or success. The task of managing these uncertainties from 
early stages is the main objective of safe design concept (Cleveland & King, 1983). 
The above referred uncertainties may come from a wide range of areas and disciplines, which can 




 Contract and/or procurement 
 Sub-contract 
 Political and/or cultural 
It is obvious that, all of the above listed factors will contribute to the overall uncertainty in the 
planning, execution and operation of the project. The project objectives, or the measure of project 
success or failure, are often defined in terms of cost, time schedule, and technical performance. In 
response to these challenges, safety analysis must be tailored towards the attainment of these 
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project objectives through the provision of systematic approach for analysing, controlling, and 
documenting identified threats and opportunities both during planning and execution of the 
project. Safety assessment can be carried out at various phases of an offshore field development 
project, such as the feasibility study phase, concept study phase, pre-engineering phase, detailed 
engineering phase, construction phase and commissioning phase (Umar et al, 2006). The major 
inherent safety challenges confronting the offshore development projects are as listed below: 
 Blow out 
 Fire 
 Explosion 
 Falling objects 
 Ship or helicopter impact 
 Earthquakes 
 Extreme weather 
It is clear that the above listed challenges suggest the need for continuous efforts to evolve more 
systematic approaches or techniques for controlling and monitoring safety, particularly from the 
very early development stages through design process (Gupta & Edwards, 2002). Sequel to the 
aforementioned, this research project will be dedicated to the development of a new proposed risk 
assessment model for offshore platforms based on the concept of “design for safety” and 
principles of fuzzy reasoning approach in order to deal with the imprecise safety information and 
other associated complex risk factors. 
1.3 Research Basis 
The initial question, which stimulates the idea of this work, is expressed as: - is there any need 
for another approach for safety provision in the design of offshore platforms? The hypothesis that 
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whether the new approach will make any difference or resultant improvement in offshore 
platform safety management. The answer is yes, as any simplistic approach built on some well 
tested methods would make more meaningful impact so long as it is not based on common sense. 
However, the answer can never be that simple when one considers the tremendous efforts made 
in this area. In the work of Wang & Ruxton, (1997) it was stated that, in recent years, design 
engineers and safety researchers have continually developed and applied quantitative safety 
techniques, but almost all have not received acceptance enough to encourage their wider 
application in order to guarantee ultimate solutions to safety based decisions during the design 
process. However, these techniques succeeded by offering better opportunities for further 
development of more objective and efficient safety analysis methods that facilitated the efforts of 
integrating safety features into the design process from the initial stages (Umar et al, 2006). Some 
constraints or difficulties associated with this process must also be highlighted which include; 
 Insufficient data in most cases while in some cases it is difficult to obtain. This results in 
having very poor statistical accuracy. 
 It is extremely difficult to carry out “design for safety” produce or use a single 
mathematical model for a project of such magnitude as an offshore platform. 
 The decision making process is made so difficult due to the combination of the complex 
task of defining the scope or extent of “design for safety” at the early stages, as well as the 
enormity of work and the associated cost of safety quantification process. 
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 The high level of uncertainty associated with the quantification of effects and 
consequences of hazard which constitute some difficulties to the “design for safety” 
process. 
 The quantification of risks involves significant number of assumptions, estimations, 
judgements, and opinions which often require the involvement of very skilful safety 
analyst to interpret the results. 
 It is also extremely difficult to set up absolute criteria for safety acceptability as safety is 
only a part of the important requirements for the appraisal of the acceptability of an 
industrial activity. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 1:- The need for continuous efforts aimed at the development of more comprehensive 
and structured methods for the investigation and analysis of hazards associated with offshore 
platforms is highlighted and some historical development related to safety management systems 
also discussed. The industrial reports on previous accidents and incidents, and governmental 
reports are also reviewed in this Chapter. The discussion concludes with outline of the whole 
thesis structure of thesis. 
Chapter 2:- This Chapter presents the concepts of safety and safety systems, as well as their 
applications into more complex approaches, as per the current safety management system. The 
current safety management system was introduced and, its elements and components also 
discussed. In efforts to achieve a comprehensive review relative to the relevance of the topic, 
various safety assessment methods are discussed enumerating their strengths or benefit to the 
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current work and weaknesses leading to the identification of gaps in the safety of offshore 
platform which require further efforts. The Chapter also introduces the concept of design for 
safety which is considered very vital for the current study. The concept of “design for safety” is 
deployed in order to explore the possibilities of achieving the main objective of applying the 
principles of “design for safety” through the different design stages for offshore platforms in 
order to facilitate decision-making process. 
Chapter 3:- The framework for the methodology adopted in this research is discussed in details 
in this Chapter. This framework involves giving detailed definition of the research aim and 
objectives, review of some relevant literature and conducting broader discussions leading to 
identification of the gaps in the area of dealing with safety challenges associated with 
development of offshore platforms. The Chapter enumerated further highlights on the links 
between the research objectives and, how they are achieved and demonstrated through different 
parts of this report. 
Chapter 4:- In this chapter, the concepts of offshore platform safe design approach is enumerated 
and the design processes also reviewed in efforts to establish foundation for the proposed design 
for safety framework. Further highlights include how a modified “design for safety” framework 
has been developed and proposed for the achievement of safe design of offshore platforms. This 
modification is intended to form the basis for the development of a safety assessment method to 
be employed in the safety modelling process for offshore platforms. 
Chapter 5: Following the review of design for safety in Chapter 4, this chapter focuses on the 
second vital part of what form the basis for safety modelling for offshore platforms. This vital 
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part is fuzzy reasoning approach (FRA) and its fundamental principles which are enumerated and 
discussed. Therefore, in this study FRA is considered as the main thrust of the modelling process 
due to its comparative advantage over other methods in terms of effective treatment of inherent 
uncertainties usually associated with risk information. The Chapter concludes the framework for 
the development of an integrated design for safety-FRA based risk assessment method referred in 
this work as knowledge-based risk assessment method (KBRAM) for safety assessment through 
the development stages for offshore platform. 
Chapter 6: This Chapter presents the development of (KBRAM) and its application procedures. 
This method begins with the establishment of foundation based on requirements, which the 
traditional safety assessment methods cannot adequately process any information that is deemed 
to be vague or lacking details required in terms of both quality and quantity at this stage. The 
KBRAM system framework developmental approach is enumerated and the methodology is also 
outlined. Demonstration of the KBRAM procedure is conducted with step by step illustrations 
using examples to interpret the mathematical equations throughout the Chapter. The Chapter 
concludes with discussion on the method‟s main attributes and innovations. 
Chapter 7: This Chapter reports on tests and illustrations of the performance of KBRAM, and its 
preliminary validation studies. The Chapter begins with demonstration of how the method is used 
to process safety information using real data collected from the industry with particular emphasis 
on offshore processing unit which is considered to be a very important and hazardous part of an 
offshore oil & gas platform. This unit is made up of six sub- systems each consisting of different 
components ranging between 15 and 21. 
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The proposed KBRAM approach is applied to the six sub-systems of the offshore process unit 
that consists of two separators (Oil & Condensate), two compressors (1 & 2), flash drum, and 
drier. Comparative study of two results based on the same principles and data with the only 
difference being an additional input parameter in the case of KBRAM as against the typical two-
parameter risk assessment method (TPRAM) which basically has two input parameters is 
presented. The Chapter concludes with discussions and recommendations of appropriate safety 
measures for each of sub-systems based on the analyses of the results mentioned above. 
Chapter 8: This Chapter enumerated the conclusions based on the compilation of the progressive 
discussions from Chapters 1 to 7 demonstrating how the research aim and objectives are achieved 
through the research methodology framework adopted in this study. The Chapter also highlighted 
recommendations for the improvement in the related areas currently militating against smooth 
conduct of research within the industry. It concludes with future works for exploring other 
possibilities or improvement in managing uncertainties especially regarding experts‟ opinion or 
knowledge. 




Concept of Safety Management 
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter is intended to provide an extensive literature review on how safety concept and 
system have been used to develop several complex safety management approaches to facilitate 
decision making process. Current safety management systems and models are introduced, and 
their processes are described and discussed in the following sections. 
As mentioned above, there are many forms of safety management systems but the most 
commonly used ones are (i) the traditional method of safety and, (ii) the proactive methods and 
philosophies of quality in conjunction with safety. 
Safety professionals in companies adopting the traditional method of safety directly ensure that 
workers comply with the expected company safety standards and regulations as well as enforce 
laws and government regulations. They are informed on new regulations, devoted to impose rules 
and regulations to their employees, carry out inspections, audit the system, direct investigations 
of accidents and injuries, and establish recommendations in order to prevent accidents and 
injuries in future. For the safety professionals, adhering to this concept means modifying the 
behaviour of the workers, motivating them, and using prizes and incentives to help them work in 
a safer way. Rewards are given only to those workers or departments that meet the pre-set safety 
objectives (Council, 1989). 
The traditional safety management programmes do not always improve the results of safety 
because they are centered exclusively on the technical requirements and achievement of short-
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term results. It has been observed that organisations adopting the traditional safety management 
only respond after occurrence of accidents or injuries. 
Another shortcoming of the traditional safety management program is that the program is isolated 
and most times disconnected with the rest of the functions of an organisation. The common 
elements of traditional safety management structure include: safety director, safety committee 
meetings relating to safety, list of rules pertaining to safety, posting of slogans, posters, and 
programs of safety incentives. The responsibility of the safety program falls on the safety 
director, who occupies a position inside the organization of the company and, in many cases, 
does not have the authority to make changes (Council, 1989). 
A proactive system centered on taking a pre-emptive approach is more effective than the one that 
continually analyse accidents after they happen in order to generate data on which to base 
improvements. Prevention is based on established rules, regulations, and safety instructions, but 
the mere publication of those rules and regulations in a safety manual is not enough for their 
effective implementation. Only when all personnel work in accordance with the safety norms and 
the established instructions will the company have safe practices (Petersen, 1988). 
The ten obligations of safety management as defined by Petersen (1978) express the way of 
deviating from traditional safety management through adoption of new obligations within the 
company: 
 Progress is not measured by injury ratios. 
 Safety becomes a system, more than a program. 
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 Statistical techniques drive the efforts of continuous improvement. 
 The investigation of accidents and injuries is renewed or is eliminated. 
 Technical principles and tools for the statistical control of the process are used. 
 Emphasis is placed on improving the system. 
 Benefits are provided for people that discover illegal situations. 
 The participation of workers in the resolution of problems and making decisions is 
formalised. 
 Ergonomic well-being is projected inside the place of work. 
 The traps within the system that cause human errors are eliminated. 
2.2 Definitions of Safety Management 
Safety management can be defined in several ways, Cox and Tait (1991) defined it as “the 
process whereby informed decision are taken to meet safety criteria”, in other words safety 
management is “the management process deployed to achieve a state of freedom from the 
unacceptable risks of personal harm or loss or damage”. Hazards or failure investigation methods 
are fundamental to the process of system safety management. 
The primary aim of safety management is to provide intervention mechanism in the process 
causing accident by breaking its chain (HSC, 1993). Safety management involves among others 
detection and/or prevention of inherent failures in the process of hazard identification, risk 
assessment, control, and monitoring (Gupta & Edwards, 2002). 
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The above definition clearly defines safety management as an integral part of the safety 
management system dealing with decision making and implementation of safety control 
measures. 
Decision making process involving safety is based on a systematic identification and assessment 
of risks with the pre-defined risk acceptability and tolerability level. Reduction and elimination of 
risk strategies are generally based on cost-benefit analysis with other requirements such as legal, 
social, and moral values playing significant role (HSC, 1993). 
2.3 Historical Perspective of Safety Management 
Though safety management concepts described above are relatively current, the safety at work 
literature can be traced back long before now. In 1920‟s Herbert Heinrich one of the early 
thinkers of safety in the United States conducted a study of the direct and indirect costs of 
occupational accidents in which he identified the existence of a linear relationship and published 
a survey results on the relative frequency ratio of different types of accidents including a popular 
“accident pyramid” (Heinrich et al, 1980). Thereafter, various studies have been conducted to 
further establish relationship between serious and minor accidents. In 1997, a study by (HSE, 
1997a) eventually confirmed and accepted the validity of the “pyramid” concept. According to 
this study, the pyramid effect and its use in preventive design strategies are still being debated. 
Injuries caused by accidents lead to fatalities only when a number of contributing factors co exist 
simultaneously. Fatal accidents are just the tip of the iceberg, depending on the type of job, some 
500-2,000 smaller injuries take place for each fatality (Takala, 2006). 
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It is a commonly agreed that there is little, if any, correlation between the occurrence of personal 
accidents and process accidents (Hale, 2001). The Texas City disaster has highlighted, yet again, 
how striving for a reduction in personal safety performance can completely miss all the 
requirements necessary to ensure process integrity. The lessons from Longford appeared not to 
have been learned. There has been the long-standing belief that the underlying causes of both 
personal and process safety problems are the same, but the hazards, and the defenses appropriate 
to manage them, differ considerably (Hale, 2003), so it is not surprising that the correlations will 
be low. Nevertheless, current evidence (Hudson, 2009) suggests that there is a level of 
commonality, but that it is at an abstract level, namely whether the organisation takes safety 
seriously or not. By this, it is probably only at the level of the organisational culture that there is a 
degree of common cause that can be identified (HSE, 1997b). 
The culture of Texas City, one that accepted non-compliance at many levels, is one that underlies 
both personal and process incidents. The lack of correlation may be due to a concentration on the 
immediate causes and an inappropriate level of granularity. Another problem is that major 
process safety incidents are quite rare, while personal safety outcomes are more common. Even 
fatal accidents, typically due to transport or construction activities in high-hazard industries like 
oil and gas, are much more frequent than major process incidents that may, or may not, have 
personal consequences. There are a number of reasons for this, primarily due to the different 
types of hazards and the depth of defense provided (Hudson, 2009). With some of the personal 
safety hazards, defenses might be both minimal and primarily reliant upon the actions of the 
individual. Even if the failure rates of individual defenses are approximately the same for 
personal and process hazards, the occurrence of extreme outcomes will always be less frequent 
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when there are more barriers and they are independent. With many personal safety hazards there 
are fewer barriers and they are often dependent upon the same individual (typically the victim). 
The net result of the differences between personal and process safety means that concentrating 
upon the superficial factors, such as the immediate causes, makes personal safety much more 
salient and easier to understand. It is also easier to demonstrate commitment when responding 
vigorously to a personal injury rather than waiting for a major process problem to arise. Part of 
the discussion about indicators represents an attempt to find appropriate levels of description that 
provide more similar frequencies or level of causal abstraction of indicator events or states. 
Therefore, it may select responses to such indicator events, preferably with corrective actions as 
well as uncovering failures that may be causally equivalent but due to the greater depth of 
defense, it may be less likely to have led to severe outcomes in the case of process safety events 
(Hudson, 2009). 
The 1960‟s witnessed the emergence of loss control prevention theories, precisely, loss 
prevention approach was developed in 1960 in the UK by the Institute of Chemical Engineers, 
which is long before the American Institute of Chemical Engineers initiated an annual series of 
symposia on “loss prevention” in 1967 (Lees, 1980). Following the Flixborough disaster in 1974, 
research efforts became more intensified as evident in the work of Frank Lees, in which loss 
prevention was clearly identified as an integral part of the management system and hazard 
quantification as part of the process of loss prevention which depends on the use of reliability 
engineering (Lees, 1980, Lees, 1996). This approach though developed in the process industry for 
the identification, assessment and control of hazards, its principles is applicable in other industrial 
activities. 
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In the 1970‟s, the use of “safety system” and “safety engineering system” in the industry became 
more popular through the work of such prominent researchers as Bertalanffy, (1971), Johnson, 
(1973, 1980), Brown, (1976), Hammer, (1972, 1980, 1989), Peterson, (1978, 1988) etc. Although 
most of the above mentioned works concentrated on the engineering aspect of the subject, 
however, Brown (1976) provided some justifications that some of the contemporary colleagues 
started transforming system concepts into reality. 
Since then most of the safety management techniques have been applied to “system engineering” 
aspects such as product safety in the design of manufacturing processes. During this period, 
Brown (1976) stated that safety engineers saddled with the management of safety were drawn 
from the ranks, operations research, industrial engineering and other disciplines. 
From the late 1970‟s and early 1980‟s most safety literature concentrated mainly on control of 
hazards and human behaviour using technology complimented by cost elements. Industry top 
managers devoted more attention to budget and compliance with legal and regulatory 
requirements.  
However, several major accidents such as Chernobyl, Piper Alpha etc revealed other possible 
causes than the traditional engineering failure and operation including human errors. The industry 
recognises the need to involve the entire structure dealing with safety matters. Accordingly, the 
dynamics of safety literature begin to involve top management in managing all safety matters as a 
measure of Health and Safety (H&S) compliance within any particular organisations. 
The accidents mentioned above, brought about increase social awareness and ethical concerns 
which possibly encouraged governments and policy makers to embrace a more proactive and 
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leading role in managing safety. In the UK, for instance, the first government action came in 
Robens report (1972), which recommended that safety management must be the responsibility of 
all stakeholders if successes are to be recorded in accident preventions. 
The report (Robens, 1972) recommended “voluntary efforts” principles which provided a 
foundation for the statutory Health and Safety at work act 1974, and eventually lead to the 
establishment of Health and Safety Executive (HSE). This recommendation though voluntary at 
the time but changed the way safety management is seen in continental Europe, following this 
was the adoption of some of its basic principles by the European Council which became 
operational in 1989 (Council, 1989). 
In 1971, in the USA, the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) became operative. These 
regulations placed “the responsibility for employers” safety, principally on employers (ISO 9000, 
2000). The regulations also emphasise the importance of occupational H&S management as 
against previous concepts whereby occupational safety was considered along side industrial 
safety. 
2.4 Safety Management Models 
Most of the existing safety management models have been developed based on quality 
management system in line with BS EN ISO 9000, (2000) and environmental management 
systems in accordance with BS EN ISO 14001, (1996). 
According to the HSE (1993) report, a proactive safety management must comprise of such key 
elements as hazard identification and assessment, established rules and procedures, training, and 
commitment to monitoring and mitigation of risks. This can only be achieved when properly 
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guided by clear policy goals and objectives as well as dedicated action plan, other key factors 
include effective communication mechanism, defined structure and, clear and specific 
responsibilities. 
In 1991, the United Kingdom developed its first formal and structural model of safety 
management system to guide organisational Health & Safety (H&S) in terms of achieving better 
improvement and implementation. This publication was further reviewed in 1997 (HSE-HSG 65) 
(HSE, 1997b) without any changes to the basic framework of the earlier edition. This UK HSE 
safety management model is in-line with the universal concepts comprising of the basic five key 
elements as illustrated in Figure 2.1. These key elements are briefly described as below. 
2.4.1 Policy 
The safety policy must be set up in a clear and formal way as to guarantee commitment and 
desire for continuous improvement. This policy must also give clear direction to reflect the 
organisational values and beliefs as well as demonstrate safety culture of the organisation. 
2.4.2 Organisation 
This involves definition of responsibilities and establishment of structures and processes to 
encourage the development of H&S in the organisation. Other key elements of organisation 
include effective communication and regular training of personnel for successful implementation 
of the policy. 
2.4.3 Implementation 
This is an integral part of planning dealing with prevention through the process of risks analysis 
and mitigation. Risk analysis covers hazard identification and assessments while risk mitigation 
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is dedicated to control measures such as reduction or minimisation or elimination of hazard 
and/or its possible effects (consequences). 
Implementation of safety policy must cover the entire organisation including but not limited to 
personnel, products, services, and environment etc. 
 
Fig. 2.1 Structure of Safety Management System 
2.4.4 Measurement 
Performance measurement is one of the most important means of assessing how the system is 
being managed and/or maintained as well as risks being controlled. The H&S established 
qualitative and quantitative indicators which when combined with benchmarking of 
organisational objectives and goals would provide necessary information regarding systems 
strength and weaknesses. This information is necessary in order to ensure that the management is 













Safety Management System 
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as a means of generating feedback on system‟s performance prior to the occurrence of any 
possible accident, incident, or ill health. Reactive monitoring is also deployed in order to monitor 
through analysis of accidents and other areas where H&S performances are found to be deficient. 
2.4.5 Review 
Reviewing the performance of the system is conducted through a comprehensive auditing 
process. This is a structured and systematic process of gathering independently verifiable 
information on the efficiency, effectiveness, and reliability of the entire system. The information 
gathered here would be used in providing the necessary means for mitigation based on the 
reviewed performances of all the components. The outcome of auditing process is applied to 
guarantee the establishment of i) appropriate management response, ii) adequate risk control 
provisions, and iii) appropriate precautionary measures. 
2.4.6 Discussions 
The HSE model described above has been adopted by most organisations in the UK as guidance 
to produce H&S management in line with the standard for best practice. However, despite the 
level of acceptance, the model has been criticised for lacking leadership, failure to inspire and 
non provision for rewards and sanctions. These limitations have been linked to failure by many 
organisations to effectively implement the system. It has also been contemplated that, there is a 
possibility that further inclusion of these factors may complicate the model and make its 
interpretation more difficult. In consideration of the above, therefore, the work addresses these 
aspects by developing a more efficient and effective safety management system and risk 
assessment modelling for offshore platform design process in subsequent sections. 
A. A. UMAR      Ph. D     2010 
 
24 
2.5 Implementation of Safety in Design 
Both the feasibility and conceptual design studies are conducted at the initial design stage of an 
engineering product. The purpose of the study in the feasibility design stage is to evaluate 
whether or not further development of an engineering product is technically feasible and 
commercially viable. The safety evaluation at the feasibility design stage usually plays a 
relatively subordinate role in determining whether to develop a product or not. Therefore, the risk 
estimation at this stage will be targeted at comparing different factors with respect to safety. The 
resultant outputs at this stage are expressed in the form of ranking of the alternatives rather than 
estimation of definite risk levels. As a result of this, in the feasibility phase, risk analysis is 
carried out to compare and/or rank alternative solutions. In addition, it will also be used to 
identify areas of uncertainty where detailed studies may need to be conducted later. The objective 
of risk analysis in the conceptual design stage of an engineering product is to provide safety-
related input in the process of developing and selection of an acceptable product. The conceptual 
design must satisfy the operator and/or customer, as well as company's safety and economic 
concerns in order to demonstrate compliance with the governing regulations (An & Wright, 
2001). 
It is important to note that, due to high level of uncertainties that may be associated with the 
information and factors used in the decision making process, there may be the need to apply 
common sense and ensure that all issues are identified and effectively addressed. At the initial 
design stages, incomplete data and high level of uncertainty may not allow traditional methods to 
be effectively and efficiently applied to model cost and, safety for making design decisions 
and/or selecting the most desirable options. Thus necessitate the need at this stage to apply such 
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techniques as approximate reasoning approach which may be more appropriate. This approximate 
reasoning approach usually involves the use of fuzzy sets and can be referred to as fuzzy 
reasoning approach (FRA). Some modifications have been incorporated with approximate 
reasoning for more effective and efficient safety modeling and decision making (An & Wright, 
2001). 
The fuzzy reasoning approach can be employed to produce design rules which can be used to 
build up a design support system. This safety-based design support system incorporating the 
approximate reasoning approach may have the following advantages (An & Wright, 2001); 
 It allows the analyst to evaluate the risk associated with item failure mode directly using 
the linguistic terms with confidence. 
 It enables the processing ambiguous, qualitative, or imprecise information, as well as 
quantitative data in an integrated manner. 
The design process proceeds further after the selection of the best design option. The more the 
information becomes available the more detailed the safety analysis will be possible. Safety 
analysis and decision making may need to be carried out at the next level. At this stage, it may be 
the case that only part of the information is complete for safety modeling while the remainder is 
still incomplete. This creates problems involving the study of both complete and incomplete data 
for safety based decision making. This may necessitate the need to develop new technique to 
model both complete and incomplete data. 
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As the design proceeds further, for example, to the detail design stage, it first get to  a stage 
where sufficient information is generated for carrying out design optimisation based on safety 
assessment. At this stage, safety may be assessed using various safety assessment techniques in 
terms of likelihood of occurrence and magnitude of consequences. A mathematical model 
consisting of safety, cost and reliability objectives can be developed and then formal decision 
making techniques can be used to process the model in order to optimise the design (Bazovesky, 
1961). 
2.6 Review on the development of Risk Assessment Methods 
The concepts of safety and reliability were first introduced in aeronautical industry following the 
development of air transportation in the 1930s. Within this period the aircraft engineers were 
made conduct careful studies of the statistical data on failure rates of aircraft components with the 
aim of achieving improvement in their design and accidents prevention. This effort soon open the 
way for a number of courses and books on safety and reliability analysis, as well as related 
statistical techniques (Bazovesky, 1961). 
The above development resulted in increasing the popularity level of the probabilistic safety and 
reliability analysis methods and eventual emergence of safety and reliability as a branch of 
engineering in the US where safety issues were accorded high priority in the 1950s, particularly 
in the aeronautical and nuclear industries. Also in focus within the period were the needs to study 
the impact of human error on these systems and how to prevent them. The first-ever analysis of 
component failures and their effects on system performance and on the safety of humans and 
property was performed (An & Wright, 2001). 
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During the same period another milestone achievement by Watson led to the development of the 
fault tree concept for assessing the reliability of a system designed to control the Minuteman 
missile launch (An & Wright, 2001). As mentioned earlier this concept was further refined by 
Boeing Co leading to its extensive application till date. In efforts to further complement this 
technique, failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) was also developed in the early 
1960s (Wang & Ruxton, 1998). 
Further efforts were also intensified following a series of missile accidents and the growing 
public concerns regarding safety. Accordingly, the U.S. Air Force conducted several safety 
studies in order to ensure the adoption of system safety analysis in the aeronautics and nuclear 
industries. As a result safety awareness soon attained essential status especially to the developers 
in hi-tech industries as such classification of potential accidents, in terms of frequencies of 
occurrence and consequences were considered in the design process on a 'right-first-time' basis. It 
also became clear that integrated studies were needed to detect and reduce potential hazards of 
large engineering products. Consequently, several standards regulating safety and reliability were 
developed and these efforts were similarly adopted in the UK (An & Wright, 2001). 
In the mid 1960s, fuzzy sets theory was developed precisely in 1965 through the works of Lofti 
Zadeh who conceived many of its applications initially in the area of industrial controllers 
(Dubois & Prade, 1991; Bandermer & Gottwald, 1995; Klir & Yuan, 1996). From this period 
onwards fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic witnessed a steady growth, it soon became a useful tool for 
application in other fields such as engineering, operational research, mathematics and most 
prominently in computer science (Sinha & Gupta, 2000). Zadeh (1992) stated that one of the 
basic aims of fuzzy logic is to provide a computational framework for knowledge representation 
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and inference in an environment of uncertainty and imprecision. Since then fuzzy logic 
application continue to receive wider applications in the area of risk assessment due to its ability 
to effectively process information with some level of uncertainties. Fuzzy sets application in risk 
assessments are found in various works such as (Kosmowoski & Kwesielewicz, 2000; Richei et 
al, 2001; Sii et al 2001; Wang, 2000,). 
In the 1970s, several innovations were adopted in order to advance industrial safety prediction 
methods. For example, in the nuclear power industries, accident scenarios were considered. 
These scenarios covered system failures and operator error during tests, maintenance, operations 
and reactor control. Following this development several new methods were developed including 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA). In addition, from the aeronautic industry emerged a Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) method which soon gained popularity and was adopted by other hi-tech 
industries. The Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) methods were also developed for the 
evaluation of the performance and system maintenance (An & Wright, 2001). 
Following special interest in safety management in the US, the then President Carter appointed a 
commission to advise on safety management which came up with some strong recommendations 
including the need for the application of PRA methods in the design of large, expensive 
engineering products. The committee also recommended that reliability data and human error 
must be considered when assessing the safety of such projects. Since then the oil & gas, 
chemical, railway and auto industries have widely adopted reliability and safety assessment 
techniques. Accordingly, applications of these techniques were discovered to cut across a range 
of activities and systems with different technological structures. Probabilistic reliability, 
availability and safety criteria were increasingly used-sometimes as self-imposed design goals. 
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Overall, safety criteria began to play a key role in the product design process (Cross, 1994; 
Villemeur, 1992). 
In the 1980s, reliability, availability, maintainability and safety assessment techniques became 
widely adopted during the period, in efforts to control and manage major industrial hazards. This 
produced a distinct engineering discipline safety like others used in engineering design and 
involves concepts, measurable quantities and mathematical tools as well as methods for 
measuring and predicting these quantities (Villemeur, 1992). As designers began to rely more 
heavily on computers, greater numbers of analysis techniques (i.e. ETA and FTA) were 
incorporated into different codes of practice. Expert systems were also widely applied in 
combination with computerised assessment tools (An & Wright, 2001). 
Following the growing technical complexities of large engineering products and the public 
concern regarding their safety resulted in generating great interest in the development and 
application of safety assessment procedures. It is evident that the above mentioned development, 
encouraged application of safety and reliability analysis in engineering product design in modern 
industry. 
Also in the 1980‟s, Bayesian network was introduced, this method also deals with the 
mathematical modelling of expert opinions. Bayesian models have been applied in safety analysis 
for the assessment of rare events, such as catastrophic occurrence in complex technical systems 
(Coolen, 1996; Guerin et al, 2003; Aven & Porn, 1998). This technique is used to process 
experts‟ data to conduct a quantitative risk analysis (QRA) of rare events despite difficulties or 
lack of adequate failure information needed to compute relative frequencies. 
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In 1990‟s, the safety analysis advancements resulted in the inclusion of many more factors such 
as socio-technical and further studies towards the development of new mathematical models. The 
challenges at this time include the need to deal with uncertainties associated with the risk 
information which mathematical modelling can handle with great efficiency. Most of the 
mathematical based models developed within the period comprised of both the probabilistic and 
non-probabilistic (Garrick & Christie, 2002). 
Some of the traditional risk assessment methods mentioned in this section will be further 
discussed in the following section. 
2.7  A Review of some Traditional Risk Assessment Methods 
However, for the purpose of having better understanding, and given the relevance of the topic, 
some traditional risk assessment methods are reviewed and summarised. 
2.7.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
The method was originally used by the US Army in the early 1960‟s, for the safety analysis of 
missiles and this use has since been extended to other fields. Following identification of hazards, 
its potential causes and consequences then possible preventive or corrective actions are listed. 
This method can be described as inductive and qualitative technique, and is formatted in a 
tabulated form (Ericson, 2005). 
Advantages: - Simple to use, fairly broad in scope and allows identification of hazards at an early 
stage. It can help the team of analysts to develop operating guidelines for application throughout 
the system‟s life cycle. 
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Drawbacks: - Preliminary studies need to be complemented by other studies to achieve the 
desired result. It is usually a precursor of other hazard analysis studies. 
Related development: - PHA was further developed to include the rough estimates of the 
occurrence probability which is referred to as Preliminary Hazard & Risk Analysis (PHRA). 
2.7.2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
FMEA was first used in 1960‟s in the aeronautical field for the analysis of aircraft safety. Its use 
was initially restricted to aeronautics, aerospace, and nuclear engineering. The uses were later 
extended to the chemical industry and other industrial sectors (Ericson, 2005). 
The procedures applied in this method include assessment of effects of each potential failure 
mode of the components of a system on the various functions of the system, and identification of 
potential failure modes impacting on the availability, reliability, maintainability, and safety of the 
system. Its approach is inductive or qualitative and is formatted in tabulated form and 
accompanied with recommendations (Ericson, 2005). 
Advantages: - FMEA is a very specific and useful tool for assessing hardware failures to ensure 
that all conceivable failure modes have been identified right from the design stage. It encourages 
planning of maintenance procedures corresponding to each failure mode. It has the ability to 
integrate reliability and safety requirement holistically. 
Drawbacks: - The method is time consuming and difficult to apply in a very complex system. 
Generally it identifies only single failure event and must therefore, be complemented by the study 
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of failure combinations resulting in undesirable events. The approach does not cover human and 
organisational aspects of failure effectively. 
Related development: - FMEA was further extended to develop Failure Modes and Effects 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA), which considers the probability of each potential failure mode and 
the criticality level of its effects or consequences. Criticality is determined by the “probability-
severity” pair, even though FMECA allows for qualitative ranking. In recent work in 2002, 
efforts were made to integrate fuzzy logic with FMEA analysis for reducing variability and/or 
uncertainty of different expert‟s opinions in the assessment process (Xu et al, 2002). 
2.7.3 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
This method was developed in the early 1960‟s by the Bell laboratories and refined by the Boeing 
Company for safety risk assessments (predictive and quantitative analysis). However, the 
technique has also been frequently used for accident analysis, as it identifies the interrelationships 
between causes and their logic. It is a typical tool for system engineering, designed for safety and 
reliability applications. It is only a method not a theory about causes of accident which has 
increasingly been used in several industrial sectors since 1965, particularly the high-tech industry 
such as nuclear, chemical process and, offshore oil and gas (Suresh et al 1996; Vario, 2002). 
The FTA lists all components of a system that are represented in a logical diagram showing the 
way their failures interact and result in an unwanted or undesirable event (top event). This 
technique uses deductive approach starting with top event like accident or incident. The main aim 
at this stage is to identify causes or initiating events and their logic combinations using 
“AND”/“OR” symbols of Boolean algebra (Wang & Ruxton, 1997). 
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The FTA is a deductive method used for qualitative analysis of causes and also quantitative 
probabilistic assessment (QRA). Its format is a logic diagram of a “top-down” tree structure 
(Ericson, 2005). 
Advantages; The fault tree may help to order the complex information about an accident that has 
happened. The method is most suitable for technical (engineering) systems, although it allows the 
inclusion of human errors or organisational factors as basic or initiating events. Its uses can be 
classified as simple or complex depending on the system being analysed. However, this is 
considered as one of the best-known methods employed in safety analysis, particularly for QRA. 
Drawbacks; The method can be costly and more time consuming, even when conducted with the 
aid of computer. A fault tree is not a model for all likely to occur in a system, it is rather a model 
of the interaction logic between events leading to the top event. The construction of the tree 
depends on the analyst‟s skills and ability to conduct the reliable analysis, as the analyst can miss 
some causes (Suresh et al, 1996). These weaknesses form major impediment against the 
application of this method in the current studies. 
2.7.4 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
This method is also referred to as “consequence tree”; it was first applied in 1972 to assess risks 
associated with nuclear power plant in the USA (Villemeur, 1992). It has since then, been widely 
applied particularly in the framework of probabilistic risk assessment in nuclear power plants. 
The basic principle applied in this method is to allow the study of potential “accident sequence” 
and the quantitative (probabilistic) assessment of each possible sequence; it works in the opposite 
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way to FTA. The analysis starts by considering an “initiating event” and then with other events 
relative to the elementary systems, to construct the so-called consequence trees (Ericson, 2005). 
The approach is generally inductive and used for quantitative analysis of consequences and also 
quantitative (probabilistic) risk assessment. 
Advantages: - Its uses can be simple or complex depending on the system under analysis. It helps 
in the identification of control measures for reducing the harmful consequences of critical 
initiating events. Well suited for analysing events which can have several different outcomes. 
Drawbacks: - The method does not describe the causes of the “intermediate events” in a clear 
manner. It can easily grow very large, and the analyst may never be sure whether all potential 
accident sequences have been identified. The construction of the tree depends on the analyst‟s 
skills and ability to conduct the analysis, as the analyst will require training (Villemeur, 1992). 
These weaknesses create major limitations for the application of this method in the current 
studies. 
2.7.5 Hazard Operability Studies (HAZOP) 
This approach was developed in ICI Petrochemical Division in 1963 in the UK. The first 
published paper on HAZOP was from Herbert G. Lawley, in 1974 (IChemE, 2002). This 
approach is generally considered to be “process industry” oriented mostly used in the chemical, 
pharmaceutical and food industry. It uses simple guided words such as No/Not/None, More, Less, 
Reverse etc to enable analyst find the deviation from the normality. It is also inductive and 
qualitative, and is presented in tabulated form. 
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Advantages: - It is a very useful method in identifying high hazards requiring further analysis 
and/or quantification, especially in the process industry. It can detect weaknesses early in the 
design stage. 
Drawbacks: -It is expensive and would require a large team of analysts to explore as well as time 
consuming. It is a complicated process of analysis and therefore may result in some hazards to be 
missed.  
Though this method is widely used in the oil and gas industry but the combination of the 
weaknesses mentioned above and its reliance on expert assessment based on historical data 
without due regard for improvement in safety is considered  to have a conservative approach 
towards consequence. Thus the need for the introduction of method based on fuzzy logic 
approach which has the ability to deal with combination of information. 
2.7.6 Fuzzy Logic Approach 
Fuzzy logic can be described as a type of mathematical logic in which truth value is assumed to 
belong to a continuum of values range between 0 and 1. Fuzzy logic can also be considered as a 
form of multi-valued logic derived from fuzzy set theory applied to deal with reasoning referred 
to as fuzzy reasoning approach that is approximate rather than precise. Fuzzy reasoning approach 
has the ability to operate like human mind by effectively employing modes of reasoning that are 
approximate rather than exact. This enables the specification of mapping rules in linguistic rather 
than numeric terms, and approximate reasoning rather than precise. In other words, fuzzy 
reasoning approach relies on fuzzy sets to define fuzzy operators and can be applied in situation 
where the appropriate fuzzy operator is uncertain thus necessitating the use of if–then rule, or 
constructions that are equivalent, such as fuzzy associative matrices. These rules are constructed 
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to express or transform human knowledge to knowledge based or rule-based (An et al, 2007). 
One of the most important attributes of fuzzy reasoning theory is the provision of a systematic 
procedure for transforming human knowledge into a non-liner mapping. A fuzzy if–then rule is 
usually expressed in form of some words which are characterised by continuous membership 
functions (MFs) for example “if variable is property then action”.  
However, like any other method fuzzy logic reasoning approach has its advantages and 
disadvantages as listed in the following sections. 
Advantages of fuzzy reasoning 
 It has the ability to integrate expert knowledge, engineering judgement, historical data and 
other risk analysis information to handle the safety and risk assessment in a more 
consistent manner; 
 It can make use of ambiguous, imprecise, incomplete and uncertainty information in the 
assessment; 
 The risk can simply be evaluated using the linguistic expressions which are employed in 
conducting risk assessment; 
 It offers a more flexible structure for combining failure occurrence and consequence. 
Disadvantages of fuzzy reasoning 
 Possible human error arising from actions of risk analysts will affect the results 
 Possible subjectivity in deciding boundaries by the expert‟s.  
 Possible uncertainties and the dispersions during de-fuzzification 
This method draws it major strength in its ability to reduce level of uncertainty in the data to a 
certain degree however, further improvements may be required to ensure more acceptable results. 
Such improvement in this work include introduction of an additional parameter on consequence 
probability to factor-in improvement in safety to ensure achievement of more refined results to 
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encourage decision making. In addition to the above innovation, the author will integrate fuzzy 
reasoning approach with the concept of design for safety to further ensure more acceptable results 
are achieved. 
The concepts of safety and the evolution of safety thinking over the past decades are reviewed in 
the previous sections leading to the specifics of the concept of “design for safety” which will be 
the main focus of discussion in the subsequent sections. 
2.8 Design for Safety 
"Design for safety" is a process of identifying hazards, estimating the associated risks before 
finally classifying them in two basic parameters of occurrence probability of each hazard and the 
magnitude of their possible consequences to enable design review and mitigation (An & Wright, 
2001). For example, in the UK, the concept of "design for safety" was first introduced in 
aerospace, nuclear, chemical process, marine, offshore, railway and other industries for many 
years. It is important to note the focus at this stage is the selection of the most effective design 
option within reasonable time to avoid the effect of late decisions which often jeopardise the 
balance of the whole project. 
"Design for safety" supports the decisions making at the early design as a way of achieving a 
more significant impact on the performance of an engineering product compared to the decisions 
made at later stages in its lifecyc1e. In the UK for example, industries are made to comply with 
several safety case regulations which became effective in recent years such as Offshore 
Installations (Safety Case) Regulations and Railways (Safety Case) Regulations. 
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An & Wright, (2001) stated that when an engineering product is designed, the design for safety 
process is applied to identify all possible failure conditions, assess how frequently they may 
occur and determine how serious their consequences may be. For example, for an infrastructure 
or a railway vehicle or more specifically an offshore platform, the following risk factors need to 
be taken into account in design process. These include blowout, fire, explosion, falling objects, 
ship and helicopter collisions, earthquakes, extreme weather conditions, loss of stability, and/or 
relevant combinations of these accidents etc. 
Design for safety, via the full quantification of hazard consequences and probabilities, can 
provide statistics that describe risks. When risks (qualified or quantified) are judged to be 
unacceptable with respect to corresponding criteria, the design may need to be modified. Cost 
benefit analysis may also be applied to produce a design with optimal safety. Therefore, a design 
for safety framework is expected to be developed to allow various safety assessment tools to be 
applied individually and/or in combination so that as the design process advances and the 
available information increases in detail, safety assessment can move from an assessment 
function to a decision making function and finally to a verification function, ensuring that the 
final design meets defined levels of safety (Ruxton & Wang, 1992). Design for safety constitutes 
five phases namely problem definition, risk identification, risk estimation, risk evaluation and 
design review. 
It is obvious that, “design for safety” may be required when designing an engineering system 
such as offshore platform in order to identify all possible failure conditions, assess the frequency 
of their occurrence and analyse their possible consequences as well as determine or estimate the 
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level of impact. This can be achieved through the application of various safety analysis 
techniques in the design process. 
Usually, expert opinion or judgement is used to assess the probability of occurrence of a system 
failure event. This is a matter of judgement, normally based on the experience gained through 
operating similar system. However, due to sometime subjective nature of this type of judgement, 
fuzzy reasoning approach (FRA) and/or other quantitative techniques may be deployed to 
effectively deal with the associated uncertainties (An, 2003a). 
Consequence analysis varies with the value attached to human life or loss of any nature. The 
magnitude of failure consequence has over the years been produced using a combination of 
experience and computational methods. However, the need to explore more analysis techniques 
will continue as a way of responding to the emerging technological advancements. 
Quantification of consequences and probabilities of hazards through the process of “design for 
safety” will provide figures which best describe the risk level. These figures are used to 
determine whether the risk level is acceptable or not. The level of risk determined either through 
qualification or quantification techniques when estimated to be unacceptable relative to the 
corresponding criteria, the design procedure may have to be modified. This modification can be 
achieved by the provision of a set of protection system such as alarm or other complimentary 
element or even use of more reliable components, needed to reduce risks through design process 
(Wang & Ruxton, 1998). 
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Risk reduction can be achieved by lowering the frequencies of unacceptable system failure events 
and/or magnitude of their consequences to an acceptable level. Analysis of cost of providing 
safety may also be conducted with a view to determining whether or not the cost is within budget. 
The constraints associated with the “design for safety” process need to be highlighted in order to 
achieve the desired integration. The constraints or difficulties associated with “design for safety” 
include the problems of getting sufficient data, effect of multiple factors or processes, 
complicated decision-making process etc (An, 2003a; Wang & Ruxton, 1997). Details will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
2.8.1 "Design for Safety" in Offshore Industry 
In the offshore sector, some of the major accidents generated a lot of interests leading to more 
intensive efforts in the area of development of more effective safety and reliability management 
methods. The public inquiries arising from the North Sea accidents at Ekofisk Bravo, Alexander 
Kielland, West Vanguard, and Piper Alpha became the rallying points focused on safety and 
reliability issues, thus necessitating tremendous efforts in areas of research projects to improve 
the safety and reliability of offshore systems. 
Following the publication of public inquiry report on Piper Alpha in 1990 (Cullen, 1990) in the 
UK, the responsibilities for offshore safety regulations were transferred from the Department of 
Energy to the Health & Safety Commission (HSC) acting through the Health & Safety Executive 
(HSE) as the single regulatory body for offshore safety. Thereafter several new regulations were 
also issued by the UK HSE such as Safety Case Regulations 1992, PFEER 1995, MAR 1995 and 
DCR 1996 (HSE, 1992). The main feature of the new offshore safety regulations in the UK is the 
absence of a prescriptive regime and defining specific duties of the operator and definition of 
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what “adequate means” in reference to safety. The regulations set forth a high level of safety 
objectives while leaving the selection of particular arrangements to deal with hazards in the hands 
of the operator. This is in recognition of the peculiarities of hazards related to offshore product 
based on specific functions and site conditions. The new safety case regulations require 
operational safety cases to be prepared for all offshore installations. Additionally all new 
installations require a design safety case. 
In a related development, UKOOA with the assistance from the UK HSE produced "The 
industrial guidelines on a framework for risk related decision support" for UK offshore oil and 
gas industry (UKOOA, 1999). An & Wright, (2001) mentioned that these guidelines provide way 
for assessing the relative importance of various codes and standards, good practice, engineering 
judgement, risk analysis, cost benefit analysis, company values and societal values when making 
decisions to develop an offshore project. 
In general, the framework could be usefully applied into wide range of situations. The aim at this 
stage is to support major decisions made during the design, operation and decommissioning of 
offshore installations based on safety assessments. This in particular provides a sound basis for 
evaluating various options that need to be considered at the feasibility and concept selection 
stages of a project, especially with respect to "major accidental hazards" such as fire, explosion, 
impact and loss of stability. 
2.9 Safety Case 
The regulation requires that a safety case should be accompanied with sufficient particulars to 
demonstrate that hazards with potential to cause major accidents have been identified, risks 
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properly evaluated and measures have been taken to reduce them to As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable (ALARP). In addition it should also demonstrate that safety analysis and cost-benefit 
analysis methods have been deployed in order to adequately control safety. This further 
demonstrates that the safety case requirements fall within the concept of design for safety. 
This new concept of Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations allows operators and/or 
duty holders to have more flexibility in tackling the offshore safety problems. Offshore duty 
holders may use various safety assessment approaches and safety-based decision-making tools to 
examine all safety-critical elements of offshore installations, wells, infrastructures, operations 
management and maintenance to optimise safety. This may encourage offshore analysts to 
develop and employ novel safety assessment and decision-making approaches to deal with 
offshore safety challenges. 
2.10 Summary 
In this Chapter the concept of design for safety is described, its attributes and processes also 
enumerated. This concept has its support from the various accidents and incident reports notable 
among them is the Lord Cullen (1990) which recommended its adoption for offshore facilities 
development. The Chapter also enumerated difficulties negating the application of design for 
safety. 
One of the most notable issues raised in this Chapter is the need to integrate the principles of 
fuzzy reasoning approach within the concept of design for safety in order to have holistic 
approach to deal with the uncertainties in the risk information for the assessment of offshore 
platform associated risks. 
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This Chapter further reviewed the concepts of safety and the evolution of safety thinking over the 
past decades. This review revealed that at the beginning, safety literature and practice 
concentrated on technological failures and operator errors. In the late 1970‟s and 1980‟s, safety 
management began to focus on other areas than just engineering system to more comprehensive 
complex concepts. This development recognised the need for the involvement of top management 
in order to achieve any meaningful success. This modest progress facilitates the development of 
modern safety theories. 
HSE (UK), standard safety management system model has been presented and discussed, and the 
philosophy and principles of Health & Safety (H&S) provision have also been explored. 
Also discussed in this Chapter are some historical perspectives of safety analysis approaches 
which have been outlined ranging from earlier tools for identifying hazards and technical risks, to 
modern tools for assessing failures. Some of the most popular methods used for identifying 
hazards and assessing risks associated with technical systems have also been reviewed. The 
review shows that each method has its own advantages and limitations suggesting the desirability 
of using some combination in certain situations in order to achieve the desired result. Most of 
these theories and methods were initially developed to deal with high-tech industry risk but only 
a few can be applied effectively in complex design processes with high level of uncertainty such 
as the offshore installations. 
PHA would be used at the preliminary stages to generate lists of hazards and provide basis for 
achieving rough estimation of failure occurrence probability. This effort will provide input 
required for further analyses using FTA and FMEA combined to determine the various 
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interactions leading to top event, their effects, and criticality levels to guarantee successful 
integration with other compatible methods. 
The chapter also discussed, “design for safety” methodology with the overall objective aimed at 
achieving safety improvement through the design of offshore platform using appropriate 
technology and available finances. 
The process would be deployed to generate information regarding identification of failure events 
to be applied through modelling procedure with a view to achieving proper integration with other 
methods possibly to deal with uncertainties such as fuzzy reasoning approach based method. In 
this study the author highlighted intention to introduce a third input parameter referred to target 
consequence probability to the existing two parameters to further reduce the weaknesses of the 
fuzzy reasoning approach and reinforce its strength to achieve a more refined result. 
Furthermore, the author applied weight factor to deal with expert judgements where there exist 
uncertainty in the risk date and to avoid the dispersions. 
In conclusion detailed process of design for safety is further enumerated in subsequent Chapters 
to demonstrate how the integration will be achieved in order to develop a risk assessment model 
for offshore platform design with the ability to effectively deal with associated uncertainties in 
risk information. 






This Chapter gives detailed highlights on the methodology for this study as enumerated in Figure 
3.1 which shows the various steps adopted for the conducting this research work. 
Chapters 1 & 2 discussed the basis for further work on safety of offshore platforms through the 
literature review. This Chapter presents how the research is conducted in details. These details 
have been structured from the definition of research aim and objectives to data collection and 
analyses leading up to the development of a proposed risk assessment model. This model will 
then go through testing procedure before application in a case study using data collected from the 
industry in order to validate its efficiency based on the results obtained. 
3.2 Research Methodology 
An offshore platform design for safety model to be developed will enable the application of the 
existing safety assessment techniques, intended to encourage smooth progression from a 
qualitative method to a quantitative method, and from an assessment function to decision making 
function, before ultimately moving to verification function (Ruxton, 1992). 
As stated earlier the research methodology framework as shown in Figure 3.1 is used to elaborate 
step by step details of processes of this research project, which is described in the subsequent 
sections. 
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Fig. 3.1 Research Methodology Framework 
3.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
3.3.1 Research Aim 
The aim of this research is to develop a “design for safety” based assessment technique for the 
design of offshore platforms in order to facilitate decision making. 
3.3.2 Research Objectives 
The objectives of this research are outlined to ensure the achievement of the above stated aim 
through the various steps summarised as follows: 
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1. To examine the risks, their possible causes and impacts on offshore platforms through 
design process. 
2. To study some of the traditional safety assessment methods with a view to identifying 
areas that still need to be addressed. 
3. To develop a new safety assessment model to effectively deal with the gaps identified in 
objective 2. 
4. To verify the performance of the proposed safety assessment model in a case study using 
real industry data. 
5. To recommend safety improvements for the industry and suggest future works based on 
performance of the model and results obtained  
The above highlighted steps are further discussed in section 3.5 which elaborates on how each of 
the five objectives is met in relation to the overall thesis structure. 
3.4 Literature Review 
This is a continuous process through most part of this work as a means of ensuring no 
information is left out. This review is conducted to help establish basis for the research especially 
in identifying the areas where gap exist as well as in making informed decision about the most 
suitable modelling processes to be developed for processing data in order to facilitate the 
achievement of the objectives. 
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As stated in Chapter 1, the complex nature of offshore platform is associated with high level risk 
arising from continuous expansion and increased level of innovations as may be necessitated by 
the dynamic nature of the industry. 
Several literatures have been written about the safety need in this area but yet risk mitigation 
efforts are met with increasing challenges. Lois et al, in his work of 2004 stated that the 
magnitude of the offshore safety problems requires continuous efforts with a view to eliminating 
or reducing hazards. The task of safety analysis in this context will mainly concentrate on the 
prevention and/or mitigation or control of risks through the entire life of the project. 
According to Raftery, (1993), the consensus of opinion among the experts on risk is unanimous 
in accepting the inadequacy of software only solutions to the risk management problem as 
currently being pursued. 
Wang et al, (1995) described the risk associated with marine systems as a measure of exposure to 
the possibility of economic or financial loss or gain, physical damage or injury or delay as a 
consequence of the uncertainty associated with the pursuance of a particular course of action. 
In considering this topic, a combination of several factors such as the importance of the subject of 
safety management for an offshore platform and its overall importance in the oil and gas industry, 
as well as the applicability of the proposed research works to enhance safety in the field provided 
the basis for the topic: “Design for Safety framework ofor Offshore Oil and Gas Platforms”. 
Based on the review conducted so far, it is evident that most efforts made previously are still 
grappling with the issue of uncertainties associated with data on most marine systems such as 
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offshore platform. In this study therefore, risk assessment model to be proposed will specifically 
target areas that will effectively deal with such uncertainties to enable informed decision-making 
based on cost-benefit evaluation. 
3.5 Objectives 
As earlier introduced in section 3.3 this section will further elaborate how each of these 
objectives is achieved in the current work. 
3.5.1 Objective 1 
Literature review on the development of a typical offshore project in general and offshore 
platform in particular. This works are discussed in Chapters 1 & 2. 
3.5.2 Objective 2 
Chapter 2 reviews the traditional safety analysis methods which are discussed band their merits 
and demerits highlighted. Accordingly, what is observed to be common with them all is their 
inability to effectively deal with uncertainties associated with risk data especially in systems of 
complex configuration like an offshore platform. 
3.5.3 Objective 3 
The foundation for the development of a new offshore platform safety assessment model is 
established in Chapters 4, 5 & 6 briefly discussed as follows; 
Chapter 4 presents safe design approach and Chapter 5, deals with offshore platform safety 
framework, its development as well as introduction of a modified design for safety methodology 
for offshore platforms. This modification is intended for the achievement of proper integration 
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with fuzzy reasoning approach (FRA) which is considered very reliable in dealing with 
uncertainties. Details of this are discussed in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 is used to explain the concluding steps leading to the development of a knowledge-
based risk assessment model (KBRAM). KBRAM is a composite model developed through the 
integration of concept of design for safety with the principles of fuzzy reasoning approach in 
order to improve the treatment of data uncertainties as this undoubtedly is a major gap that still 
exists in risk assessment efforts for offshore platform. 
3.5.4 Objective 4 
Chapter 7 demonstrates how the real data is used to verify the performance of KBRAM. This has 
been achieved through comparative analysis of the results from two fuzzy reasoning approach 
(FRA)-based models (Traditional two-input parameter TPRAM and the proposed three-input 
parameters KBRAM) using the same industry data and procedure. 
The results obtained through the process above are used to reach some conclusions leading to 
recommendations and suggestions for further works as detailed in Chapter 8. 
3.5.5 Objective 5 
As mentioned in the previous section above, in Chapter 8, the results are used to recommend 
safety improvement in offshore platform design process and suggest areas for future works in 
order to facilitate decision-making. 
3.6 Development of Conceptual Model 
The information generated through the review of various methods of assessing risks for offshore 
projects will be used to establish solid basis for the development of suitable modelling technique 
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to allow for the effective and efficient analysis of data. It is obvious that, analysis is very critical 
for the assessment of risk information related to offshore platform, especially its associated 
uncertainties which need to be adequately considered in the choice of processing techniques. 
Following the choice and development of the appropriate model there will then be the need for 
testing to ascertain its efficiency. 
3.7 Data Collection and Analysis 
3.7.1 Data collection 
At this stage the real data collected from the industry will be used to test the performance of the 
proposed model. This data include failure frequency information and expert responses to the 
interviews and questionnaires which together constitute the necessary input for gathering 
information required for test running the model and its preliminary validation studies with regard 
to offshore platform risk assessment. 
However, to accomplish this task the following requirements must first be satisfied, these are: 
 1. Search for existing records on the case studies via: 
 Internet sources, 
 Documents and publications, and 
 Design management reports. 
 2. Conduct industry survey through 
 Questionnaires, and 
 Interviews. 
3.7.2 Data analysis 
 Analysis of the data collected from industry has been conducted through the use of; 
 Statistical or historical analysis, 
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 Other relevant programmes, such as, AutoCAD, Excel etc, 
 Compare the results of the proposed model with the ones obtained using two 
parameters in order to validate the efficiency of the proposed model. 
3.8 Model Testing 
Testing of the developed model will make use of all the collected information to run through the 
procedures in order to generate results. These results will have two possible outcomes either 
satisfactory or not. If the outcome gives the desired result then the process will continue to the 
validation using real industry data or case study. However, if the outcome is not satisfactory then 
there may be the need for further verification of the adequacy of the data otherwise modification 
of the model may become necessary. 
3.9 Summary 
This chapter enumerated the tasks of accomplishing the process and procedures for the pursuance 
of the proposed studies dealing with the safety assessment for offshore oil and gas platforms. The 
Chapter also provided detailed discussion on the aim and objectives and how they have been 
interpreted in subsequent section of this work all through to the conclusion. 
The validation of the model through case study is conducted to ensure that results generated have 
satisfied the main aim of the research which will be summarised in conclusion report to put 
forward recommendations for mitigation and further identification of areas for further works. 




Safe Design Approach for Offshore Platform 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 described a “design for safety” of an engineering system as a systematic approach used 
to identify and control high risks at the early design stages in order to reduce or eliminate major 
hazards. In this chapter, the concept of an offshore platform is highlighted and their design 
process is reviewed in efforts to lay foundation for the proposed design for safety framework. 
However, due to the complex nature of offshore platform and its safety assessment, coupled with 
lack of clear cut guidance for “design for safety” criteria all together make it difficult to fully 
integrate “design for safety” methodology in the active design process to an acceptable level. In 
this regard it is important to note that despite the continuous efforts in safety provision, major 
accident still do occur thereby necessitating further efforts such as the adoption of principles of 
“design for safety” in the design offshore platform as a way of complimenting existing methods 
for the achievement of improved safety. 
Sequel to the above, a new “design for safety” based methodology is proposed in this work for 
offshore platform risk assessment. This proposed methodology comprises of various phases 
which are discussed with reference to their descriptions, objectives, and requirements. 
4.2 Safe Design Method for Offshore Platforms 
This section describes two major aspects of offshore platform safety requirement and engineering 
design methods which have substantial impact on design for safety in the offshore platform 
development projects. 
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4.2.1 Offshore Platform Safety 
As stated in Chapter 1, an offshore platform is a complex engineering system composed of input 
from various engineering disciplines. This system requires special consideration in the area of 
safety through design. It therefore becomes imperative to think of integrating safety through the 
design process at early stages. 
The identified inherent risks and the challenges posed to an offshore platform development 
project necessitate the need for continuous work in the areas of managing such risks. These risks 
have the potentials to cause injuries and/or loss of lives, degradation of the environment, and 
damage to the property or economic assets and will therefore require deployment of effective 
safety management approach (Khan & Amyotte, 2002). 
The safety management approach in this context is needed for the establishment of appropriate 
risk elimination or reduction measures from the design to the final installation stages. This 
approach requires detailed hazard identification and risk assessment of possible failures in the 
design process (Vinnem & Hope, 1998). 
The above could be achieved through the application of appropriate risk analysis techniques to 
enable integration of: 
 risk assessment process into practice, and 
 incorporation of safety procedures using design tools. 
The offshore platform project faces critical safety challenges as described in Chapter 1, section 
1.2. These critical risk challenges necessitate the need for continuous efforts to develop 
systematic approach aimed at controlling and monitoring safety from conceptual design phase to 
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detailed design phase (Khan et al, 2002). An offshore platform as an engineering system has its 
design process based on the principles of engineering design methods as discussed in the 
following Section. 
4.2.2 Engineering Design Methods 
Engineering design can be described as a creative process beginning with the identification of 
requirements, definition of the system and the development of methods establishing the system in 
order to meet the desired requirements. 
Engineering design can be divided into three main categories, which are as follows; 
i. Original design: This encourages the production of an original solution for a 
system to perform a new function. 
ii. Adaptive design: This suggests customising a familiar system to a changed 
function. 
iii. Variant design: This involves changing the sizes and/or arrangement of certain 
aspects of the chosen system while the function and principle remain constant. 
The above categories are applied in design of various engineering systems and they can be 
identified and analysed using their individual patterns to form series of steps required to organise 
and guide an engineering design. These steps can be referred to as an engineering design 
methodology (Cleveland & King, 1983; Cross, 1989). 
The advantages of engineering design methodology include prompt and simple ways of 
generating and evaluating design solutions through a systematic framework for maximum 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
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Generally, there are two types of models available for most design processes of engineering 
project development such as an offshore platform, and these are descriptive and prescriptive 
types. The descriptive model describes how a design is done, while the prescriptive model gives 
detailed example of how the design engineer performs the process of design. When comparing 
the two models one cannot but conclude that, the descriptive type of model is subjective while the 
prescriptive is not. Both models offer rational systematic frameworks which simplify the design 
process and improve the performance of the design engineer. 
The prescriptive model involves a more traditional approach consisting of steps from 
identification of needs through feasibility study, Preliminary study, detailed design, qualification 
testing, production planning, and acceptance testing for operations (Danish, 2006). 
Both models have been carefully studied with regard to the offshore development (Khan & 
Amyotte, 2002). A combination of both heuristic and empirical knowledge is used in the design 
of offshore platforms. The design engineers used empirical knowledge to conceptualise an 
offshore platform as a complete system, while heuristics are used for general aspects such as 
layouts of an offshore platform. 
For instance, heuristics are used in the design process of top side of an offshore platform, to 
locate the different compartments, activities, and items in three dimensional forms right from 
early stages of the preliminary design phases. However, as more detailed information is gathered, 
the design progresses to a more comprehensive preliminary definition of the design leading to 
completion of conceptual design phase from where detailed design commences (Paik & 
Thayambali, 2007). 
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The above clearly expressed reason why prescriptive methodology may not provide an absolute 
choice for the offshore platform development but may be used to explore all possible alternatives. 
In contrast however, descriptive methodology may be considered more appropriate in detailing 
the design requirements. Sequel to foregoing, a descriptive design methodology for the 
development of offshore development project is described in the following section. 
4.3 Typical Phases for Offshore Project Development  
The typical offshore project development phases are presented in a highly simplified sequential 
form as shown in Figure 4.1. However, in practice these phases will to a greater or lesser extent 
overlap, depending on the participants involved in the project, the choice of contract philosophy, 
contract types, etc. In this study however, these simplified phases have been expanded to produce 
Figure 4.2 adopting the principles of design for safety which will further be modified by 
integrating with the fuzzy reasoning approach in order to develop a new offshore platform risk 
assessment model details of which will be discussed in Section 4.4 (Wang & Ruxton, 1998). 
4.4 Framework for Offshore Platform Development 
Typically, a design for safety framework as described in the work of Wang & Ruxton (1998) 
shows the typical design process of complex marine and offshore products such as an oil and gas 
platform. This framework is found to be generally suitable for application in the design process 
for most complex engineering systems. However, project peculiarities may necessitate changes or 
even elimination of some steps, therefore, in this study a framework for the development of 
offshore platform is shown in Figure 4.2 and described in the subsequent sections as follows. 












To investigate if there are field developments solutions 
which are technically, economically and safety feasible 
for the field in the proposed field.
To decide which solution should be selected as the 
basis for declaration of commerciality. To describe the 
main features of selected field platform concept.
To specify the premises for and content of the work to 
be performed in detail engineering phase.
To place purchase orders for long lead time equipment 
(Critical equipment).
To prepare the necessary information for and to 
administer all contracts and purchase orders.
To fabricate the equipment packages and modules, 
construct the final product, and transport it to the field, 
or if necessary complete it there.
To verify that all equipments, systems etc operate as 




Fig. 4.1 Typical offshore project development phases 
4.4.1 Planning/Feasibility Study 
This phase of the design process is where information gathered regarding the project is further 
defined preparatory to commencement of work in the conceptual study phase. This process of 
refining the project objectives begins with the specification of needs, information gathering, 
conceptualisation, and definition. 




Fig. 4.2 Step by step design process for a typical offshore development 
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4.4.1.1 Feasibility assessments 
The selection of the concept will then be subjected to some feasibility assessment to satisfy the 
project is both technically and economically realisable. The feasibility assessment is necessary in 
order to ensure that the selected concept is defined in such a manner as to guarantee continuity of 
the design. At this stage of the feasibility study of the project, the selected concepts viability 
would be defined in terms of meeting the desired objectives including safety standard 
requirements within the available resources, before carrying out further work on the project 
(Vinnem & Hope, 1986). 
The establishment of the project requirements must follow the clear concept definition before the 
commencement of the preliminary design. This task is important and difficult part of the design 
process as these established requirements must be reviewed and revalidated continuously during 
the design process to ensure their conformity with the project goals and objectives. 
4.4.1.2 Definition 
This stage involves the studies of the various project elements within the approved concept in 
relation to the specified need for the establishment of requirements at every level. This procedure 
will be repeated continuously through the design process as the structure and its components are 
further defined, tested, evaluated, fabricated, and assembled into a functioning system. The next 
assignment requires the structure to be broken down into various work elements related to each 
task in the form of a family tree. This tree will provide basis for taking adequate inventories 
issues such as technical, schedule, and manpower (Wang & Ruxton, 1997). 
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4.4.2 Conceptual Design Phase 
This phase of the design process is where information gathered from the feasibility study phase is 
further defined preparatory to commencement of work in the detailed design phase. This covers 
design development, evaluation, and selection of the prepared alternative for the design team to 
commence work. 
4.4.2.1 Design Development 
Following the definitions of the overall structures, layouts, and drawings of an offshore platform 
at the concept design phase, intensive analysis should be conducted at this stage. The analysis 
may include detailed literature search, analysis methods, previous experiences of similar designs 
and discussion with experts in particular fields. Testing may also be conducted at this stage if 
deemed to be cost effective (Pappas, 1994). 
4.4.2.2 Evaluation 
The continuous refining of the concept design layout, fabrication of the various elements will 
gradually be implemented. At this stage both technical and cost estimation would be defined in a 
more realistic manner. The technical evaluation is conducted in order to ensure that, the design 
specifics like stability, weight distribution, flow safety, and reliability are in conformity with the 
project requirements. The economic evaluation to be carried out must satisfy that aspects as cost 
of construction, equipment, operation and maintenance are all within the acceptable limit. Testing 
process at this stage may be necessary in order to ascertain that, the initial design stages have 
adequately been taken care of including both operation and maintenance procedures (Wang & 
Ruxton, 1997). 




Further redefining of the design at this stage will be necessary if more than one alternative is 
involved in the evaluation of the process prior to the selection of the best alternatives. 
The final step in the project design prioritisation and development process is project selection. 
The term selection relates to actual project implementation and therefore relates directly to the 
programming of funds in the safety improvement. Project selection is therefore an element of the 
safety improvement and financing programming process. Selection criteria may include: 
• Funding availability and management commitment; 
• Political and public support; and/or 
• Existence of supportive planning, environmental and engineering studies. 
4.4.3 Pre-Engineering (Detailed Design) Phase 
At this stage all disciplines involved in the project are active in ensuring the design concept is 
translated into product parts. Evaluation of these parts is in line with the established specific 
design requirements produced in the conceptual design phase. The project costs continue to be 
authenticated at this stage and placement of purchase orders for long lead equipment as prior 
testing may be necessary for the validation of the design to confirm the installation meets the 
desired specifications. 
4.4.4 Detailed Engineering, Production and Commissioning 
Design review is conducted before the commencement of detailed engineering for the proper 
identification of the machines and tools required, and to determine the machinery operation to be 
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used. Following that is the commencement of production before finalising the design process 
with commissioning, testing, and eventual start up of operation. 
4.5 Modified Design for Safety Methodology for Offshore Platform 
As stated in Chapter 2, the concept of design for safety methodology becomes more popular 
following Lord Cullen report of 1990, where the adoption of principles of design for safety from 
the early stages of the design process for an offshore system was recommended. The “Design for 
safety” as earlier referred to in Chapter 2 is a process of minimising injury or death of personnel, 
damages to offshore products and pollution of the environment (Lois, P. et al, 2002). It involves a 
methodology of incorporating safety into the design process from the early stages, which is 
achieved through a systematic approach to the identification and control of high-risk areas.  
The constraints or difficulties associated with “design for safety” as discussed in Chapter 2 are 
considered in the process of model development based on concept of “design for safety”. 
The development of safety model through the design of such a structure like an offshore platform 
can be difficult which may require approximation, estimation and judgments by experts and 
operatives with adequate knowledge regarding the operation of the system (Wang & Ruxton, 
1998). This effort may necessitate the need for the application of safety analysis methods either 
individually or in combination to conduct a qualitative or a quantitative safety analysis. However, 
the problem with application of these methods is the lack of specification of where and how to 
apply them or how they inter-relate. Therefore, these will certainly require good knowledge of 
qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques and how to apply them. 
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In view of the above, the design for safety framework developed for this study will aim to 
achieve integration of relevant safety assessment procedures where necessary, as the design 
progresses. 
This modified design for safety methodology for offshore platform development comprises of 
mainly four phases as in general design for safety framework but expanded to meet the project 
requirements and the details, these phases are as follows (Umar et al, 2006); 
1. Problem definition 
2. Risk identification 
3. Risk estimation 
4. Design review 
As referred to earlier design for safety is a progressive process where for example the information 
generated from the design review may be used to conduct the task of risk identification alongside 




Fig. 4.3 Modified design for safety framework 
Problem definition phase 
Risk identification phase 
Risk estimation phase 
Design review 
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Figure 4.3 shows a modified design for safety framework designed to ensure proper integration of 
with fuzzy reasoning approach purposely for the development of knowledge-based risk 
assessment model for offshore platform processes. 
4.51 Problem Definition 
The problem definition specifically involves the identification of the safety need conducted in 
relation to the project classification and the detailing product specification during the evaluation 
of the project design process. The specification of need is accomplished in the feasibility study 
process. 
At this stage, the general safety need once established will lead to the production of more specific 
requirements for the actualisation of the project. The requirements for the operation and design 
relating to safety can be specified by using information generated through the definition of need, 
but this specification has to be broken down into component parts to enable proper assessment 
from the component level before progressing to sub-system and overall system levels. 
At this stage the common factors that need to be considered may include. 
 Sets of rules and regulations by the regulatory authorities and control standards, 
 Deterministic life of the product, reliability, etc, 
 Criteria referring to the probability of occurrence of various system failure events and 
possible consequence. 
4.5.2 Risk Identification 
Risk identification is the process of finding potential hazardous events, their respective causes 
and possible consequences. This progress achieved in the design process will advance from 
concept evaluation phase to preliminary design phase, the details generated at this stage will 
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enable achievement of some reasonable level of progress in the risk identification process. The 
configuration of the system at all levels has been defined to allow the commencement of the 
process of risk identification. Risk identification is a very critical stage where a complete system 
safety check is conducted and proper measures are taken from early stages of design to prevent 
failures. 
This phase requires experiences of the engineers and operators to be deployed at this stage in 
order to ensure identification of all possible failure events at each level. This would be achieved 
through the proper assessment of the effects of such facilities on the system safety and 
performance. 
The various safety analysis methods may be incorporated into the risk identification phase in the 
design for safety framework either individually or in combination for a more effective 
identification process of risks associated with the system (Cross, 1989). However, the need to 
effectively deal with the problems of uncertainties associated with risk information as stated 
earlier in this thesis may necessitate the application of such methods as fuzzy reasoning approach 
(FRA) to conduct risk estimation (An et al, 2000b). 
4.5.3 Risk Estimation 
Risk estimation involves the use of identified failure or hazardous data to estimate possible 
consequence and overall risk level using combination qualitative and quantitative methods. Risk 
estimation process begins with the estimation of consequences of each failure event using 
qualitative methods if the identified event may not be readily quantifiable. However if the level 
of uncertainty is very high, subjective safety analysis methods such as fuzzy reasoning approach 
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which has the ability to deal with uncertainty may prove to be more appropriate in executing this 
task (An et al, 2000b; Wang & Ruxton, 1998). 
As the design progresses, more and more information regarding safety are generated to the level 
that minimal cut sets are identified. These minimal cut sets are elements leading to the system 
failure event (top event) and failure data of the basic events associated with them must have been 
collated, then quantitative risk estimation can be conducted. Cut set is a collection of component 
failure events, which are necessary and sufficient to cause the top event while minimum cut sets 
are a set of irreducible failure events leading to top event. The methods used in carrying out 
typical quantitative risk estimation may include fault tree analysis (FTA), event tree analysis 
(ETA), and simulation (Pillay & Wang, 2002 & 2003). 
The probability of occurrence of each failure event associated with the minimal cut sets of a top 
event may be obtained either from historical analysis, and simulation, or from the data collection 
programmes and engineering judgement. The consequences of possible occurrence of a top event 
may be quantified in economic terms in relation to the loss of lives and/or property, and the 
degradation of the environment. 
The information generated and result obtained from this phase may be used in the safety design 
review phases, and may also be useful in the development of operational and maintenance 
policies. 
4.5.4 Design Review 
Design review depends on recommendation arising from the result of risk estimation phase. It 
involves adoption of measures needed for effective reduction or elimination of risk through 
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design process. This activity can be integrated into the evaluation and selection phases of the 
preliminary design process of an offshore system. Having determined the probability of 
occurrence of each serious system failure by the minimal cut sets associated with some basic 
failure events. Therefore, the task for effective reduction or elimination of unacceptable failure 
events, otherwise referred to as minimal cut set with the highest probability of occurrence, must 
be targeted for elimination. The process of eliminating such cut sets can be achieved by the 
deployment of safety measure which may include the provision of protection systems and alarm 
devices or recommending the use of more reliable components. 
During the design review, risk mitigation measures must consider human errors and possibility of 
reducing its probabilities through the provision of sensing and alarm devices, and better training. 
Further efforts must be aimed at improving the inspection and maintenance policies to 
compliment others in reducing the probabilities of occurrence of system failure events (King, 
1990). 
Cost-benefit analysis should be made as a part in the design review process in order to facilitate 
decision making on the design. Cost-benefit analysis compares the cost of safety proposal and the 
benefit in real economic terms which provides basis for decision making on the design options. 
This review action may use other formal decision making tools to process information generated 
from risk estimation phase. The design review makes use of these approaches to achieve optimal 
design alternatives and, the best maintenance and operational policies through careful studies of 
both design and maintenance procedures (Lees, 1980 & 1996). 




This Chapter reviews design for safety concept for a complex engineering system such as an 
offshore platform. The review further highlighted offshore platform safety requirements with a 
view to integrating design for safety methodology preparatory to the development of a new 
knowledge-based model for the assessment of offshore platform associated risks. 
Chapter 5 highlights the fundamental of fuzzy reasoning approach and demonstrate how the 
approach has been integrated with the principle of design for safety to develop the methodology 
for the risk assessment of offshore platforms. 




Fuzzy Reasoning- based Risk Assessment Approach 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 various safety assessment approaches have been reviewed and offshore platform 
safety requirements have been highlighted in Chapter 4 with the aim of establishing basis for 
integration of concept of design for safety with fuzzy reasoning based risk assessment approach 
for assessing offshore platform associated risks. 
In this Chapter however, detailed fundamentals of fuzzy reasoning approach are discussed to 
demonstrate how its principles have been integrated within the framework of design for safety 
thereby establishing foundation for the development of a knowledge-based modelling for the 
assessment of risks related with offshore platforms. 
5.2 Fundamentals of Fuzzy Reasoning Approach 
Fuzzy reasoning approach (FRA) is based on the principles of fuzzy logic which can be described 
as a type of mathematical logic in which truth value is assumed to belong to a continuum of 
values range between 0 and 1. Fuzzy logic can also be considered as a form of multi-valued logic 
derived from fuzzy set theory applied to deal with reasoning that is approximate rather than 
precise. As stated earlier fuzzy reasoning approach has the ability to operate just like human mind 
by effectively employing modes of reasoning that are approximate rather than exact. This enables 
the specification of mapping rules in linguistic rather than numeric terms, and approximate 
reasoning rather than precise. In other words, fuzzy reasoning approach relies on fuzzy Sets to 
define fuzzy operators and can be applied in situation where the appropriate fuzzy operator is 
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uncertain thus necessitating the use of if–then rule, or constructions that are equivalent, such as 
fuzzy associative matrices. These rules are constructed to express or transform human knowledge 
to knowledge based or rule-based (An et al, 2007). One of the most important attributes of fuzzy 
reasoning theory is the provision of a systematic procedure for transforming human knowledge 
into a non-liner mapping. A fuzzy if–then rule is usually expressed in form of some words which 
are characterised by continuous membership functions (MFs) for example “if variable is property 
then action”. Further descriptions of fuzzy reasoning approach are given in the following 
sections. 
5.2.1 Background of fuzzy reasoning approach 
A fuzzy set A  on a universe of discourse U  is defined as a set of ordered pairs (Bojadziev & 
Bojadziev, 1995)  
 UxxxA A  ))(,(                 (5-1) 
where )(xA  is called the membership function (MF) of x  in A  that takes values in the interval 
[0, 1]. The element x  is characterised by linguistic values e.g. in offshore risk assessment, the 
failure probability or likelihood (FP) is defined as very low, low, average, high and very high; the 
consequence severity (CS) is defined as negligible, marginal, moderate, severe, and catastrophic; 
and the risk level (RL) is defined as minor, tolerable, major, and intolerable. In fuzzy reasoning 
various types of MFs can be used, such as triangular, trapezoidal, generalised bell-shaped and 
Gaussian functions. However, the most frequently used in risk analysis practice are triangular and 
trapezoidal MFs. It is also important to note that, the most common fuzzy set operations are 
union and intersection, and that they essentially correspond to OR  and AND  operators, 
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respectively for example consider two sets A  and B  to be two fuzzy sets (An et al, 2007; 
Bojadziev & Bojadziev, 1995; Maseguerra et al, 2003). 
Union: - The union of A and B, denoted by BA  or A  OR B , contains all elements in either A  
or B , which is calculated by the maximum operation and its MF is defined as (Bojadziev & 
Bojadziev, 1995): 
)}(),(min{)( xxx BABA                                                                         (5-2) 
Intersection: - The intersection of A  and B , denoted by BA or A AND B, contains all the 
elements that are simultaneously in A  and B , which is obtained by the minimum operation and 
its MF is defined as (Bojadziev & Bojadziev, 1995); 
)}(),(max{)( xxx BABA                                                                       (5-3) 
As stated earlier FRA is a rule-based methodology developed from human knowledge in the form 
of fuzzy if–then rules expressed in form of statement in which some words are characterized by 
continuous MFs; e.g. the following is a frequently used fuzzy if–then rule in risk assessment (An 
et al, 2007). 
If failure probability (FP) is high AND consequence severity (CS) is severe, then risk level (RL) 
of the failure event is major. 
Here, FP, CS, and RL are linguistic variables while high, severe and major are linguistic terms 
characterised by MFs. 
A fuzzy rule base consists of a set of fuzzy if–then rules. Consider the input space 
n
n RUUUU  ......21  and the output space RV  . Only the multi-input–single-output 
A. A. UMAR      Ph. D     2010 
 
73 
case is considered here, as a multi-output system can always be decomposed into a collection of 
single-output systems. To be precise, a. fuzzy rule base comprises the following fuzzy if–then 




i BisythenAisxandandAisxifR    . ,  ....   : 1 1                                                    (5-4) 
where 1,.2,...n)j  ;,...2,.1(  riAij  is the i-th linguistic terms in the j-th part of the antecedent, r is 
the number of linguistic terms of a linguistic variable in the antecedent. n is the number of 
linguistic variable, iA1  and 
iB  are the fuzzy sets in RU   and RV  , respectively, and 
Uxxxx Tx  ),....,( 21  and Vy  are the input and output (linguistic) variables of the fuzzy 
reasoning system respectively. However, due to the concise nature of fuzzy if–then rules, they are 
often employed to capture the imprecise modes of reasoning that play an essential role in the 
human ability to make decisions in an environment of uncertainty and imprecision. Therefore, in 
the proposed fuzzy reasoning system, human knowledge has to be represented in the form of the 
fuzzy if–then rules i.e. expressed in Equation (5-4). There are three major properties of fuzzy 
rules that are outlined as follows (An et al, 2007). 
1. A set of fuzzy if–then rules is complete only if for any Ux  , there is at least one rule in the 
fuzzy rule base, say rule iR  as in the form of equation (5-4), thus: 
0)(
1
xiA                                                                                                  (5-5) 
for all ni ,...,.2,.1 . Intuitively, the completeness of a set of rules means that at any point in the 
input space, there is at least one rule that „fires‟, i.e. the membership value of the if part of the 
rule at this point is non-zero.  
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2. A set of fuzzy if–then rules is consistent if there are no rules with the same if parts, but 
different then parts.  
3. A set of fuzzy if–then rules is continuous if there do not exist such neighbouring rules whose 
then part fuzzy sets have empty intersection, i.e. they do not intersect.  
5.2.1.1  Fuzzy inference system (FIS) 
The FIS consists of four steps which are the fuzzy rule base, fuzzification, fuzzy inference engine, 
and defuzzification as described in the followings. 
1 Fuzzy rule base 
Construction of these rules involves the deployment of various knowledge acquisition techniques 
to generate appropriate information required for the development of fuzzy linguistic variables and 
their associated MFs in order to determine the corresponding risk levels (RLs). This gathering of 
the required information can be achieved through the deployment of several techniques; however, 
knowledge acquisition techniques to be applied in this research are as enumerated below (An et 
al, 2006); 
(a) historical data analysis; 
(b) failure analysis; 
(c) concept mapping; 
(d) domain of human expert experience and engineering knowledge analysis. 
The above mentioned techniques are not mutually exclusive thus their combination is found to be 
the most effective way of determining the rule base (An et al, 2007). 




This process involves the conversion of input values into the corresponding fuzzy MF values. 
This is a stage where the degrees of input values belonging to each of the appropriate fuzzy sets 
by MFs are determined. 
3 Fuzzy inference engine 
This is a process where the principles of fuzzy logic are deployed by combining the fuzzy if–then 
rules in the fuzzy rule base into a mapping from input fuzzy sets to an output fuzzy set. Fuzzy 
inference engine consists of three steps which are evaluation of fuzzy rules, implication, and 
aggregation. These steps are described in the following sections. 
Step I -Fuzzy rule evaluation: Evaluation of fuzzy rules is conducted to determine which rule in 
the rule base is fired or not through the application of fuzzy logic principles to combine fuzzy if–
then rules in fuzzy rule base into a mapping for example from a fuzzy set A  and U  to a fuzzy set 
B  in V . Following the fuzzification of inputs, these fuzzified values are applied to each rule to 
determine whether the rule will be fired. If a rule has a true value in its antecedent (input part), it 
will be fired and then contribute to the consequent (output part). If the antecedent of a given rule 
has more than one part, the fuzzy operator will then be applied to evaluate the composite firing 
strength of the rule for example assume an i-th rule has two parts its antecedent or input part (An 
et al, 2006 & 2007). 
iii
i BisythenAisxandAisxifR    ...... ,  ....   : 221 1                                                (5-6) 
where ri ,...,.2,.1  
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The two parts in the antecedent are connected with „and‟ and the firing strength i  can be 
obtained using fuzzy intersection (minimum) operation; 
)}(),(min{ 21
21
xx ii AAi                                                                         (5-7) 
where )( 1
1
xiA  and )( 22
xiA  are the membership functions (MFs) of fuzzy sets 
iA1  and 
iA2 . 
The firing strength is implicated with the value of the conclusion MF to produce an output in 
form of a truncated fuzzy set. 
Step II -Fuzzy rule implication process: The implication using fuzzy intersection (minimum) 
operation is given by; 
)}(,min{)( yy ii Biimp                                                                          (5-8) 
where )(yiB  is the MF of the conclusion part of a fuzzy rule and )(yiimp  is the MF of the 
truncated fuzzy set after implication. The truncated fuzzy sets that represent the implication 
outputs of each rule are aggregated into a single fuzzy set. 
Step III -Fuzzy aggregation process: The aggregation using fuzzy union (maximum) operation is 
denoted by; 
)}(),(),(max{)( 21 yyyy rimpimpimpagg                                                    (5-9) 
where )(yagg  is the MF of the fuzzy set after aggregation. 




Fig. 5.1 Fuzzy inference process 
5.2.1.2 Defuzzification 
The aggregate output fuzzy set is used as input for the defuzzification process to obtain an output 
in a single number. This single number is in a crisp form, representing the final result of the fuzzy 
inference process. To obtain this value the centroid of area method which is the most frequently 
used method in fuzzy reasoning systems is used to determine the centre of gravity of an 














                                                                                  (5-10) 
where )(yagg  is the aggregated output MF. The process of fuzzy inference is shown in Fig.5.1. 
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n = the number of aggregated risk level conclusions  
iy  = the support value at which the i-th membership function reaches its maximum value 
)( iagg yu  = the degree of truth of the i-th membership function 
defy  = the Weighted Mean value of Maximum conclusion 
5.2.2 Advantages and disadvantages of fuzzy reasoning approach 
In contrast with the traditional methods mentioned earlier, the fuzzy logic reasoning approach has 
the following advantages (An et al, 2000a & 2007): 
5.2.2.1 Advantages 
 It has the ability to integrate expert knowledge, engineering judgement, historical data and 
other risk analysis information to handle the safety and risk assessment in a more 
consistent manner; 
 It can make use of ambiguous, imprecise, incomplete and uncertainty information in the 
assessment; 
 The risk can simply be evaluated using the linguistic expressions which are employed in 
conducting risk assessment; 
 It offers a more flexible structure for combining failure occurrence and consequence. 
5.2.2.2 Disadvantages 
Possible human error arising from actions of risk analysts will affect the results 
5.3 Two Parameters Risk Assessment Method (TPRAM) 
TPRAM is a fuzzy reasoning approach (FRA) based risk assessment method. This method 
combines two risk factors such as frequency or probability of failure occurrence and the severity 
of failure consequence in order to determine the risk level. 
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However, it is pertinent to note that these two risk factors can be generated through the use of 
other traditional methods. Therefore, combining them together in a single assessment process will 
even ensure more reliable results. Failure occurrence probability can be computed as an output of 
other methods like event tree analysis, fault tree analysis etc. to quantify failure during the 
process time, while the failure consequence severity is ranked subjectively according to the 
seriousness of the failure event. Generally, the failure frequency can be determined by 
quantitative approaches and the consequence severity by some highly subjective means. 
Therefore to determine the consequence severity of a failure will require the employment of 
subjective methods like previous experience or expert judgement or engineering judgement. 
The above therefore, suggests the need for methods which can effectively combine both 
quantified and qualified (subjective) safety information to determine the risk level. This need led 
to the development of method or methods based on the principles of fuzzy reasoning approach 
(FRA). As stated earlier FRA has the ability to process incomplete safety information, imprecise 
knowledge and subjective information such using methods as TPRAM. 
It is obvious that, TPRAM provides a more effective and efficient way of assessing risk with high 
level of uncertainties. This method employs principles of FRA through the use of fuzzy inference 
system (FIS) where the failure frequency and consequence severity are described in linguistic 
terms. These linguistic variables are fuzzified to determine their degrees of membership. These 
membership functions (MFs) are then evaluated using linguistic rule base and fuzzy logic 
operations to establish the corresponding degree of membership in each risk class. These fuzzy 
conclusions are then defuzzified to obtain a single crisp value representing the risk level for the 
failure which is usually expressed as a percentage belief. 
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In this work, this method will be modified to develop the proposed knowledge-based modeling 
process for assessing offshore platform related risks. 
5.4 Knowledge-based Concept Framework 
As mentioned in the previous sections, the proposed knowledge-based modelling is a composite 
(Knowledge-based) framework shown in Figure 5.2. This is designed to introduce a simple 
schematic arrangement on how concepts of fuzzy reasoning based approach has been integrated 
with the concept of design for safety in order to facilitate identification process for all possible 
cut sets leading to top events. This process ensures that all identified cut sets are put into focus, 
and the uncertainties associated with them are also adequately dealt with to achieve a more 
efficient risk assessment through the design process of offshore platform. More details of this 
modelling process are discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Fig. 5.2 Knowledge-based framework 
5.4.1 Preliminary Identification Phase 
This phase is dedicated to the deployment of techniques for the identification of causes leading to 
the top events based on the principles of design for safety. In other words this can be referred to 
Risk estimation phase 
Preliminary identification phase 
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as design for safety phase of the Knowledge-based modelling framework being developed for the 
risk assessment. 
The process requires experienced system operators and engineers to participate as a means of 
ensuring proper identification of all potential failure events. This process is based on detailed 
assessment of effects of such failures on the system safety and performance. 
At this stage, some traditional safety analysis methods may possibly be deployed to compliment 
the identification efforts for all the potential system risks, which have been discussed earlier in 
this Chapter. 
5.4.2 Estimation Phase 
Risk estimation is the conclusive risk characterisation phase which is finally expressed mostly in 
qualitative term. This phase is designed based on the principles of fuzzy reasoning approach. The 
process involves gathering of information on the frequency of the likelihood of occurrence of 
each identified failure event, its possible consequences, and probability that consequence will 
result. The information gathered at this stage will be used to establish risk parameters which will 
provide all the necessary input for further analysis based on the principles of fuzzy reasoning 
approach (FRA), more detailed discussion will be given in Chapter 6. 
However, due to the high level of uncertainty in the available data, the risk analysis should 
combine quantitative methods in the safety analysis process, with other tested analysis methods 
like fuzzy reasoning which has been proved to be most suitable especially in dealing with 
subjectivities. The results obtained at this stage will provide basis for risk evaluation and design 
review and/or recommendation of responses to the evaluated risks. The information gathered 
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from this process will be used to determine priority action regarding possible condition in relation 
to system safety. 
5.4.3 Design review 
Design review involves a systematic examination of the design process with the aim of meeting 
design requirements. This can be conducted at any stage of the design process in order to 
eliminate or reduce the risk to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). The performance of 
this process may be determined by the result produced at various stages of risk estimation phase. 
5.5 Summary 
Considering earlier reviews in the previous Chapters on some traditional methods which could be 
used to analyse the data where even for example failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) being one 
of the most efficient is found to be weak in dealing with multiple relationships between failure 
modes, causes and effects. The database could be more 'reliable' if repeat entries were eliminated 
with many-to-many relationships among several FMEA elements. This suggests the need for 
adoption of other alternatives such as combining some compatible attribute of the traditional 
methods with concept of design for safety and fuzzy reasoning approach in order to fill the gap 
created by observed weakness. 
Fuzzy reasoning approach encourages the performance of analysis based on prioritising the 
identified failures obtained using other methods. This result enables appropriate actions to correct 
or mitigate the effects of a failure to be prioritised even though the information is vague, 
ambiguous, qualitative or imprecise. 
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In this chapter, the fundamentals of fuzzy reasoning approach (FRA) has been discussed, its 
advantages enumerated based on which the basis for developing a combine framework with other 
traditional method was established. This framework combines the advantages of the concept of 
design for safety with that of the fuzzy reasoning approach to develop a new knowledge-based 
model for the risk assessment for offshore platform. 
Also discussed in this Chapter is the FRA based method referred to as two parameter risk 
assessment method (TPRAM). This method will be modified further to develop a knowledge-
based risk assessment model to be proposed in this research work and eventually the two methods 
will be compared to establish the effect of modification via results and eventual decision-making. 
Details on the new knowledge-based risk assessment model are discussed in Chapter 6. 




Knowledge-Based Risk Assessment Technique 
This Chapter details the development of the proposed knowledge-based risk assessment 
technique KBRAM which is a risk assessment technique developed for application in the 
identification and assessment of risks associated with an offshore platform. It consists of a risk 
analysis method based on the concept of design for safety and the principle of fuzzy reasoning 
approach (FRA). The technique begins with the establishment of foundation based on safety 
needs, where limitations associated with some of the traditional safety assessments techniques are 
highlighted in relation to the quality and quantity of information. The Chapter concludes with 
discussion on the method‟s main attributes and innovations tailored towards effective assessment 
of offshore platform associated risks. 
6.1 Introduction 
The offshore oil and gas industry is associated with, risks as enumerated in Chapter 1. These risks 
sometime lead to failures with varying consequences ranging from system deterioration and/or 
malfunction as well as possible injuries to persons and environmental degradation (Khan et al, 
2002). Due to the nature of risk which is mostly controlled by numerous factors such as human 
error it is difficult to conduct risk analysis at the early stages of the project. The nature of data 
and availability of information in most circumstances, which make it extremely difficult to 
adequately assess risks associated with an offshore system due to the level of uncertainty 
involved. The various risk assessment techniques currently being used in the industry such as 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) etc are comparatively effective and their results also reliable. However, their 
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applications have been limited due sometimes to difficulties in obtaining information of high 
quality and/or sufficiency as a pre-requisite requirement to guarantee their effective applications 
within the industry (Crawley & Grant, 1997). Furthermore, these quantitative techniques have 
been found to be deficient in dealing with uncertainties and subjectivities associated with safety 
and risk data. These facts necessitate the need for continuous search for new or improved risk 
analysis technique for the purposes of identification and assessment of offshore facility 
associated risks. This further gives credence to the need for a more effective way to process risk 
information and reliably apply same findings through the design in order to facilitate decision-
making and eventual approvals. 
The knowledge based safety model is proposed to provide alternative for decision-making 
through a safe design process. This knowledge based risk assessment model is a modified safety 
management framework comprising five phases, such as problem definition phase, data 
collection and analysis phase, risk identification phase; risk estimation phase and risk response 
phase. The process provides a systematic approach to the identification and control of high-risk 
areas. Figure 6.1 shows the typical steps of the proposed risk assessment process. This framework 
is considered to be generally applicable to most risk analysis processes for offshore platforms. 
However, some variations may be applied depending on circumstances where there may be need 
for complete elimination of some steps (An et al, 2007). The definition of safety problems is 
conducted using the concept of design for safety technique while fuzzy reasoning approach is 
applied for the analysis of the risks, i.e. risk identification, assessment, and control. The 
background and the steps considered in this assessment method are elaborated in the subsequent 
sections. 
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6.2 Development of a Knowledge-Based Risk Assessment Model 
As discussed earlier in this report, design for safety as a process relies on proper examination of 
the procedures to enable identification  and assessment of potential hazardous events and their 
associated risks with regard to the chosen system in order to provide rational basis for 
determining where and when to apply risk reduction and/or control measures appropriately. An 
effective risk analysis process must cover all aspects of risks through the various steps in the 
design process in order to reach rational decision regarding appropriate steps needed to minimise, 
reduce or even eliminate the risk involved. Therefore, this must include sufficient particulars to 
demonstrate that hazards with the potentials to cause the system failure are identified, evaluated, 
and appropriate measures applied to bring the level of risks to As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
(ALARP) (An et al 2003a & 2003b). 
This proposed risk analysis model begins with the identification of safety need for the system 
following the collation of the relevant information from previous records i.e. database incidents 
and accidents on similar systems. The overall safety need is defined with reference to statutory 
regulations, the product deterministic life, and various system failure events as well as possible 
resultant consequences. However, for design with such complexities like an offshore platform 
and its accompanying insufficient and/or vague risk information, the use of expert judgement 
becomes necessary in order to adequately determine the safety need and conclude with the choice 
of the top events. The top event is then further analysed through progressive steps from 
component to sub-system and finally to system levels (Umar et al, 2006). 





Fig. 6.1 Proposed knowledge-based risk assessment model 
Design  
Review 
Problem Definition Phase 
Risk Identification Phase 
Assemble Risk Assessment Team 
Identify failures at Component Level 
Identify failures at Sub - system Level 
Identify failures at System Level 
Risk Estimation Phase 
Establish Risk Parameters 
Develop Fuzzy Membership Functions 
Establish Fuzzy Rule Base 
Fuzzification 
Fuzzy Inference Engine 
Defuzzification 
To reduce to as low as  




Risk Response Phase 
Intolerable Tolerable Minor Major 
Reduce Risk if  
Cost - Effective 
Data Collection and Analysis Phase 
Failure analysis and other  
information sources 
Historical Data  
Analysis 
Data Collection Expert Knowledge 
A. A. UMAR      Ph. D     2010 
 
88 
6.2.1 Problem definition phase 
Risk assessment begins with identification of safety needs while problem definition involves 
identifying specific safety requirements. These requirements should be specified possibly at 
different levels, e.g. component level, sub-system level and the offshore system level. The 
following typical items may need to be specified in the problem definition (An et al, 2006; BS 
EN ISO 14001, 2004; BS EN ISO 9000 2005; BS EN ISO 20815, 2008; IEC 62278, 2008; 
EN50129, 1998). 
1. Sets of rules and standard regulations made by the regulatory authorities and classification 
societies, e.g. Health & Safety Executive etc 
2. Deterministic requirements for safety, reliability, availability, maintainability, etc. 
3. Criteria referring to probability of occurrence of serious hazardous events and the possible 
consequences. 
6.2.2 Data collection and analysis phase 
Once the need for safety is established, the risk assessment progresses from the problem 
definition phase to the data collection and analysis phase with the aim of developing a good 
understanding of what constitute serious accidents and incidents in a particular offshore system 
over the years to generate information. If the statistical data is not available, expert and 
engineering judgements could be applied. 
The information generated at this stage will then be used to develop qualitative descriptors and 
associated MFs. A number of the most commonly used techniques can be used to gather 
information and knowledge such as statistical data and information analysis, domain human 
experience and engineering knowledge analysis and concept mapping. These techniques can also 
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be combined to generate sufficient risk information in the most effective way. The information 
generated at this stage will be applied to conduct the process of risk identification. 
6.2.3  Risk identification phase 
The aim of risk identification process is to enable systematic identification of all potential 
hazardous events associated with a chosen system of the offshore platform at different levels, e.g. 
from component level to sub-system level with a view to assessing their effects on the entire 
offshore system safety. At this stage several risks identification methods such as brainstorming 
approach, check-list, „what if?‟, HAZOP (Hazard and Operability), and failure mode and effect 
analysis (FMEA), may be deployed either  individually or in combination to identify the potential 
hazardous events of a particular offshore system. The risk identification can be initially 
conducted to identify component hazards, before progressing up to sub-system level and finally 
to the offshore system level. At this stage also a team of risk experts with pre-requisite 
knowledge will be assembled to assess and determine the risk scores for failure consequence 
severity (FCS) and failure consequence probability (FCP) based on their knowledge and 
experiences of the system being assessed. 
6.2.3.1 Assemble risk assessment team 
To accomplish the above task a team of experts with varying knowledge and experiences needs to 
be nominated and assembled. These experts are from different background thus will have 
different impacts on the final decision, therefore weighted factor (WF) is introduced into the risk 
assessment process. These factors will be assigned to reflect their knowledge, experience, and 
competences in dealing with the chosen system. WFs assigned these experts would be applied in 
line with the principles of fuzzy reasoning approach (FRA) where the sum total of all the WF 
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must be equal to 1, expressed as 1WF  where aggregated score of a failure event (FS) is 
within the range between 0 and 1 which is represented by ]1,0[FS . This will be done before the 
commencement of risk assessment process so as to ensure all the three parameters have crisp 
single inputs for all the failure events ready for the conduct of risk estimation. 
6.2.4 Risk estimation phase 
Risk estimation phase is where the RLs are assessed at component level, sub-system level and the 
implication on the entire system and this can be carried out either on qualitative or quantitative 
basis. Various risk analysis techniques such as fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, failure 
modes and effect analysis (FMEA), programme evaluation and review technique that are 
applicable across sectors, are currently used in the offshore oil and gas industry. As stated earlier 
in this report, in some instances it may be extremely difficult to conduct a quantitative risk 
assessment due to the high level of uncertainty involved in the risk data. However, even with 
such level uncertainty, subjective risk analysis based on the expert knowledge applied through 
the principles of fuzzy reasoning approach (FRA) incorporated into modeling may prove to be 
more effective and suitable for estimating associated risks. In this report risk estimation is made 
up of six stages which are described in details in the following sections. 
6.2.4.1 Establishment of risk parameters 
Three risk parameters are used in this proposed risk assessment model to assess risk levels (RLs) 
of component failure events and their implication on the sub-systems and overall system 
(offshore platform). The aim at this stage is to determine the risk level of identified failure events. 
It is worth noting that, the overall RL is usually determined through the assessment using two 
fundamental input parameters i.e. failure frequency (FF) and consequence severity (CS) (An et 
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al, 2007). However, in this study a third parameter consequence probability (CP) has been 
introduced due to some reasons as enumerated in the next paragraph. 
As mentioned earlier, in this study the two parameters will be referred to as failure likelihood 
(FLH), and failure consequence severity (FCS). Furthermore, considering the magnitude of a 
particular failure, risk is highly dependent on several factors, such as product nature, equipment 
reliability, human reliability, and work environment; the two input parameters may require some 
modification in order to achieve much more detailed estimation of risk levels (RLs) at all levels. 
Consequently, a third parameter of failure consequence probability (FCP) has been introduced in 
order to capture the possibilities of consequence resulting upon occurrence of any particular 
failure event. The third risk parameter is introduced to generate additional experts‟ opinion on the 
failure risks associated with the offshore platform as a means of achieving further reduction in the 
level of subjectivities in the risk information for more reliable results. This third parameter 
became necessary when one consider an example of smoke in a building as enumerated below; 
Assume a building has a higher number of smokers and compare risk estimation using two 
scenarios; 
Scenario 1- 2 Parameter: fire likelihood is HIGH and consequence severity is HIGH 
therefore, the risk level will be estimated to be HIGH 
Scenario 2- 3 Parameter:  fire likelihood is HIGH and consequence severity is HIGH and 
consequence probability is adjudged LOW then the risk level will 
certainly be downgraded to MEDIUM 
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In addition to the above efforts, the experts‟ contribution would also be evaluated through 
appropriate processes such as brainstorming, checklist, and scoring (An et al, 2000a). 
The FLH defines the number of times an event occurs over a specified period, e.g. number of 
events/year. FCS indicates the number of fatalities, major injuries and minor injuries resulting 
from the occurrence of a particular failure event. This proposed risk model as discussed in 
Chapter 5 is based on principles of FRA method to enable processing of incomplete risk data, 
imprecise knowledge and subjective information to be used in the risk assessment process. As 
stated earlier in this report, risk data and information can be obtained from a number of available 
sources such as previous accident and incident reports, historical data, engineering knowledge 
and expert experience to conduct the risk assessment. Risk identification can be conducted earlier 
to enable identification of potential failure events, which are grouped into a number of categories 
based on their contributions to the safety. For example, an offshore platform processing unit is 
faced with major inherent hazards such as fire and explosion depending on the location of the 
sub-systems and the nature of the product being processed. Each sub-system is faced with a 
number of components failure events, e.g. a leak in the compressor may lead to continuous flow 
of flammable gas which on ignition would cause a jet fire and may eventually cause injury or 
fatality, equipment damage, environmental degradation etc. Thus risk assessment need be carried 
out from component failure level, to sub-system level and finally to offshore processing system 
level. To analyse the risk associated with, for example an offshore processing unit, the fuzzy 
reasoning approach (FRA) with three input parameters described in the previous sections would 
be applied from the component failure events and their cumulative effects at the sub-system level 
to determine the overall RL and its implication on the entire system level (An et al, 2000a). 
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An et al, (2007) stated that the application of FRA in risk assessment may have the following 
advantages; 
1. the risk can be evaluated directly by using qualitative descriptors; 
2. it is tolerant of imprecise data and ambiguous information; 
3. it gives a more flexible structure for combining qualitative as well as quantitative information. 
FRA uses qualitative descriptors in natural language to provide basis for approximate reasoning 
with imprecise propositions. Qualitative descriptors can be used to represent the condition of a 
risk factor at a given interval, and the details of fundamentals of FRA are as discussed in Chapter 
5. However, the proposed risk assessment model  which adopts the principles of FRA begins with 
the development of fuzzy qualitative descriptors and MFs for describing FLH, FCS, FCP and RL 
expressions, as summarised in the following sections. 
1. Failure likelihood FLH 
Table 6.1 describes the range of the FLH to estimate likelihood by using such qualitative 
descriptors as „Very low‟, „Low‟, „Average‟, „High‟, and „Very high‟ suggested to be less than 
6E-06, between 3-12E-06, 9-21E-06, 18-27E-06 and 24-30E-06 respectively as shown in Table 
6.2. The trapezoidal membership functions (MFs) are assigned to describe these MFs of the 
likelihood of occurrence as shown in Figure 6.2 and each qualitative descriptor of FLH has 
categorisations which describe the levels of likelihood in quantitative terms. For example, 
qualitative descriptor „Very low‟ is defined to cover the range of FLH between non-occurrence 
which is 0 and 6E-06, and the approximate numerical value can be computed to be a maximum of 
0.06 event per year. 
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Table 6.1 Failure Likelihood 
Linguistic 
variables 
Failure likelihood probability description Failure 
frequency  






Failure unlikely to be noticed or even occur. 
Failure likely to occur, but unlikely to be frequent. 
Failure likely to occur more than once. 
Failure almost certain to occur at least once. 
























Fig. 6.2 Membership functions of Failure Likelihood 
 
2. Failure consequence severity FCS 
The FCS describes the magnitude of possible consequences and qualitative descriptors such as 
„Negligible’, ‘Marginal’, ‘Moderate’, ‘Severe’ and ‘Catastrophic’ are used to describe the 
different linguistic terms. Table 6.2 shows the criteria used to rank the FCS of failure events 
while the MFs of FCS are as shown in Figure 6 3. 
Table 6.2 Failure Consequence Severity 
Linguistic 
variables 












Failure has no effect on the system operation, the operator 
may not even notice. 
Failure that would cause slight annoyance to the operator 
but not result in system deterioration. 
Failure that would cause high degree of operator 
dissatisfaction or result in noticeable but slight system 
deterioration. 
Failure that would cause significant deterioration in 
system performance and/or lead to minor injuries. 
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31 2 1087654 90  
Fig. 6.3 Membership functions of Failure Consequence Severity 
3. Failure consequence probability FCP 
The third input parameter FCP describes the magnitude of possibility of consequences occurrence 
following a failure event. Qualitative descriptors such as ‘Highly unlikely’, ‘Unlikely’, ‘Likely’, 
‘Highly likely’ and ‘Definite’ are used to describe the different linguistic terms. Table 6.3 shows 
the criteria used to rank the FCP of failure events and the MFs of FCP are shown in Figure 6 4. 
Table 6.3 Failure Consequence Probability 
Linguistic 
variables 









Failure consequence is a remote possibility. 
Consequence is not likely but possible given the occurrence 
of failure event. 
A potential consequence may result. 
A high potential consequence will result with failure 
occurrence. 
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Fig. 6.4 Membership functions of Failure Consequence Probability 
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4. Risk level RL 
RL commonly can be expressed in terms of degrees of belonging within ranges of qualitative 
descriptors such as, ‘Minor’, ‘Tolerable’, ‘Major’ and ‘Intolerable’, that are referred to as risk 
expressions. Table 6.4 shows the qualitative descriptor categories of RL. Trapezoidal MFs are 
also employed to describe each qualitative descriptor of RL as shown in Figure 6.5. 
Table 6.4 Risk level 
Linguistic 
variables 






Acceptable risk no attention required. 
Further reduction required depending on cost. 
Require reduction to as low as reasonably practicable 







Minor Tolerable Major Intolerable












Fig. 6.5 Membership functions of Risk level 
6.2.4.2 Development of fuzzy rule base 
Fuzzy rule base consists of a set of fuzzy IF–THEN rules. This is the main focal point of a fuzzy 
logic system as all other operations are channeled towards implementation of these rules in a 
reasonable and efficient manner. It comprises of the following fuzzy IF–THEN rules as detailed 
in Chapter 5. 
For example, in the proposed offshore platform risk analysis model, a rule with three input 
parameters can be constructed and interpreted as IF FLH is very low and FCS is severe and FCP 
is likely, THEN RL is tolerable, where „very low‟, „severe‟, „likely‟ and „tolerable‟ are qualitative 
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descriptors characterized by MFs and their corresponding quantitative values which will be used 
to express percentage belief in membership. 
As described in the works of both An et al, (2007) and Zeng et al, (2006), fuzzy rules are 
expressed in qualitative descriptors rather than numerical values, they present a natural platform 
for the delivery of information based on expert knowledge and engineering judgments. Therefore, 
experts often find it very convenient to express their knowledge in assessing risks. Though other 
factors also need to be considered in constructing the fuzzy rules base as enumerated in An et al 
(2006), where the factors influencing the development of fuzzy rule are given as below: 
(a) Completeness: the fuzzy rule base must cover all matches between inputs and outputs; 
(b) The number of rules: although there is no general procedure for deciding the optimal number 
of rules, the decision is important when performance, efficiency of computations and choice of 
qualitative descriptors are important considerations; 
(c) Consistency and correctness: the choice of fuzzy rule should minimize the possibility of 
contradiction, and unwanted interactions between the rules.  
The membership function (MF) mapped out is used to establish the fuzzy rules and the total 
number of these rules in the fuzzy rule base depend on the number of qualitative descriptors 
adopted for representing input parameters which in this case are FLH, FCS and FCP. These input 
parameters have five qualitative descriptors each, thus the number of rules (NR) in the fuzzy rule 
base will be computed as (NR=5 × 5 × 5 = 125) as shown in Table 6.5. Furthermore, these MFs 
are interpreted to obtain results of their implications according to the fuzzy rules using a 
combination of Microsoft (MS) Excel and AutoCAD programmes. The mappings in AutoCAD 
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programme adopted as a rule viewer were used to access the MFs. Fuzzy inference functions 
such as fuzzification, aggregation and defuzzification processes. 
6.2.4.3 Determine expert weighted scores at component (failure event) level 
Members of the risk assessment group will then be required to allocate scores to each failure 
event at component level for only two out of the three input parameters which are FCS and FCP 
as the information regarding the first input parameter FLH will be obtained from the industry 
database. 
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Table 6.5 Fuzzy rules 
Rule No Rule Description
R1 IF FLH is Very low and  FCS is Negligible and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Minor
R2 IF FLH is Very low and  FCS is Marginal and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Minor
R3 IF FLH is Very low and  FCS is Moderate and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Minor 
R4 IF FLH is Very low and  FCS is Severe and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Minor
R5 IF FLH is Very low and  FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Minor
R6 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Negligible and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Minor
R7 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Marginal and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Minor
R8 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Moderate and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Minor
R9 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Severe and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Minor
R10 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Minor
R11 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Negligible and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R12 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Marginal and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R13 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Moderate and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R14 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Severe and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Major
R15 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Major
R16 IF FLH is High and FCS is Negligible and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R17 IF FLH is High and FCS is Marginal and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Major
R18 IF FLH is High and FCS is Moderate and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Major
R19 IF FLH is High and FCS is Severe and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Major
R20 IF FLH is High and FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Intolerable
R21 IF FLH is Very high  and FCS is Negligible and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R22 IF FLH is Very high  and FCS is Marginal and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R23 IF FLH is Very high  and FCS is Moderate and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Major
R24 IF FLH is Very high  and FCS is Severe and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Major
R25 IF FLH is Very high  and FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Intolerable
R26 IF FLH is Very low and FCS is Negligible and FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Minor
R27 IF FLH is Very low and FCS is Marginal  and FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Minor
R28 IF FLH is Very low and FCS is Moderate and FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R29 IF FLH is Very low and FCS is Severe and FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R30 IF FLH is Very low and FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R31 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Negligible and FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R32 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Marginal and FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R33 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Moderate and FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R34 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Severe and FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R35 F FLH is Low   and FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R36 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Negligible and FCP is Unlikely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R37 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Marginal and FCP is Unlikely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R38 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Moderate and FCP is Unlikely  THEN  RL is Major
R39 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Severe and FCP is Unlikely  THEN  RL is Major
R40 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Unlikely  THEN  RL is Intolerable
R41 IF FLH is High and FCS is Negligible and FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R42 IF FLH is High and FCS is Marginal and FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R43 IF FLH is High and FCS is Moderate and FCP is Unlikely  THEN  RL is Major
R44 IF FLH is High and FCS is Severe and FCP is Unlikely  THEN  RL is Intolerable
R45 IF FLH is High and FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Unlikely  THEN  RL is Intolerable
R46 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Negligible and FCP is Unlikely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R47 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Marginal and FCP is Unlikely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R48 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Moderate  and FCP is Unlikely  THEN  RL is Major
R49 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Severe and  FCP is Unlikely  THEN  RL is Major
R50 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Unlikely  THEN  RL is Intolerable
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Table 6.5 Continue 
Rule No Rule Description
R51 IF FLH is Very low   and  FCS is Negligible and FCP is Likely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R52 IF FLH is Very low   and  FCS is Marginal and FCP is Likely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R53 IF FLH is Very low   and  FCS is Moderate and FCP is Likely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R54 IF FLH is Very low   and  FCS is Severe and FCP is Likely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R55 IF FLH is Very low  and  FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Likely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R56 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Negligible and FCP is Likely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R57 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Marginal and FCP is Likely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R58 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Moderate and FCP is Likely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R59 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Severe and FCP is Likely THEN  RL is Major
R60 F FLH is Low   and FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Likely THEN  RL is Major
R61 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Negligible and FCP is Likely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R62 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Marginal and FCP is Likely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R63 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Moderate and FCP is Likely  THEN  RL is Major
R64 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Severe and FCP is Likely  THEN  RL is Major
R65 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Likely  THEN  RL is Intolerable
R66 IF FLH is High and FCS is Negligible and FCP is Likely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R67 IF FLH is High and FCS is Marginal and FCP is Likely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R68 IF FLH is High and FCS is Moderate and FCP is Likely  THEN  RL is Major
R69 IF FLH is High and FCS is Severe and FCP is Likely  THEN  RL is  Major
R70 IF FLH is High and FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Likely  THEN  RL is Intolerable
R71 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Negligible and FCP is Likely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R72 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Marginal and FCP is Likely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R73 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Moderate  and FCP is Likely  THEN  RL is Major
R74 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Severe and  FCP is Likely  THEN  RL is Major
R75 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Highly likely THEN  RL is Intolerable
R76 IF FLH is Very low   and  FCS is Negligible and FCP is Highly likely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R77 IF FLH is Very low   and  FCS is Marginal and FCP is Highly likely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R78 IF FLH is Very low   and  FCS is Moderate and FCP is Highly likely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R79 IF FLH is Very low   and  FCS is Severe and FCP is Highly likely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R80 IF FLH is Very low  and  FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Highly likely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R81 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Negligible and FCP is Highly likely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R82 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Marginal and FCP is Highly likely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R83 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Moderate and FCP is Highly likely THEN  RL is Major
R84 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Severe and FCP is Highly likely THEN  RL is Major
R85 F FLH is Low   and FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Highly likely THEN  RL is Intolerable
R86 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Negligible and FCP is Highly likely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R87 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Marginal and FCP is Highly likely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R88 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Moderate and FCP is Highly likely  THEN  RL is Major
R89 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Severe and FCP is Highly likely THEN  RL is Major
R90 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Catastrophic and  FCP is Highly likely THEN  RL is Intolerable
R91 IF FLH is High and FCS is Negligible and FCP is Highly likely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R92 IF FLH is High and FCS is Marginal and FCP is Highly likely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R93 IF FLH is High and FCS is Moderate and FCP is  Highly likely  THEN  RL is Major
R94 IF FLH is High and FCS is Severe and FCP is Highly likely  THEN  RL is  Intolerable
R95 IF FLH is High and FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Highly likely  THEN  RL is Intolerable
R96 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Negligible and FCP is Highly likely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R97 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Marginal and FCP is Highly likely  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R98 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Moderate  and FCP is Highly likely  THEN  RL is Major
R99 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Severe and  FCP is Highly likely  THEN  RL is Intolerable
R100 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is Highly likely THEN RL is Intolerable
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Table 6.5 Continue 
Rule No Rule Description
R101 IF FLH is Very low   and  FCS is Negligible and FCP is  Definite THEN  RL is Tolerable
R102 IF FLH is Very low   and  FCS is Marginal and FCP is  Definite THEN  RL is Tolerable
R103 IF FLH is Very low   and  FCS is Moderate and FCP is  Definite  THEN  RL is  Major
R104 IF FLH is Very low   and  FCS is Severe and FCP is  Definite THEN  RL is  Major
R105 IF FLH is Very low  and  FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is  Definite  THEN  RL is Intolerable
R106 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Negligible and FCP is  Definite THEN  RL is Tolerable
R107 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Marginal and FCP is  Definite THEN  RL is Tolerable
R108 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Moderate and FCP is  Definite THEN  RL is Major
R109 IF FLH is Low  and FCS is Severe and FCP is  Definite THEN  RL is Major
R110 F FLH is Low   and FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is  Definite THEN  RL is Intolerable
R111 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Negligible and FCP is  Definite THEN  RL is Tolerable
R112 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Marginal and FCP is  Definite  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R113 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Moderate and FCP is  Definite  THEN  RL is Major
R114 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Severe and FCP is  Definite THEN  RL is Major
R115 IF FLH is Average and FCS is Catastrophic and  FCP is   Definite THEN  RL is Intolerable
R116 IF FLH is High and FCS is Negligible and FCP is  Definite THEN  RL is Tolerable
R117 IF FLH is High and FCS is Marginal and FCP is  Definite THEN  RL is Tolerable
R118 IF FLH is High and FCS is Moderate and FCP is   Definite  THEN  RL is Major
R119 IF FLH is High and FCS is Severe and FCP is  Definite  THEN  RL is  Intolerable
R120 IF FLH is High and FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is  Definite  THEN  RL is Intolerable
R121 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Negligible and FCP is  Definite  THEN  RL is Tolerable
R122 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Marginal and FCP is  Definite  THEN  RL is  Major
R123 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Moderate  and FCP is  Definite  THEN  RL is Major
R124 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Severe and  FCP is  Definite  THEN  RL is Intolerable
R125 IF FLH is Very high  and  FCS is Catastrophic and FCP is  Definite THEN RL is Intolerable  
To demonstrate this proposed risk assessment method, risk information will be generated through 
the use of questionnaire specifically designed to enable experts to allocate scores using a scale of 
1–10 to represent the implication of each of the listed failure event in relation to the two input 
parameters of FCS and FCP. This questionnaire enables the experts to express their knowledge 
and engineering judgements using a combination of linguistic and numerical expressions such as 
about x-numeric, close to y-numeric etc. or deal directly with a range of values say between a 
range of numbers, where they cannot express their opinions using exact numerical value. Zeng et 
al, (2006) gave examples of such classifications as below; 
 A linguistic term, e.g. „„about 7‟‟ 
 A range, e.g. (3, 7) 
 A scale is likely between 3 and 7 
 A fuzzy number, e.g. (3, 6, 8) 
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The values above are still in their crisp form and can be converted into the overall weighted 
scores for each hazardous event using the Equation (6-1). 
As different experts have different impacts on the final decision, expert factor represented by 
symbol )(w  is therefore introduced into the offshore platform risk assessment model to 
distinguish individual experts‟ and their competences. This factor )(w  will be allocated to experts 
on the basis of their experience, knowledge and expertise. For example assume n  experts in the 
group, the ith  expert iE  is assigned a contribution factor iw  where ]1,0[iw , 
and 1....21  nwww . However, it is important to note that this factor )(w  is flexible and can 









 1                                                                    (6-1) 
where 
jS
Z  is the weighted risk score for failure event j , n  is the total number of experts, iw  is 
the allocated expert factor for expert i , ),..,2,.1( ni  , ijs  is the ith expert ( iE ) score on failure 
event j  ( jth  failure event). 
The above equation will be applied to all failure (hazardous) events at the component level to 
obtain the risk score for application through the fuzzy inference system. 
6.2.4.4 Fuzzification 
Fuzzification is the process of converting input parameters such as failure likelihood (FLH), 
failure consequence severity (FCS) and failure consequence probability (FCP) into their fuzzy 
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qualitative descriptors of FLHZ , FCSZ  and FCPZ  respectively in order to determine the degree of 
belonging of each of the appropriate fuzzy set in rule base via membership function (MF) 
assumptions. 
Step 1: Fuzzification of (FLH) 
In this example, the component is assumed to have a recorded failure frequency equivalent to 
0.028 event per year which correspond to the linguistic categorisation, belonging to very low, and 
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Fig. 6.6: Membership function at 61015.3 FLHZ , 
Step 2: Fuzzification of (FCS) and (FCP) 
As demonstrated in section 6.4.2.2 the input parameters of FCS and FCP, experts‟ weighted 
contributions will be applied. For example, assume three experts 1E , 2E  and 3E  in the group, 
their contribution factors are 1w , 2w  and 3w  respectively and their corresponding numerical 













 assigned based on experts roles and 
experiences. As stated earlier, the experts have been given a range of values between 0 and 10 
represented by [0, 1] for scoring the implications of failure events relative to the severity and 
probability that consequence will result. 
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i) Fuzzification of FCS 
The consequence severity of a component failure is assumed to have experts‟ scores 1S , 2S  and 
3S  allocated as 9, 10 and 10 respectively. Therefore, to calculate weighted experts‟ score 









The above computed score is approximately 3.20 categorised and expressed in linguistic terms, 
belonging to Marginal and moderate with belief of 80% (MF=0.800) and 20% (MF=0.200) 
respectively as shown in Figure 6.7. 
















Fig. 6.7: Membership function at 20.3FCST  
ii) Fuzzification of FCP 
The consequence probability of a chosen component failure is assumed to have experts scores 1S , 
2S  and 3S  allocated as 5, 6 and 7 respectively. Therefore, to calculate weighted experts‟ score 
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The above computed score return a value of 1.90 categorised and expressed in linguistic terms, 
belonging to Highly unlikely, and unlikely with belief of 10% (MF=0.100) and 90% (MF=0.900) 





















Fig. 6.8: Membership function at 90.1FCPT  
In concluding fuzzification process fuzzy sets of the crisp values given above are expressed as 
61015.3 FLHZ  for FLH, 20.3FCSZ  for FCS and 90.1FCPZ  for FCP. To further express 
the risk implication Equation (6-2) is applied and the result obtained shows the corresponding 
values representing the degree of their belonging (membership) according to their membership 
functions (MF‟s) as demonstrated in subsequent sections. 
Figures 6.7, 6.8 & 6.9 show how the assumed values have been used to calculate the values of 
MF of the corresponding linguistic classification as detailed in Table 6.6. These values will then 
be used further to conduct fuzzy analysis of the risk. 
Table 6.6 Fuzzification of inputs at 61015.3 FLHT , 20.3FCST  and 90.1FCPT  
Input Parameter Linguistic class Membership function
Failure Likelihood (FLH) Very low 0.95
" Low 0.05
Failure Consequence Severity (FCS) Maginal 0.80
" Moderate 0.20
Failure Consequence Probability (FCP) Highly unlikely 0.10
" Unlikely 0.90  
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6.2.4.5 Fuzzy inference engine 
As described in Chapter 5, the proposed offshore platform risk assessment process is used to 
combine the fuzzy if–then rules in the fuzzy rule base into a mapping from input fuzzy sets 
representing the inputs FLH, FCS and FCP to an output fuzzy set representing output RL 
expression. Fuzzy inference engine consists of three stages which are evaluation of fuzzy rules, 
implication, and aggregation. 
Stage 1: Evaluation of fuzzy rules 
This process is primarily conducted in order to determine which rule in the rule base is fired or 
not, through the application of fuzzy logic principles to combine fuzzy if–then rules in fuzzy rule 
base into a mapping, for example FLHZ  for FLH, FCSZ  for FCS and FCPZ  Following the 
fuzzification of these inputs, their fuzzified values are applied to each rule to determine which of 
the one hundred and twenty-five (125) rules listed in Table 6.1 are fired. If a rule has a true value 
in its antecedent (input part), it will be fired and then contributes to the conclusion (output part). 
If the antecedent of a given rule has more than one part as is the case of in this study then , the 
fuzzy operator will then be applied to evaluate the composite firing strength of the rule, for 
example assume the i-th (2
nd
) rule has three parts in its antecedent (An et al, 2006 & 2007). 
According to the above eight (8) out of the one hundred and twenty-five (125) rules in the rule 
base have been found to be fired based on the principles described in the section above as they 
turn out non-zero values, see Tables 6.7 and 6.8 below; 
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Table 6.7 Fired rules 
Rule No. Rule Description
R2 IF FLH is Very low and  FCS is Marginal and   FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Minor
R3 IF FLH is Very low and  FCS is Moderate and   FCP is Highly unlikely THEN  RL is Minor
R7 IF FLH is Low   and  FCS is Marginal  and  FCP  is Highly unlikelyTHEN  RL is Minor
R8 IF FLH is Low   and  FCS is Moderate  and  FCP  is Highly unlikelyTHEN  RL is Minor
R27 IF FLH is Very low and  FCS is Marginal and   FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Minor
R28 IF FLH is Very low and  FCS is Moderate and   FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R32 IF FLH is Low   and  FCS is Marginal  and  FCP  is Unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable
R33 IF FLH is Low   and  FCS is Moderate and  FCP  is Unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable  
As can be seen in above, the eight fired rules will therefore be processed using fuzzy minimum 
operator to establish their respective firing strengths. For example to determine the corresponding 







lowVery FCPFCSFLH                            (6-2) 
  = min {(very low, low), (marginal, moderate), (highly unlikely, unlikely)} 
  = min {(0.9500, 0.0500), (0.8000, 0.2000), (0.1000, 0.9000)} 
= min {(very low, moderate, unlikely)} 
  = min {0.9500, 0.8000, 0.1000} 
= min {(the lowest value which is 0.100)} 
   therefore: 2 = 0.1000 
Similarly, other firing strengths of fired rules can be calculated. The results are given in Table 
6.8. 
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Table 6.8 Fuzzy operation over fired rules 
 
Stage II: Implication 
The implication from antecedent to consequent can be obtained by fuzzy minimum operator 
method based on the firing strength of each rule. The implication output is a truncated fuzzy set. 
Figure 6.10 gives a detailed process of implication, where the shadowed areas indicate the output 
of implication for each fired rule. The firing strength for each rule is indicated in the vertical axis 
(degree of membership function). The linguistic variables of consequence, which is the risk level 
for the fired rules, are Minor, Tolerable, Major, and Intolerable, respectively as given in Figure 
6.10. 
R2: )}(,min{ 222 yB                                                                               (6-3) 
where 2  is the firing strength of the 2-nd rule, )(2 yB  is the membership function (MF) of RL 
of the fuzzy 2-nd rule and 2  is the membership function of the truncated fuzzy set after the 
performance of implication operation on 2-nd rule. The implication of the 2-nd rule can be 
computed using Equation (6-3). 
 Step 1: Substitute the value of 2  into Equation (6-3) 
 R2: )}(,1000.0,9000.0,9500.0min{ 2 yB  
         )}(,1000.0 2 yB  
Rule No. MF value of FLH MF value of FCS MF value of FCP Firing strength 
R2 0.9500 0.8000 0.1000 0.1000 
R3 0.9500 0.2000 0.9000 0.2000 
R7 0.0500 0.8000 0.9000 0.0500 
R8 0.0500 0.2000 0.9000 0.0500 
R27 0.9500 0.8000 0.1000 0.1000 
R28 0.9500 0.2000 0.1000 0.2000 
R32 0.0500 0.8000 0.1000 0.0500 
R33 0.0500 0.2000 0.1000 0.0500 
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To conclude implication process the value of MF 28RL  must be determined first and this is 
computed to obtain a value of 4.000 as demonstrated below; 








Fig. 6.9: MF-RL implication of R2 
5000.1)(2 yB  
Step 3: Substitute the values of 2  and )(2 yB in Equation (6-3) 
Substituting 2  and )(2 yB  in Equation (6-3) above will be expressed as below; 
i.e. )5000.1,1000.0min(2   
using fuzzy minimum operation on values 0.1000<1.500 
then 1000.02   
Applying the same three steps approach, the implications for all the eight fired rules have been 
computed and the details are listed in Table 6.10 below; 
Table 6.9 Fuzzy operation of implication of the fired rules 
 
Rule No. MF value of FLH MF value of FCS MF value of FCP Firing strength 
R2 0.9500 0.8000 0.1000 0.1000 
R3 0.9500 0.2000 0.9000 0.2000 
R7 0.0500 0.8000 0.9000 0.0500 
R8 0.0500 0.2000 0.9000 0.0500 
R27 0.9500 0.8000 0.1000 0.1000 
R28 0.9500 0.2000 0.1000 0.2000 
R32 0.0500 0.8000 0.1000 0.0500 
R33 0.0500 0.2000 0.1000 0.0500 




Stage 3: Aggregation 
Aggregation is a process whereby the fuzzy sets of the outputs of each rule are combined into a 
single fuzzy set conducted once for each output variable. The membership functions of the 
truncated fuzzy set for each of the fired rules obtained after implication are further used as inputs 
for the aggregation process for each rule as illustrated in Figure 6.10. The output for the 
aggregation process is one fuzzy set for each of the output variable. Fuzzy maximum operation 
method is applied in the execution of this process as denoted below. 
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Fig.6.10: Implication process of the eight fired rules 
This step combines all the eight outputs of implication processes into a single fuzzy set for which 
the membership function will be determined by the application of fuzzy maximum operators 
performed on the eight truncated membership functions in the output part and the value of this 
truncated membership function of the aggregated output is computed using Equation 6.4 below; 
),,,,,,,max()( 333228278732  yagg                                                         (6-4) 
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where )(yagg  is the MF value of output (risk level) after aggregation process. 
6.2.4.6 Defuzzification 
The aggregate output fuzzy set is used as input for the defuzzification process to obtain an output 
in a single number. Although fuzziness is required during the intermediate steps for the 

















                                                                                                    (6-5) 
Even though the defuzzified single value is calculated using Equation (6-5) shown above, its 
discrete form is always used for simplicity. This discrete form is given in Equation (6-6) below 






























According to the results of the aggregation as shown in Figure 6.11 and computed using as 
above, the defuzzified (crisp) value is obtained as shown in Figure 6.11. 












Fig.6.11: Aggregation of consequent output 
The defuzzified output result of 2.4375 is applied in RL axis as shown in Figure. 6.12 below to 
determine the membership function of the RL and its corresponding value as shown in Figure 
6.12. This clearly illustrates that, the RL value obtained belongs to minor and tolerable categories 
with a belief of 53% (MF=0.5282) and 47% (MF=0.4718) respectively. This result will thus 
provide safety analyst with useful information regarding the failure of the component used for the 
purpose of this demonstration. At this stage the risk information generated will enable safety 
analyst to make safety recommendations needed to modify and improve system design to make it 
safer. 
 
Fig.6.12: The result of risk level (RL) of the illustrated example 
The outcomes of risk assessment using FRA at the component level as demonstrated in previous 
sections above where the levels of risks are expressed as the degrees of belonging to MFs of RL 
1 . 0 
0 . 9 
0 . 8 
0 . 7 
0 . 6 
0 . 5 
0 . 4 
0 . 3 
0 . 2 
0 . 1 
y 
x 
Minor Tolerable Major Intolerable 
3 1 2 10 8 7 6 5 4 9 1 
 . 
   2.4375 
A. A. UMAR      Ph. D     2010 
 
114 
and illustrated in Figure 6.12. In this illustration the risk categories are defined with a belief of 
percentage for just one component failure event. Therefore to obtain the RLs at sub-system and 
the entire system levels fuzzy aggregation operation is applied progressively from component to 
sub-system level and finally to overall system level. For detailed demonstrations of how these are 
computed, the reader is referred to sections 7.3.4.6 & 7.3.4.7 in Chapter 7. 
6.2.5 Risk response phase 
The results produced from the risk estimation phase will provide the necessary information 
needed for the determination of appropriate responses to the associated risks. This information 
may also be used to assist risk analysts, design engineers, and managers in project design and, 
developing maintenance and operation policies. If risk is evaluated to be high, risk reduction 
measures must be applied or the system operation has to be reconsidered to reduce the occurrence 
probabilities or to control the possible consequences. On the other hand if risk is accepted to be 
negligible or inconsequential then, no further action would be required but the information 
produced needs to be recorded for certification purpose. However, it is important to note that the 
acceptable and unacceptable regions are usually divided by a transition region and any risk that 
falls within this transitional region must be reduced to ALARP (HSE, 1997). In this study, the 
RLs are categorised into four regions, i.e. „Minor‟, „Tolerable‟, „Major‟ and „Intolerable‟ These 
definitions are generally similar to those described by British, European and International 
Standards EN 50129, IEC 62278, BS EN ISO 12100-1, BS EN ISO 14121-1 and BS EN ISO 
20815 (EN, 1998; IEC, 2008; ISO 2003, 2007 & 2008). 
It is also important to note that risk assessment is not a one-off activity and therefore it becomes 
necessary for the safety needs to be reviewed at the appropriate intervals in order to update the 
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risk assessment and provide risk information for appropriate responses. Detail responses to 
assessed risk will also be given in Chapter 7 using case study. 
6.3 Summary 
As referred severally in this report the data available from offshore platform installation is often 
saddled with high level of uncertainty, particularly, at early stage in design, which may 
necessitate the need for the use of subjective judgement, and vague data to conduct a risk 
analysis. The traditional quantified risk assessment methods such as fault tree analysis (FTA) and 
event tree analysis (ETA) may not effectively handle the vague risk data with high level of 
uncertainty in the recorded information. However, the fuzzy reasoning based method can offer a 
great potential in the risk assessment, especially in dealing with uncertainties. In contrast with the 
traditional methods mentioned earlier, the fuzzy logic reasoning approach has the following 
advantages (An et al, 2000a & 2007): 
 It has the ability to integrate expert knowledge, engineering judgement, historical data and 
other risk analysis information to handle the safety and risk assessment in a more 
consistent manner; 
 It can make use of ambiguous, imprecise, incomplete and uncertainty information in the 
assessment; 
 The risk can simply be evaluated using the linguistic expressions which are employed in 
conducting risk assessment; 
 It offers a more flexible structure for combining failure occurrence and consequence. 
This chapter outlines the methodology of fuzzy reasoning approach in risk assessment of an 
offshore system. Illustrations have been used all through the procedure to demonstrate how the 
proposed risk analysis model can be used to progressively and effectively assess offshore 
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platform design-based risks from component failure to sub-system level and finally to system 
level. 
This chapter further describes how fuzzy reasoning approach is integrated and adopted to the 
concept of design for safety to develop a knowledge-based model for the assessment of risk of 
any chosen engineering system within the offshore domain. The effectiveness of the proposed 
model using real data collected from the industry will be detailed in Chapter 7. The results of 
case study will be used to demonstrate the ability of the proposed model to effectively assess the 
offshore platform risks in order to compliment the various techniques currently being used within 
the industry and to facilitate decision-making process. 






This Chapter describes the work carried out for testing the performance of the proposed 
knowledge-based risk assessment method (KBRAM), and the preliminary validation studies. The 
Chapter begins with the demonstration of how the method is used to process safety information 
by the application of the failure data collected from the industry. In this case the data is for the 
offshore processing unit of an offshore oil and gas platform. The KBRAM is applied to ensure 
that, the safety requirements are adequately integrated in the design of complex engineering 
systems such as offshore oil and gas platform. 
It is pertinent to note that, the operation of the processing unit is probably the most hazardous 
activity related to the transportation and drilling operation on an offshore oil and gas platform. 
Past experiences of onshore and offshore oil and gas activities have revealed that a small miss-
happening in the process operation might escalate to a catastrophe, which is of special concern in 
the offshore oil and gas platform especially due to the limited space and compact geometry of the 
process area coupled with limited ventilation and difficult escape routes. It is important to note 
that each extra controls measure added on the offshore oil and gas platform do not only occupy 
space but also increase congestion and add extra load to the platform. 
However, eventualities in the offshore oil and gas platform process operation can be minimised 
by incorporating appropriate control measures at the early design stage. The proposed risk 
assessment methodology is applied to various sub-systems of the offshore process unit referred to 
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in this report as the overall system. These sub-systems include the separators (Oil & Condensate), 
compressors 1 & 2, flash drum and driers for which appropriate safety measures are 
recommended based on their individually identified risk potentials. 
This Chapter also illustrates how adoption of the concept of the design for safety measures can 
contribute positively towards controlling risks to a more acceptable level. 
7.2 Description of an Offshore Processing Unit (OPU) 
The main function of the offshore production platform is to operate the wells, and to separate the 
fluid from the wells into oil, gas-condensate, gas and water. It subsequently pumps oil, gas-
condensate and gas to the onshore facilities. The offshore platform processing plant has three 
main parts, i.e. the wellhead, the separators and the gas compression. The layout of the process 
plant is shown in Figure 7.1. 
Production lines from individual wells terminate at the wellhead, and each line being topped by a 
„Christmas tree.‟ The well fluid passes through a manifold and is withdrawn at a production 
separator through a wing valve. The main hazard from the well is blowout which is likely to 
occur during work-over of the well. However, the present case study does not cover wellhead 
system hazards but focuses mainly on the major separation and compression parts of the process 
system. 
The fluid from the well is then conveyed through separators where it is separated into the four 
major products as mentioned above. Oil is pumped through the main oil line to the onshore 
facilities and part of the condensate is pumped along with the oil. Gas compression is achieved 
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using centrifugal compressors before it is subsequently delivered through the flash drum where 

























Fig. 7.1: Offshore platform process plant layout 
The gas is then dried and purified before it is further compressed to high-pressure through 
reciprocating compressors. Part of the gas is used at the wells for power generation on the 
platform while the remaining gas is pumped to the onshore facilities leaving a small amount to be 
flared. A simplified process flow diagram is presented in Figure 7.2 in order to present clearer 
details on the configuration of offshore platform. 




Fig.7.2: A simplified process flow diagram 
7.3  Offshore Processing Unit Risk Assessment using KBRAM 
A case study of risk assessment on offshore platform processing unit is presented to demonstrate 
the application of the proposed risk assessment method developed for the achievement of safer 
designed sub-system. This safe design concept is intended to facilitate decision-making through 
safety cost evaluations derived from the results obtained through the application of KBRAM. 
Figure 7.2 shows the processing unit consisting of six sub-systems: oil separator (SP1), 
condensate separator (SP2), compressors (CP1 & 2), flash drum (FD), and drier (DR) which will 
be used to demonstrate the KBRAM in the following sections. 
To flare 













Purified dry gas 
Drier 
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7.3.1 Data Collection and Analysis for Offshore Processing Unit 
The complete process system comprising separators, compressors, and pipelines has been studied 
in details. Safety measures are designed and implemented on each of the six process sub-systems 
based on the hazard identification studies presented by Khan et al, (2002b). The results from 
industry records, personnel interviews and previous hazard studies indicated that separators, 
compressors, drier and flash drum are considered as highly hazardous sub-systems, whereas the 
pipelines and pumps are considered to be moderately hazardous sub-systems. A detailed study on 
failures related to both the highly hazardous and moderately hazardous sub-systems is presented 
to illustrate and validate the efficiency of the proposed knowledge-based risk assessment method 
with reference to the results obtained as demonstrated in the following sections. 
7.3.2 Risk Identification for Offshore Processing Unit 
The Historical data of accidents and incidents recorded over the past period of time are assembled 
to generate the necessary input for the conduct of a risk assessment. This failure data has been 
reviewed identified and grouped into the six vital hazard groups as presented by Khan, et al, 
(2002b). Accordingly, each hazard group was further examined to identify a number of hazardous 
events which have also been verified by the risk assessments team listed in Table 7.1. 
7.3.2.1 Establishment of risk assessment team 
As explained in Chapter 6, in conducting this case study six experts with high knowledge of 
safety requirements on the offshore processing system have been carefully assembled to 
constitute a risk assessment team vested with the responsibility of conducting the risk assessment 
using the proposed knowledge-based risk assessment method. As mentioned in Chapter 6, 
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experts‟ weighted factors (WFs) have been assigned to each member based on their individual 
knowledge and experience. 
Table 7.1 below give the list of experts working with one of the world leading major oil & gas 
producing company. This list comprises of employees of the above company stationed in both 
West Africa and Middle East and referred to in this report as Nivi & Team for confidential 
reasons.  
As discussed in section 6.2.3.1 and further explained in section 6.2.4.4 experts contribution 














 and are assigned based on expertise, skills, status and 
experiences, thus Nivi & Team contribution factors are as shown in Table 7.1 below; 
Table 7.1 Risk assessment team and Contribution factors 
Expert Position Years of Assigned 
Experience Expertise Status Experience Contribution Factor
E1 Safety Officer <5 Yrs 15 10 5 0.3
E2 Safety Advisor >5 Yrs 10 5 5 0.2
E3 Operations Superintendent <5 Yrs 10 5 5 0.2
E4 Maintenance Supervisor <5 Yrs 3 2 5 0.1
E5 Operations Engineer >5 Yrs 3 2 5 0.1
E6 Operations Engineer >5 Yrs 3 2 5 0.1
Contribution Factor Determinants 
 
The contribution factors are obtained by scoring a maximum point of 100 spread the three main 
factors with per expert with pro-rated points of between 0 and 15 to arrive at the assigned 
contribution factors. 
Each member of the risk management team expressed their individual assessment through 
responses to questionnaires and interviews, on the levels of consequence severity and 
consequence probability of the identified top events based on component failures using the failure 
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data collated from the industry for the process unit. These expert assessments have been 
harmonised with the data on the inherent risk with reference to fire and explosion which are 
considered to be the most challenging to the operations of offshore platform processing unit. 
These inherent risks have been assessed carefully for the purposes of mitigation and decision 
making through design. The experts agreed that the data collected has adequate information 
regarding the top events and their corresponding failure frequencies and/or likelihood for all the 
critical components for the various sub-units (sub-system) of the processing unit (system). The 
team therefore, concentrated on the task of risk assessment using this information to measure the 
levels of severity of consequences and the probability of consequence resulting from each 
component failure which is applied to both sub-system and system levels. This proposed method 
is intended to compliment the efforts of various existing methods with particular reference to 
dealing with subjectivities and uncertainties associated with the data in order to demonstrate 
some measure of relative enhanced effectiveness. 
Following discussions with relevant managers and operators of shell OMAN and NIGERIA the 
list of identified risks associated with OPU has been compiled and verified to contain all possible 
failures, the result of which is now reflected in table 7.2 below (Nivi & Team, 2007); 
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Table 7.2 Offshore processing unit hazardous events (Nivi & Team, 2007) 
Sub-System Component Failure Mode Failure 
Code
Flow control valve S1-1
Leak indicator failed S1-2
Excess flow at upstream S1-3
Impurities causing exothermic reaction S1-4
Sudden change in pressure S1-5
Temperature controller failed S1-6
High pressure upstream line S1-7
Upstream pressure controller failed S1-8
Condensate line choked S1-9
Oil pipeline or valve choked S1-10
Gas pipeline or valve choke S1-11
Safety valve undersize S1-12
Safety/pressure valve choked or not function on demand S1-13
External heating S1-14
Exothermic reaction in vessel S1-15
Temperature controller failed S1-16
Pressure controller system of separator failed S1-17
Pressure or safety release failed S1-18
Ignition due to explosion energy S1-19
Ignition due to heat from surrounding S1-20
Electric spark as source of ignition S1-21
Leak from joints S2-1
Leak from main pipeline S2-2
Leak from joints S2-3
Leak from main pipeline S2-4
Leak from vessel S2-5
Leak from fracture, joints or crack S2-6
Leak from the pipe connection S2-7
Leak from safety valve S2-8
Leak from pressure release valve S2-9
Leak from control valves S2-10
Outlet pipe choked S2-11
High pressure upstream line S2-12
Sudden phase change S2-13
External heat absorption causing increase in pressure S2-14
Ignition due to explosion energy S2-15
Ignition due to external heat from surrounding S2-16
Ignition due to electric spark S2-17
Release from pipe after explosion S2-18
Release from vessel aftermath of explosion S2-19
Ignition due to external explosion energy S2-20
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Table 7.2 Continue (Nivi & Team, 2007) 
Sub-System Component Failure Mode Failure 
Code
Leak from compressor downstream pipeline CP-1
Leak from compressor downstream pipeline joints CP-2
Leak from compressor upstream pipeline CP-3
Leak from joints of compressor upstream pipeline CP-4
Release from casing of compressor CP-5
Leaking of seal CP-6
Release from impeller CP-7
Compressor completely failed causing release of chemical CP-8
Leak from junction of pump and pipeline CP-9
Leak from rotor CP-10
Pump failed to operate and caused release of chemical CP-11
Leak from casing CP-12
Ignition due to explosion energy CP-13
Ignition due to external heat from surrounding CP-14
Ignition due to electric spark CP-15
Fire caused by failure of pipeline CP-16
Fire caused vessel to fail & release of chemical CP-17
Leak from upstream pipeline FD-1
Leak from upstream pipeline joints FD-2
High-pressure in vessel causing rupture & release of gas FD-3
Leak from joints or flange FD-4
Leak from downstream pipeline FD-5
Leak from joints of downstream pipeline FD-6
Leak from joint of gas pipeline FD-7
Leak from gas pipeline FD-8
Ignition due to explosion energy FD-9
Ignition due to external heat from surrounding FD-10
Ignition due to electric spark FD-11
Ignition due to explosion energy FD-12
Ignition due to external heat from surrounding FD-13
VCE causes pipeline to fail and release chemical FD-14
VCE causes vessel to fail and release chemical FD-15
Impurities in feed line DR-1
Control system failed DR-2
Sudden phase change DR-3
Temperature controller failed DR-4
Heating due to external heat source DR-5
Drier outlet line choked DR-6
Outlet valve choked DR-7
Safety valve failed to operate on demand DR-8
Pressure relief failed to operate on demand DR-9
Ignition due to external heat from surroundings DR-10
Ignition due to electric spark DR-11
Ignition due to explosion energy DR-12
Ignition due to external heat from surroundings DR-13
BLEVE causes vessel to fail and release chemical DR-14

















Questionnaire was designed and discussed with Nivi & Team, (2007) based on the listed failure 
event in Table 7.2. Quality check of the questionnaire was conducted by the author‟s supervisors 
to ensure all the necessary informations regarding the chosen installations are adequately 
captured for effective analysis and achievement of reliable results. 
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1. SP1 (Oil separator): - The cumulative effect of overpressure and heat load may result in the 
release of a chemical gas from other units, which on ignition would cause a fire. This type of 
failure has high possibility of causing fatality as well as trigger accidents in other units such as 
condensate separator, the oil transportation pipeline, and the main pumping station. 
Damage potential estimation: - The result for separator 1 failures is boiling liquid expanding 
vapour explosion (BLEVE) to be followed by fire. BLEVE would generate fatal overpressure 
over an area and the vapour cloud generated by the released chemical on ignition causes a 
fireball, which would generate a heat radiation effect. This type of failure has high possibility of 
causing fatality due to heat load. The overpressure and heat radiation effect may cause a fatality 
as well as second-tier accidents through damages to other units such as separator 2, the oil 
transportation pipeline, and the main pumping station. 
2. SP2 (Condensate separator): -  The failure involves release of chemical forming vapour cloud 
which on ignition would cause vapor cloud explosion (VCE) and eventual fire capable causing 
severe damage to the condensate and gas pipelines. 
Damage potential estimation: - VCE followed by fire would cause considerable damage. There is 
high possibility that damage could have high level of consequence severity due to a combination 
of overpressure and shockwave.  
The residue or left over chemical within the unit would burn as a pool fire resulting in possible 
combination of heat load and shockwave. This possible combination unit could initiate secondary 
and a higher order of accidents in the neighbouring units such as condensate and gas pipeline. 
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3. CP (Compressors 1 & 2): - the continuous release of flammable gas from compressor 1 on 
ignition would cause a jet fire, which may generate the lethal heat load resulting in possible 
fatality and damage. Flash drum and the drier are likely to be affected by this failure. 
Damage potential estimation: -: Compressor I: It is evident from that this scenario would cause 
moderate damage. There is no likelihood of overpressure development, however, a fire jet may 
result and generate lethal heat load with the potential of causing fatality and damage. There is 
also a possibility that the jet flame may trigger some damages in the units within its close 
proximity either through direct impact or by external heat load. The units likely to be affected by 
this accident are the flash drum and the drier. 
Damage potential estimation: Compressor 2: It is evident from that this scenario would cause 
moderate damage. There is no likelihood of overpressure development, however, a fire jet may 
result and generate lethal heat load with the potential of causing fatality and damage. There is 
also a possibility that the jet flame may trigger some damages in the units within its close 
proximity either through direct impact or by external heat load. The units likely to be affected by 
this accident are the drier and the pipeline. 
4. FD (Flash drum): - The failure involves the release of gas which on ignition would cause a 
fireball while the cumulative effect of overpressure and heat may cause other units to fail and 
result in pool and/or jet fires. The burning of a vapor cloud as well as a liquid pool would 
generate a lethal heat load which would cover a larger area. This sub-unit does not pose any 
serious threat. 
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Damage potential estimation: The flash drum poses lesser hazards compared to the separators. It 
is evident that damage causing shockwaves would be effective only to a limited area. The 
burning of a vapor cloud as well as a liquid pool would generate a lethal heat load which would 
cover a larger area. As evident from the detailed descriptions of the failure scenario, this unit 
does not pose a serious threat and there is less likely to result in secondary accident. 
5. DR (Drier): - The drier is another important unit in the process facility as it handles a large 
quantity of flammable gas at high-pressure. The released chemical on ignition would cause a 
fireball and a pool fire generated heat load has capabilities of causing fatality and damage over a 
wider area. The sub-units likely to be affected are compressors and gas transportation line. 
Damage potential estimation: Drier; Lethal overpressure load is enough to cause fatality, and 
damage would cover a reasonable area. The released chemical on ignition would cause a fireball 
and a pool fire due to leftover chemical in the unit. This lethal heat load has capabilities of 
causing fatality and damage which could extend to a wider area. It is also likely that overpressure 
and heat radiation load may cause other units to fail as secondary accidents. 
7.3.3 Risk Estimation for Offshore Processing Unit 
This is the stage where input parameters are measured, fuzzified, aggregated and defuzzified 
using Equations (6-1) to (6-6) to obtain crisp values in order to accurately define output 
implication. These values are further applied to the output membership function (MF) to express 
risk level (RL) as degree of percentage of belonging to any or a combination of two linguistic risk 
categories. The risk estimation steps are explained in the subsequent sections. 
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7.3.3.1 Establishment of risk parameters 
In this case study the failure likelihood (FLH) has been adopted from the industry data for the 
identified top events at the component level. Therefore, the task is the measurement of failure 
consequence severity (FCS) and failure consequence probability (FCP), which involves steps, 
like measurement of FCS and FCP by the experts, conversion of individual assessment by 
applying experts‟ weighted factors (WF) as given in Table 7.1 and aggregation of the scores into 
expert collective assessment for each component failure event by substituting corresponding 
value in Equation 6.1. 
The input parameters are FLH, FCS and FCP of failure events and the outputs of risk assessment 
are RLs of failure events, at component level, sub-system level and the overall system of the 
offshore processing unit with risk scores located from 0 to 10. These scores will then be applied 
through the modeling procedures to obtain corresponding risk levels (RLs) belonging to category 
or categories as „Minor’, ‘Tolerable’, ‘Major’ and ‘Intolerable’ expressed in percentage belief. 
The RLs for all the sub-systems are calculated using the principles of fuzzy reasoning approach 
(FRA) based on the aggregation of the results for each failure event belonging to the particular 
subsystems. 
The overall RL for the system is obtained based on the aggregated implication of all the fired 
rules from all the constituent components of the various sub-systems as listed in Table 7.1. 
7.3.3.2 Establishment fuzzy membership functions (MFs) for the risk parameters 
As mentioned earlier in this report, the three input parameters of FLH, FCS and FCP, are selected 
for assessing the RL of the identified top events of the offshore platform processing unit from 
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components through sub- system to overall system levels. The six experts have also agreed with 
five linguistic terms to describe the three input parameters i.e. FLH as very low (VL), low (Lo), 
average (Av), high (Hh) and very high (VH), for FCS as negligible (Ne), marginal (Mg), 
moderate (Md), severe (Se) and catastrophic (Ct), and FCP as highly-unlikely (HU), unlikely 
(Ul), likely (Li), highly-likely (HL) and definite (Df). However, for the output parameter RL, they 
agreed to use four linguistic terms described as minor (Mn), tolerable (To), major (Mj) and 
intolerable (It). 
The risk descriptions of FLH, FCS, FCP, and RL are shown in Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 & 6.4, which 
are defined by Trapezoidal MFs as shown in Figures 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 & 6.5. 
7.3.3.3 Fuzzification using case study example  
This process as described earlier will in this proposed offshore risk assessment be applied to 
convert input parameters FLH, FCS and FCP into their fuzzy qualitative descriptors of FLHZ , 
FCSZ  and FCPZ  respectively in order to determine the degree of belonging of each of the 
appropriate fuzzy set in rule base via MF assumptions of FLH and computations of weighted 
scores for FCS are as demonstrated in the following sections; 
In determining the fired rules using case study, for example the failure of safety and/or pressure 
valve chocking or failure on demand in Separator 1 coded SP1-13 was considered and mapped as 
shown in Figure 7.3. These values indicate that, this component failure has likelihood (FLH) of 
0.002 events per year and the corresponding values (scores) of 3.92 and 3.04, for FCS and FCP 
respectively as obtained using Equation (6-1) as expressed in chapter 6 to compute experts‟ 
weighted scores. 
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Fig.7.3: MFs of three input parameters for SP1-13 
These input values are further used to determine the linguistic classifications and MFs for each of 
the three input parameters which are summarised in Table 7.3 below. 
Table 7.3 SP1-13 Fuzzification 













7.3.3.4 Application of fuzzy inference engine process using case study example 
Applying the fuzzy inference engine procedure as demonstrated in Section 6.2.4.5 of Chapter 6, 
the input details in Table 7.3 above have been combined in the fuzzy rule base to determine the 
fired rules. These established fired rules are further required through the processes of fuzzy 
inference engine in order to establish the risk implications as demonstrated. 
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Stage 1: Evaluation of fuzzy rules 
The conclusion of the fuzzy rules evaluation as described in Chapter 6, in this case turned out 
four fired rules from the rule base as the four rules turn out non-zero values, and these are listed 
in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4 Fired rules for SP1-13 
 
The four fired rules will therefore be processed further through the application of fuzzy minimum 
operator and Equation (6-2) as in Chapter 6 to compute the rules respective firing strengths and 
the result is as shown in Table 7.5. 
Table 7.5 SP1-13 Fired rules fuzzy operations 
Rule No. MF value of FLH MF value of FCS MF value of FCP Firing Strength
R27 1.00 0.08 0.96 0.08
R28 1.00 0.92 0.96 0.92
R52 1.00 0.08 0.04 0.04
R53 1.00 0.92 0.04 0.04  
Stage 2: Implication 
The implication from antecedent to consequent can be obtained by fuzzy minimum operator 
method based on the firing strength of each rule. The implication output is obtained also through 
the application of fuzzy minimum operator and Equation (6-3) to compute their corresponding 
implications as described in Chapter 6 and the result is summarised in Table 7.6. 
Rule No. Rule Description 
R27 IF FLH is Very low and FCS is Marginal  and FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Minor 
R28 IF FLH is Very low and FCS is Moderate and FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable 
R52 IF FLH is Very low and FCS is Marginal  and FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable 
R53 IF FLH is Very low and FCS is Moderate and FCP is Unlikely THEN  RL is Tolerable 
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Table 7.6 SP1-13 Fired rules implication 
 
Stage 3: Aggregation 
The output for the aggregation process is one fuzzy set for each of the output variable. Fuzzy 
maximum operation method is applied in the execution of this process to obtain results as shown 
in Figure 7.4 below. 
R53
Output Defuzzification
























































Fig.7.4: Implication process of the four fired rules 
This step combines all the four outputs of implication processes into a single fuzzy set for which 
the membership function is determined by the application of fuzzy maximum operators 
Rule No. Firing Strength MF Value of RL MF Value of Implication 
R27 0.08 1.50 0.08 
R28 0.92 4.00 0.92 
R52 0.04 4.00 0.04 
R53 0.04 4.00 0.04 
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performed on the four truncated membership functions and the value of this truncated 
membership function of the aggregated output is computed using Equation (6-4) as described and 
demonstrated in Chapter 6. 
7.3.3.5 Defuzzification 
As demonstrated in Chapter 6, the aggregate output fuzzy set is used as input for the 
defuzzification process to obtain an output in a single number. Equation (6-6) is applied to 







According to the aggregation result shown in Fig 7.4 and computed using Equation (6-6) as 











Fig.7.5: Aggregation of consequent output 
This defuzzified output value of 3.8148 as shown above is applied in RL axis as shown in Figure. 
7.6 to determine the membership function of the risk level and its corresponding value. The 
illustrations in Figure 7.6 shows that the RL value belongs to tolerable category with belief of 
100% (MF=1.00) respectively. This procedure was applied to all the failures events from 
A. A. UMAR      Ph. D     2010 
 
135 















Minor Tolerable Major Intolerable
31 2 1087654 91
3.8148  
Fig.7.6: The result of risk level (RL) of the illustrated example 
The outcomes of risk assessment using FRA at the component level as demonstrated in previous 
sections above where the level of risks are expressed also as the degrees of belonging to 
membership functions (MFs) of risk level (RL) for SP1-13 and illustrated in Figure 7.12, and the 
results are summarised in Table 7.7. 
Therefore to obtain the RLs at sub-system and the entire system levels fuzzy aggregation 
operation is applied progressively to sub-system levels and eventually overall system level as will 
be demonstrated and discussed in the subsequent sections of this Chapter. 
The result of the above process will be expressed in one or a maximum combination of two out of 
the four linguistic categories for the risk level this information is used to draw conclusion and 
make recommendations needed to facilitate the decision making process. For example, if the risk 
belongs to either tolerable or minor category or a combination of both then the control measures 
may be based on economic cost benefit analysis. However, for risk belonging to either major 
and/or intolerable design review would be recommended in order to re-assess the risk and apply 
necessary measures to reduce the risk to ALARP level. 
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According to the above, the safety analyst will make safety recommendations including risk 
responses needed to modify and improve the component quality through design to make it safer 
and more reliable. 
7.3.4 Internal Validation of Experts Jugdements 
7.3.4.1 Typical Expert Scores 
Table 7.7 below shows the result of internal validation of a typical expert scores extracted from 
the raw data reflecting their responses to the questionnaire. These scores are specifically for the 
failure event coded S1-12  in Table 7.2 related to undersize safety valve fitted to an offshore 
processing unit (OPU). 





















































































































































































































































0.10 Very low 0.10 Very low 0.10    Very low 0.10     Very low 0.10     Very low 0.10       
Low 0.90 Low 0.90 Low 0.90    Low 0.90     Low 0.90     Low 0.90       
Moderate 1.00 Moderate 1.00 Marginal 1.00    Moderate 0.50     Marginal 0.50     Moderate 0.50       
- - Severe 0.50     Moderate 0.50     Severe 0.50       
Likely 1.00 Unlikely 1.00 Unlikely 0.50    likely 1.00     likely 1.00     likely 1.00       
Likely 0.50    
100% 100% 100% 71% 100% 71%
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Figure 7.7 below further shows that internal validation of experts judgement indicating data 
consistency when applies to the model as all the five experts posted risk level substantially within 
the tolerable region with on. This result confirms the consistency of fuzzy knowledge-based 
method (KBRAM) thus deomstarting the reliability of the model. 
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Fig.7.7: The result of risk level (RL) of the illustrated example for typical scores 
7.3.4.2 Most Disperse Expert Scores 
Table 7.8 below shows the result of internal validation of a typical expert scores extracted from 
the raw data reflecting their responses to the questionnaire. These scores are specifically for the 
failure event coded S1-1 in Table 7.2 related to flow control valve fitted to an offshore processing 
unit (OPU). 





















































































































































































































































0.30 0.30 0.30    0.30     0.30     Very low 0.30       
0.70 0.70 0.70    0.70     0.70     Low 0.70       
Severe 1.00 Severe 1.00 Moderate 1.00    Moderate 1.00     Moderate 1.00     Severe 1.00       
- - - - - - - - - -
Likely 1.00 Likely 1.00 Likely 1.00    Likely 1.00     Likely 1.00     Likely 1.00       
- - - - - - - -
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Risk Score 6.10 4.00 4.00
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Figure 7.8 below furher shows that internal validation of disperse experts score indicating data 
consistency when applies to the model as all the five experts posted risk level substantially within 
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the tolerable region with on. This result confirms the consistency of fuzzy knowledge-based 
method (KBRAM) thus deomstarting the reliability of the model. 
y
x
Minor Tolerable Major Intolerable
31 2 1087654.00 90
6.10E3, E4 & E5
E1 & E2
 
Fig.7.8: The result of risk level (RL) of the illustrated example for disperse scores 
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Table 7.9 Membership Functions of OPU component failures 
S1-1 2.85E-06 1.00 0 0 0 0 3.04 0 0.96 0.04 0 0 2.24 0 1.00 0 0 0
S1-2 2.28E-06 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.96 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.24 0 1.00 0 0 0
S1-3 9.11E-06 0 1.00 0 0 2.80 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.48 0 1.00 0 0 0
S1-4 3.42E-07 1.00 0 0 0 3.28 0 0.28 0.72 0 0 1.84 0.16 0.84 0 0 0
S1-5 1.94E-06 1.00 0 0.00 0 0 2.80 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.56 0 1.00 0 0 0
S1-6 2.28E-06 1.00 0 0 0 0 3.04 0 0.96 0.04 0 0 2.56 0 1.00 0 0 0
S1-7 7.97E-06 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.88 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.56 0 1.00 0 0 0
S1-8 2.85E-06 0.30 0.70 0 0 0 3.04 0 0.96 0.04 0 0 2.40 0 1.00 0 0 0
S1-9 2.39E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.64 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.64 0 1.00 0 0 0
S1-10 8.54E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 3.04 0 0.96 0.04 0 0 2.64 0 1.00 0 0 0
S1-11 1.71E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 3.04 0 0.96 0.04 0 0 2.56 0 1.00 0 0 0
S1-12 5.69E-06 0.10 0.90 0 0 0 3.52 0 0.48 0.52 0 0 3.12 0 0.88 0.12 0 0
S1-13 1.71E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 3.92 0 0.08 0.92 0 0 3.04 0 0.96 0.04 0 0
S1-14 1.71E-06 1.00 0 0 0 0 3.20 0 0.80 0.20 0 0 2.24 0 1.00 0 0 0
S1-15 3.42E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 3.52 0 0.48 0.52 0 0 2.56 0 0 0 1.00 0
S1-16 2.28E-06 1.00 0 0 0 0 3.36 0 0.64 0.36 0 0 2.56 0 1.00 0 0 0
S1-17 2.28E-06 1.00 0 0 0 0 3.28 0 0.28 0.72 0 0 2.72 0 1.00 0 0 0
S1-18 1.71E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 4.00 0 0 1.00 0 0 3.12 0 0.88 0.12 0 0
S1-19 1.71E-05 0 0 1.00 0 0 4.00 0 0 1.00 0 0 3.04 0 0.96 0.04 0 0
S1-20 2.28E-05 0 0 0 1.00 0 4.00 0 0 1.00 0 0 2.96 0 1.00 0 0 0
S1-21 2.85E-05 0 0 0 0 1.00 4.16 0 0 1.00 0 0 2.80 0 1.00 0 0 0
S2-1 5.12E-06 0.30 0.70 0 0 0 2.24 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.24 0 1.00 0 0 0
S2-2 3.42E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.48 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.08 0 1.00 0 0 0
S2-3 5.12E-06 0.30 0.70 0 0 0 2.48 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.32 0 1.00 0 0 0
S2-4 3.42E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.48 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.16 0 1.00 0 0 0
S2-5 1.71E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.48 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.20 0 1.00 0 0 0
S2-6 4.55E-08 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.48 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.20 0 1.00 0 0 0
S2-7 7.40E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.64 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.36 0 1.00 0 0 0
S2-8 6.26E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.88 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.24 0 1.00 0 0 0
S2-9 1.71E-06 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.80 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.52 0 1.00 0 0 0
S2-10 2.85E-06 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.80 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.40 0 1.00 0 0 0
S2-11 3.98E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 3.04 0 0.96 0.04 0 0 2.16 0 1.00 0 0 0
S2-12 1.94E-05 0 0 0.53 0.47 0 2.72 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.16 0 1.00 0 0 0
S2-13 1.94E-06 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.40 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.24 0 1.00 0 0 0
S2-14 1.82E-06 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.84 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.88 0 1.00 0 0 0
S2-15 1.71E-05 0 0 1.00 0 0 3.36 0 0.64 0.36 0 0 3.04 0 0.96 0.04 0 0
S2-16 2.28E-05 0 0 0 1.00 0 3.52 0 0.48 0.52 0 0 2.96 0 1.00 0 0 0
S2-17 2.49E-05 0 0 0 0 1.00 3.60 0 0.40 0.60 0 0 3.04 0 0.96 0.04 0 0
S2-18 1.14E-05 0 0.20 0.80 0 0 3.36 0 0.64 0.36 0 0 3.52 0 0.48 0.52 0 0
S2-19 5.69E-06 0.90 0.10 0 0 0 3.52 0 0.48 0.52 0 0.00 3.52 0 0.48 0.52 0 0
S2-20 2.28E-05 0 0 0 1.00 0 3.68 0 0.32 0.68 0 0.00 3.20 0 0.80 0.20 0 0
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Table 7.9 Continue 
CP-1 7.40E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.88 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.36 0 1.00 0 0 0
CP-2 1.02E-05 0 0.58 0.42 0 0 2.64 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.32 0 1.00 0 0 0
CP-3 3.42E-07 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.48 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.40 0 1.00 0 0 0
CP-4 5.12E-06 0.30 0.70 0 0 0 2.80 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.16 0 1.00 0 0 0
CP-5 5.69E-06 0.10 0.90 0 0 0 2.96 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.64 0 1.00 0 0 0
CP-6 1.37E-05 0 0 1.00 0 0 2.80 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.72 0 1.00 0 0 0
CP-7 1.14E-05 0 0.20 0.80 0 0 2.80 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.64 0 1.00 0 0 0
CP-8 7.97E-06 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.96 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.48 0 1.00 0 0 0
CP-9 1.14E-06 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.80 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.28 0 1.00 0 0 0
CP-10 6.83E-06 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.80 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.28 0 1.00 0 0 0
CP-11 1.71E-05 0 0 1.00 0 0 2.64 0 1 0 0 0 2.64 0 1.00 0 0 0
CP-12 2.28E-05 0 0 1.00 0 3.04 0 0.96 0.04 0 0 2.72 0 1.00 0 0 0
CP-13 1.71E-05 0 0 1.00 0 0 3.44 0 0.56 0.44 0 0 3.12 0 0.88 0.12 0 0
CP-14 2.28E-05 0 0 0 1.00 0 3.28 0 0.72 0.28 0 0 3.12 0 0.88 0.12 0 0
CP-15 2.85E-05 0 0 0 0 1.00 3.28 0 0.72 0.28 0 0 2.80 0 1.00 0 0 0
CP-16 1.14E-06 1.00 0 0 0 0 3.20 0 0.80 0.20 0 0 3.28 0 0.72 0.28 0 0
CP-17 5.69E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 3.44 0 0.56 0.44 0 0 3.20 0 0.80 0.20 0 0
FD-1 3.42E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.64 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.32 0 1.00 0 0 0
FD-2 5.12E-06 0.30 0.70 0 0 0 2.64 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.32 0 1.00 0 0 0
FD-3 3.42E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 3.28 0 0.72 0.28 0 0 2.24 0 1.00 0 0 0
FD-4 8.54E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.80 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.24 0 1.00 0 0 0
FD-5 3.42E-09 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.64 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.32 0 1.00 0 0 0
FD-6 5.12E-06 0.30 0.70 0 0 0 2.64 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.32 0 1.00 0 0 0
FD-7 7.40E-06 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.64 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.48 0 1.00 0 0 0
FD-8 5.12E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.88 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.72 0 1.00 0 0 0
FD-9 1.71E-05 0 0 1.00 0 0 3.36 0 0.64 0.36 0 0 3.04 0 0.96 0.04 0 0
FD-10 2.28E-05 0 0 0 1.00 0 3.60 0 0.40 0.60 0 0 2.96 0 1.00 0 0 0
FD-11 2.85E-05 0 0 0 0 1.00 3.60 0 0.40 0.60 0 0 2.96 0 1.00 0 0 0
FD-12 1.71E-05 0 0 1.00 0 0 3.60 0 0.40 0.60 0 0 2.96 0 1.00 0 0 0
FD-13 2.28E-05 0 0 0 1.00 0 3.60 0 0.40 0.60 0 0 3.04 0 0.96 0.04 0 0
FD-14 1.71E-05 0 0 1.00 0 0 2.88 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.80 0 1.00 0 0 0
FD-15 5.69E-06 0.10 0.90 0 0 0 2.88 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.80 0 1.00 0 0 0
DR-1 2.28E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.00 0 1.00 0 0 0 1.92 0.08 0.92 0 0 0
DR-2 2.28E-06 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.40 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.24 0 1.00 0 0 0
DR-3 2.85E-06 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.40 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.24 0 1.00 0 0 0
DR-4 2.28E-06 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.40 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.48 0 1.00 0 0 0
DR-5 1.71E-05 0 0 1.00 0 0 2.48 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.72 0 1.00 0 0 0
DR-6 4.55E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.64 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.60 0 1.00 0 0 0
DR-7 9.11E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 2.64 0 1.00 0 0 0 2.56 0 1.00 0 0 0
DR-8 8.54E-07 1.00 0 0 0 0 3.20 0 0.80 0.20 0 0 3.60 0 0.40 0.60 0 0
DR-9 1.14E-06 1.00 0 0 0 0 3.36 0 0.64 0.36 0 0 3.60 0 0.40 0.60 0 0
DR-10 2.28E-05 0 0 0 1.00 0 3.36 0 0.64 0.36 0 0 3.44 0 0.56 0.44 0 0
DR-11 2.85E-05 0 0 0 0 1.00 3.36 0 0.64 0.36 0 0 3.44 0 0.56 0.44 0 0
DR-12 1.71E-05 0 0 1.00 0 0 3.44 0 0.56 0.44 0 0 3.52 0 0.48 0.52 0 0
DR-13 2.28E-05 0 0 0 1.00 0 3.36 0 0.64 0.36 0 0 3.52 0 0.48 0.52 0 0
DR-14 5.69E-06 0.10 0.90 0 0 0 3.12 0 0.88 0.12 0 0 3.36 0 0.64 0.36 0 0

































































































































































A. A. UMAR      Ph. D     2010 
 
141 
7.3.5 Effect of third parameter FCP through comparison of KBRAM and TPRAM 
It is important to demonstrate the benefit of additional parameter FCP (failure consequence 
probability) by comparing the results of the proposed risk assessment system with the results 
from typical two–input parameter fuzzy reasoning approach based risk assessment method 
(TPRAM). TPRAM has been slightly modified to develop the proposed knowledge-based risk 
assessment method (KBRAM) for application in the risk assessment of offshore platform. The 
results produced by both TPRAM and proposed KBRAM methods are enumerated in Table 7.9 
for ease of comparison and validation purposes. In this table, the risk level values for both models 
have been computed using same fuzzy aggregation method with only difference being the 
modification by the introduction of an additional input parameter (FCP) in the case of the 
proposed KBRAM. The breakdown of the result presented in Table 7.10 shows that, the proposed 
KBRAM is seen to have returned more efficient results compared with those produced by 
TPRAM as demonstrated in subsequent sections. Table 7.11 is produced to further demonstrate 
the effect of FCP on the result as shown in the section 7.3.6. 




Table 7.10 Risk Levels of Component Failures 
S1-1 2.85E-06 3.04 2.24 1.80 100% 4.00 100%
S1-2 2.28E-06 2.96 2.24 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
S1-3 9.11E-06 2.80 2.48 4.00 100% 4.00 100%
S1-4 3.42E-07 3.28 1.84 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
S1-5 1.94E-06 2.80 2.56 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
S1-6 2.28E-06 3.04 2.56 1.60 100% 4.00 100%
S1-7 7.97E-06 2.88 2.56 4.00 100% 4.00 100%
S1-8 2.85E-06 3.04 2.40 1.60 100% 4.00 100%
S1-9 2.39E-07 2.64 2.64 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
S1-10 8.54E-07 3.04 2.64 1.60 100% 4.00 100%
S1-11 1.71E-07 3.04 2.56 1.60 100% 4.00 100%
S1-12 5.69E-06 3.52 3.12 3.85 100% 4.00 100%
S1-13 1.71E-07 3.92 3.04 2.33 100% 4.00 100%
S1-14 1.71E-06 3.20 2.24 2.00 100% 4.00 100%
S1-15 3.42E-07 3.52 2.56 2.80 16% 84% 4.00 100%
S1-16 2.28E-06 3.36 2.56 2.40 56% 44% 4.00 100%
S1-17 2.28E-06 3.28 2.72 3.30 100% 4.00 100%
S1-18 1.71E-07 4.00 3.12 4.00 100% 4.00 100%
S1-19 1.71E-05 4.00 3.04 5.50 46% 54% 7.00 100%
S1-20 2.28E-05 4.00 2.96 7.00 100% 9.00 100%
S1-21 2.85E-05 4.16 2.80 7.00 100% 9.00 100%
S2-1 5.12E-06 2.24 2.24 2.80 16% 84% 4.00 100%
S2-2 3.42E-07 2.48 2.08 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
S2-3 5.12E-06 2.48 2.32 3.25 100% 4.00 100%
S2-4 3.42E-07 2.48 2.16 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
S2-5 1.71E-07 2.48 2.20 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
S2-6 4.55E-08 2.48 2.20 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
S2-7 7.40E-07 2.64 2.36 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
S2-8 6.26E-07 2.88 2.24 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
S2-9 1.71E-06 2.80 2.52 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
S2-10 2.85E-06 2.80 2.40 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
S2-11 3.98E-07 3.04 2.16 1.60 100% 4.00 100%
S2-12 1.94E-05 2.72 2.16 4.00 100% 4.00 100%
S2-13 1.94E-06 2.40 2.24 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
S2-14 1.82E-06 2.84 2.88 1.50 100% 7.00 100%
S2-15 1.71E-05 3.36 3.04 5.11 85% 15% 4.00 100%
S2-16 2.28E-05 3.52 2.96 4.00 100% 5.56 40% 60%
S2-17 2.49E-05 3.60 3.04 5.78 18% 82% 9.00 100%
S2-18 1.14E-05 3.36 3.52 4.95 100% 7.00 100%
S2-19 5.69E-06 3.52 3.52 3.56 100% 7.00 100%
S2-20 2.28E-05 3.68 3.20 5.89 7% 93% 9.00 100%
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Table 7.10 Continue 
CP-1 7.40E-07 2.88 2.36 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
CP-2 1.02E-05 2.64 2.32 4.00 100% 4.00 100%
CP-3 3.42E-07 2.48 2.40 4.00 100% 4.00 100%
CP-4 5.12E-06 2.80 2.16 3.25 100% 4.00 100%
CP-5 5.69E-06 2.96 2.64 3.75 100% 4.00 100%
CP-6 1.37E-05 2.80 2.72 4.00 100% 4.00 100%
CP-7 1.14E-05 2.80 2.64 4.00 100% 4.00 100%
CP-8 7.97E-06 2.96 2.48 4.00 100% 4.00 100%
CP-9 1.14E-06 2.80 2.28 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
CP-10 6.83E-06 2.80 2.28 4.00 100% 5.20 100%
CP-11 1.71E-05 2.64 2.64 4.00 100% 4.00 100%
CP-12 2.28E-05 3.04 2.72 4.12 100% 7.00 100%
CP-13 1.71E-05 3.44 3.12 5.35 61% 39% 8.80 20% 80%
CP-14 2.28E-05 3.28 3.12 4.97 100% 7.56 100%
CP-15 2.85E-05 3.28 2.80 4.84 100% 7.56 100%
CP-16 1.14E-06 3.20 3.28 2.71 25% 75% 3.50 100%
CP-17 5.69E-07 3.44 3.20 3.00 100% 3.00 100%
FD-1 3.42E-07 2.64 2.32 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
FD-2 5.12E-06 2.64 2.32 3.75 100% 3.25 100%
FD-3 3.42E-07 3.28 2.24 2.20 77% 23% 3.30 100%
FD-4 8.54E-07 2.80 2.24 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
FD-5 3.42E-09 2.64 2.32 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
FD-6 5.12E-06 2.64 2.32 3.75 100% 3.25 100%
FD-7 7.40E-06 2.64 2.48 4.00 100% 7.00 100%
FD-8 5.12E-07 2.88 2.72 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
FD-9 1.71E-05 3.36 3.04 5.11 85% 15% 6.04 100%
FD-10 2.28E-05 3.60 2.96 5.80 16% 84% 7.00 100%
FD-11 2.85E-05 3.60 2.96 5.80 16% 84% 8.92 7% 93%
FD-12 1.71E-05 3.60 2.96 5.80 16% 84% 7.00 100%
FD-13 2.28E-05 3.60 3.04 5.22 74% 26% 7.00 93% 7%
FD-14 1.71E-05 2.88 2.80 4.00 100% 5.92 4% 96%
FD-15 5.69E-06 2.88 2.80 3.75 100% 4.30 100%
DR-1 2.28E-07 2.00 1.92 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
DR-2 2.28E-06 2.40 2.24 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
DR-3 2.85E-06 2.40 2.24 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
DR-4 2.28E-06 2.40 2.48 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
DR-5 1.71E-05 2.48 2.72 4.00 100% 7.00 100%
DR-6 4.55E-07 2.64 2.60 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
DR-7 9.11E-07 2.64 2.56 1.50 100% 4.00 100%
DR-8 8.54E-07 3.20 3.60 3.29 100% 5.60 36% 64%
DR-9 1.14E-06 3.36 3.60 3.42 100% 4.00 100%
DR-10 2.28E-05 3.36 3.44 5.26 70% 30% 8.28 67% 33%
DR-11 2.85E-05 3.36 3.44 5.26 70% 30% 8.28 67% 33%
DR-12 1.71E-05 3.44 3.52 5.40 56% 44% 7.00 100%
DR-13 2.28E-05 3.36 3.52 5.26 70% 30% 8.28 67% 33%
DR-14 5.69E-06 3.12 3.36 3.82 100% 6.38 100%
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7.3.6 Effect on the results when FCP is constant KBRAM and TPRAM 
Table 7.10 below shows that when the third parameter FCP (failure consequence probability) is 
constant the results the results from both methods TPRAM and KBRAM returned the same 
result.  
Table 7.11 Risk Levels of Component Failures when FCP is constant 
S1-1 2.85E-06 3.04   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-2 2.28E-06 2.96   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-3 9.11E-06 2.80   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-4 3.42E-07 3.28   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-5 1.94E-06 2.80   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-6 2.28E-06 3.04   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-7 7.97E-06 2.88   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-8 2.85E-06 3.04   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-9 2.39E-07 2.64   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-10 8.54E-07 3.04   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-11 1.71E-07 3.04   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-12 5.69E-06 3.52   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-13 1.71E-07 3.92   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-14 1.71E-06 3.20   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-15 3.42E-07 3.52   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-16 2.28E-06 3.36   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-17 2.28E-06 3.28   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-18 1.71E-07 4.00   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S1-19 1.71E-05 4.00   1.00 7.00 100% 7.00  100%
S1-20 2.28E-05 4.00   1.00 9.00 100% 9.00  100%
S1-21 2.85E-05 4.16   1.00 9.00 100% 9.00  100%
S2-1 5.12E-06 2.24   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S2-2 3.42E-07 2.48   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S2-3 5.12E-06 2.48   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S2-4 3.42E-07 2.48   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S2-5 1.71E-07 2.48   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S2-6 4.55E-08 2.48   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S2-7 7.40E-07 2.64   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S2-8 6.26E-07 2.88   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S2-9 1.71E-06 2.80   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S2-10 2.85E-06 2.80   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S2-11 3.98E-07 3.04   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S2-12 1.94E-05 2.72   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S2-13 1.94E-06 2.40   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S2-14 1.82E-06 2.84   1.00 7.00 100% 7.00  100%
S2-15 1.71E-05 3.36   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
S2-16 2.28E-05 3.52   1.00 5.56 40% 60% 5.56  40% 60%
S2-17 2.49E-05 3.60   1.00 9.00 100% 9.00  100%
S2-18 1.14E-05 3.36   1.00 7.00 100% 7.00  100%
S2-19 5.69E-06 3.52   1.00 7.00 100% 7.00  100%
S2-20 2.28E-05 3.68   1.00 9.00 100% 9.00  100%
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Table 7.11 Continue 
CP-1 7.40E-07 2.88   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
CP-2 1.02E-05 2.64   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
CP-3 3.42E-07 2.48   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
CP-4 5.12E-06 2.80   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
CP-5 5.69E-06 2.96   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
CP-6 1.37E-05 2.80   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
CP-7 1.14E-05 2.80   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
CP-8 7.97E-06 2.96   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
CP-9 1.14E-06 2.80   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
CP-10 6.83E-06 2.80   1.00 5.20 100% 5.20  100%
CP-11 1.71E-05 2.64   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
CP-12 2.28E-05 3.04   1.00 7.00 100% 7.00  100%
CP-13 1.71E-05 3.44   1.00 8.80 20% 80% 8.80  20% 80%
CP-14 2.28E-05 3.28   1.00 7.56 100% 7.56  100%
CP-15 2.85E-05 3.28   1.00 7.56 100% 7.56  100%
CP-16 1.14E-06 3.20   1.00 3.50 100% 3.50  100%
CP-17 5.69E-07 3.44   1.00 3.00 100% 3.00  100%
FD-1 3.42E-07 2.64   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
FD-2 5.12E-06 2.64   1.00 3.25 100% 3.25  100%
FD-3 3.42E-07 3.28   1.00 3.30 100% 3.30  100%
FD-4 8.54E-07 2.80   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
FD-5 3.42E-09 2.64   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
FD-6 5.12E-06 2.64   1.00 3.25 100% 3.25  100%
FD-7 7.40E-06 2.64   1.00 7.00 100% 7.00  100%
FD-8 5.12E-07 2.88   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
FD-9 1.71E-05 3.36   1.00 6.04 100% 6.04  100%
FD-10 2.28E-05 3.60   1.00 7.00 100% 7.00  100%
FD-11 2.85E-05 3.60   1.00 8.92 7% 93% 8.92  7% 93%
FD-12 1.71E-05 3.60   1.00 7.00 100% 7.00  100%
FD-13 2.28E-05 3.60   1.00 7.00 93% 7% 7.00  93% 7%
FD-14 1.71E-05 2.88   1.00 5.92 4% 96% 5.92  4% 96%
FD-15 5.69E-06 2.88   1.00 4.30 100% 4.30  100%
DR-1 2.28E-07 2.00   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
DR-2 2.28E-06 2.40   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
DR-3 2.85E-06 2.40   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
DR-4 2.28E-06 2.40   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
DR-5 1.71E-05 2.48   1.00 7.00 100% 7.00  100%
DR-6 4.55E-07 2.64   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
DR-7 9.11E-07 2.64   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
DR-8 8.54E-07 3.20   1.00 5.60 36% 64% 5.60  36% 64%
DR-9 1.14E-06 3.36   1.00 4.00 100% 4.00  100%
DR-10 2.28E-05 3.36   1.00 8.28 67% 33% 8.28  67% 33%
DR-11 2.85E-05 3.36   1.00 8.28 67% 33% 8.28  67% 33%
DR-12 1.71E-05 3.44   1.00 7.00 100% 7.00  100%
DR-13 2.28E-05 3.36   1.00 8.28 67% 33% 8.28  67% 33%
DR-14 5.69E-06 3.12   1.00 6.38 100% 6.38  100%
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7.3.7 Result Analysis comparing KBRAM and HAZOPS for Offshore Processing Unit 
It is important to note that, there are significant benefits to be gained by comparing the results of 
the proposed risk assessment system with the results from typical industry adopted HAZOPS 
assessment method. HAZOPS is currently being used by experts in oil & gas industry. However, 
as stated in section 2.7.5 of Chapter 2, its reliance on historical data necessitate the need for 
introduction of such methods like a knowledge-based risk assessment method (KBRAM) for 
application in the risk assessment of offshore platform has been developed. The results produced 
by both industry experts using HAZOPS and proposed KBRAM methods are enumerated in 
Table 7.12 for ease of comparison and validation purposes. The breakdown of the result 
presented in Table 7.12 shows that, the proposed KBRAM is seen to have returned more detailed 
results compared with those produced through HAZOPS while maintaining some level of 
consistency as demonstrated in subsequent sections. 
As stated above, the result presented in Table 7.12 revealed that the KBRAM assessment 
demonstrates a remarkable reduction in the risk level categorisations as compared to HAZOPS. 
This reduction will translate to corresponding reduction in mitigation requirements and its cost 
implication. The detail reduction show that by comparing the two results for each of the offshore 
processing unit sub-systems indicate reduction of 81-90% achieved for Separators, 35% for 
Compressors, 73% for Flash Drum and 60% for Drier. The detailed analyses are as described in 
the following sections. 
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Table 7.12 Risk Levels of Component Failures 
S1-1 2.85E-06 3.04       2.24       1.80       100% 3.00 100%
S1-2 2.28E-06 2.96       2.24       1.50       100% 2.00 100%
S1-3 9.11E-06 2.80       2.48       4.00       100% 3.00 100%
S1-4 3.42E-07 3.28       1.84       1.50       100% 4.00 100%
S1-5 1.94E-06 2.80       2.56       1.50       100% 6.00 100%
S1-6 2.28E-06 3.04       2.56       1.60       100% 7.00 100%
S1-7 7.97E-06 2.88       2.56       4.00       100% 4.00 100%
S1-8 2.85E-06 3.04       2.40       1.60       100% 3.00 100%
S1-9 2.39E-07 2.64       2.64       1.50       100% 4.00 100%
S1-10 8.54E-07 3.04       2.64       1.60       100% 3.00 100%
S1-11 1.71E-07 3.04       2.56       1.60       100% 5.00 100%
S1-12 5.69E-06 3.52       3.12       3.85       100% 7.00 100%
S1-13 1.71E-07 3.92       3.04       2.33       100% 5.00 100%
S1-14 1.71E-06 3.20       2.24       2.00       100% 2.00 100%
S1-15 3.42E-07 3.52       2.56       2.80       16% 84% 6.00 100%
S1-16 2.28E-06 3.36       2.56       2.40       56% 44% 7.00 100%
S1-17 2.28E-06 3.28       2.72       3.30       100% 6.00 100%
S1-18 1.71E-07 4.00       3.12       4.00       100% 8.00 93% 7%
S1-19 1.71E-05 4.00       3.04       5.50       46% 54% 7.00 100%
S1-20 2.28E-05 4.00       2.96       7.00       100% 9.00 100%
S1-21 2.85E-05 4.16       2.80       7.00       100% 9.00 100%
S2-1 5.12E-06 2.24       2.24       2.80       16% 84% 2.00 100%
S2-2 3.42E-07 2.48       2.08       1.50       100% 2.00 100%
S2-3 5.12E-06 2.48       2.32       3.25       100% 2.00 100%
S2-4 3.42E-07 2.48       2.16       1.50       100% 2.00 100%
S2-5 1.71E-07 2.48       2.20       1.50       100% 5.00 100%
S2-6 4.55E-08 2.48       2.20       1.50       100% 5.00 100%
S2-7 7.40E-07 2.64       2.36       1.50       100% 4.00 100%
S2-8 6.26E-07 2.88       2.24       1.50       100% 2.00 100%
S2-9 1.71E-06 2.80       2.52       1.50       100% 2.00 100%
S2-10 2.85E-06 2.80       2.40       1.50       100% 2.00 100%
S2-11 3.98E-07 3.04       2.16       1.60       100% 5.00 100%
S2-12 1.94E-05 2.72       2.16       4.00       100% 5.00 100%
S2-13 1.94E-06 2.40       2.24       1.50       100% 5.00 100%
S2-14 1.82E-06 2.84       2.88       1.50       100% 2.00 100%
S2-15 1.71E-05 3.36       3.04       5.11       85% 15% 8.00 100%
S2-16 2.28E-05 3.52       2.96       4.00       100% 8.00 100%
S2-17 2.49E-05 3.60       3.04       5.78       18% 82% 6.00 100%
S2-18 1.14E-05 3.36       3.52       4.95       100% 8.00 93% 7%
S2-19 5.69E-06 3.52       3.52       3.56       100% 8.00 93% 7%
S2-20 2.28E-05 3.68       3.20       5.89       7% 93% 9.00 100%
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Table 7.12 Continue 
CP-1 7.40E-07 2.88       2.36       1.50       100% 5.00 100%
CP-2 1.02E-05 2.64       2.32       4.00       100% 7.00 100%
CP-3 3.42E-07 2.48       2.40       4.00       100% 5.00 100%
CP-4 5.12E-06 2.80       2.16       3.25       100% 4.00 100%
CP-5 5.69E-06 2.96       2.64       3.75       100% 5.00 100%
CP-6 1.37E-05 2.80       2.72       4.00       100% 5.00 100%
CP-7 1.14E-05 2.80       2.64       4.00       100% 4.00 100%
CP-8 7.97E-06 2.96       2.48       4.00       100% 4.00 100%
CP-9 1.14E-06 2.80       2.28       1.50       100% 3.00 100%
CP-10 6.83E-06 2.80       2.28       4.00       100% 3.00 100%
CP-11 1.71E-05 2.64       2.64       4.00       100% 3.00 100%
CP-12 2.28E-05 3.04       2.72       4.12       100% 3.00 100%
CP-13 1.71E-05 3.44       3.12       5.35       61% 39% 9.00 100%
CP-14 2.28E-05 3.28       3.12       4.97       100% 8.00 93% 7%
CP-15 2.85E-05 3.28       2.80       4.84       100% 6.00 100%
CP-16 1.14E-06 3.20       3.28       2.71       25% 75% 5.00 100%
CP-17 5.69E-07 3.44       3.20       3.00       100% 8.00 93% 7%
FD-1 3.42E-07 2.64       2.32       1.50       100% 3.00 100%
FD-2 5.12E-06 2.64       2.32       3.75       100% 3.00 100%
FD-3 3.42E-07 3.28       2.24       2.20       77% 23% 5.00 100%
FD-4 8.54E-07 2.80       2.24       1.50       100% 4.00 100%
FD-5 3.42E-09 2.64       2.32       1.50       100% 4.00 100%
FD-6 5.12E-06 2.64       2.32       3.75       100% 3.00 100%
FD-7 7.40E-06 2.64       2.48       4.00       100% 3.00 100%
FD-8 5.12E-07 2.88       2.72       1.50       100% 3.00 100%
FD-9 1.71E-05 3.36       3.04       5.11       85% 15% 8.00 93% 7%
FD-10 2.28E-05 3.60       2.96       5.80       16% 84% 7.00 100%
FD-11 2.85E-05 3.60       2.96       5.80       16% 84% 8.00 93% 7%
FD-12 1.71E-05 3.60       2.96       5.80       16% 84% 8.00 93% 7%
FD-13 2.28E-05 3.60       3.04       5.22       74% 26% 8.00 93% 7%
FD-14 1.71E-05 2.88       2.80       4.00       100% 6.00 100%
FD-15 5.69E-06 2.88       2.80       3.75       100% 5.00 100%
DR-1 2.28E-07 2.00       1.92       1.50       100% 4.00 100%
DR-2 2.28E-06 2.40       2.24       1.50       100% 5.00 100%
DR-3 2.85E-06 2.40       2.24       1.50       100% 5.00 100%
DR-4 2.28E-06 2.40       2.48       1.50       100% 5.00 100%
DR-5 1.71E-05 2.48       2.72       4.00       100% 6.00 100%
DR-6 4.55E-07 2.64       2.60       1.50       100% 4.00 100%
DR-7 9.11E-07 2.64       2.56       1.50       100% 6.00 100%
DR-8 8.54E-07 3.20       3.60       3.29       100% 8.00 93% 7%
DR-9 1.14E-06 3.36       3.60       3.42       100% 8.00 93% 7%
DR-10 2.28E-05 3.36       3.44       5.26       70% 30% 9.00 100%
DR-11 2.85E-05 3.36       3.44       5.26       70% 30% 9.00 100%
DR-12 1.71E-05 3.44       3.52       5.40       56% 44% 9.00 100%
DR-13 2.28E-05 3.36       3.52       5.26       70% 30% 9.00 100%
DR-14 5.69E-06 3.12       3.36       3.82       100% 7.00 100%
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7.3.7.1  Separators 
The result of two oil separator (S1) failure events described as S1-20 (ignition due to heat from 
surrounding) and S1-21 (ignition due to electric spark), and each of these failure events have 
consequences which could result in the failure leading to possible BLEVE to be followed by fire. 
It is also important to note in Table 7.12 that both S1-20 and S1-21 have high values of 
likelihood of failure FLH and, corresponding values of consequence severity (FCS) and 
consequence probability (FCP), but the two methods recorded major differences in capturing 
their RL categorisations. While the proposed KBRAM reflected risk levels to belong to major 
category with a belief of 100 per cent, the traditional HAZOPS system recorded risk levels 
belonging to intolerable category with a belief of 100 per cent. The HAZOPS results will 
therefore demand for more costly mitigation efforts. 
Further examination of the results in Table 7.12 shows that for separators (S1 & S2) HAZOPS 
expressed risk levels belonging to a range of values mainly between tolerable and intolerable for 
most of the component failure events except in the case of two separator 1 events (S1-2 & 14), 
eight separator 2 events (S2-1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10 & 14). This in comparison with the results of risk 
levels obtained from KBRAM are generally categorised lower mainly belonging to between 
minor and tolerable with exception of seven failure events distributed as three for the separator 1 
(SI-19, 20 & 21) and four for the separator 2 (S2-15, 17, 20 & 21). 
7.3.7.2 Compressors 
For compressors HAZOPS expressed risk levels mainly belonging to the tolerable and major for 
most of the component failure events except in the case of failure events CP-13 which its risk 
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level categorised to belonging to intolerable with a belief of 100%. In contrast the results posted 
by KBRAM the risk levels obtained are generally lower belonging mainly to between minor and 
tolerable with exception of on failure event CP-13 which has its risk level expressed as belonging 
to tolerable and major categories with a belief of 61% and 39% respectively. 
7.3.7.3 Flash Drum  
In analysing the results regarding the flash drum component failure events as shown in Table 
7.12 it would be observed that, the TPRAM expressed risk levels to belong to the tolerable and 
major categories for most of the component failure events except for two component failure 
events (FD-11 & FD-13) having risk level categorised as belonging to intolerable with belief of 
93% and 7% respectively. The KBRAM results on other hand maintain lower return of risk levels 
categorisations belonging to between minor and major but none above that. 
7.3.7.4  Drier  
Table 7.12 results show that drier component failure events risk levels expressed by HAZOPS to 
belong to categories between tolerable and major except in the case of failure events (DR-10, 11 
12 & 13) which indicate their risk levels to have some degree of belonging in the intolerable 
category. However, KBRAM results maintained lower categorisations of risk levels belonging to 
between minor and tolerable with exception of four failure events (DR-10, 11 12 & 13) which are 
found to belong to major category with belief ranging from 30% to 44%. However, it is 
interesting to note that, the four component failures events mentioned above have been captured 
though in different categories but with some level of consistency by both methods. 
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7.3.7.5  Other results at component level 
I. High RL events: - This is a group of component failure events assessed to have higher risk 
level belonging to categories of major and intolerable with a belief of 100 per cent. Table 7.12 
also shows seventeen failure events falling within this group which include for example S1-21, 
S2-20, CP-13, FD-10, DR-12 etc. 
The above result shows that the failure for example S1-21 and S2-20 have higher failure 
likelihood (FLH) and moderately high consequence severity and probability which both methods 
captured but KBRAM returning much more cost effective outcomes. These outcomes are due to 
additional clarity of information which the third parameter provided. 
II. Low RL events: - This is a group of component failure events assessed to have lowest risk 
level belonging to categories of minor and tolerable with a belief of 100 per cent. Table 7.12 also 
shows KBRAM returned a significant number of failure events falling within this group at the 
lowest boundary while the traditional method captured most of them at the higher boundary. 
These results also confirm the quality of information to be higher in the case of KBRAM due to 
additional in parameter. 
This result therefore, demonstrates that the additional input parameter of failure consequence 
probability (FCP) has provided the proposed KBRAM model with an additional tool needed for a 
more efficient and effective risk assessment for input with varying combinations compared to the 
traditional method (HAZOPS). Based on the result thus far it is evident that, the proposed 
approach performs much better than the traditional method in assessing failure events with 
different combination of values of FLH or FCS or FCP. It can be concluded therefore that, this 
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outcome satisfies the research aim of providing a more effective risk assessment technique based 
on cost effective evaluation of providing safety. This further demonstrates that KBRAM could 
effectively be deployed to facilitate decision making process from very early stages of offshore 
platform development. 
The KBRAM procedure is applied progressively to determine the levels at both sub-system and 
the overall system level as will be demonstrated in the following section. 
7.3.7.6  Results at sub-system level 
The results obtained at component levels and discussed in the previous section, are applied to 
Equation (7-1) shown below to compute risks scores for all the six sub-system and the overall 
system, and the results tabulated in Tables 7.13, 7.14, 7.15, 7.16 & 7.17. The results obtained 
revealed some interesting pattern which can be demonstrated for example by comparing the 
results of two sub-systems i.e. Compressors and Separator 1 (oil). This comparison results show 
that, the compressor unit despite its moderate damage causing capabilities is still rated to be very 
risky due to the high likelihood of failure of its components. In contrast however, the separator 1 
though rated to be comparatively more hazardous in terms of damage computations but found to 
be relatively less risky, due to the lower likelihood of failure of its components. Further 
examination of the aggregated individual sub-unit risk scores and their corresponding risk levels 
reveals that the compressor poses the highest major individual risk to the entire offshore 
processing system followed by flash drum and drier units. The individual sub-systems 
contribution to the overall system risk was computed and the result show that the compressors 
alone contribute over 35 percent, while separator 2 has the lowest contribution of only 15 percent. 
Generally these sub-systems risk values exceed the acceptable level based on laid down criteria, 
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this may therefore necessitate design review if considered to be cost effective or to bring within 




















                                                                                        (7-1) 
where i  fired rule (1,2,….n), n  number of fired rules, i  firing strength of the i-th rule, 
)(yiB  MF of risk implication of i-th rule  systemsub  sub-system risk score 
A. A. UMAR      Ph. D     2010 
 
154 
Table 7.13 Sub-System Risk Level – Separator 1 
Minor Tolerable Major Intolerable
1.50 4.00 7.00 9.00
R27 0.30 0.45 0.45
R28 0.04 0.16 0.16
R32 0.70 2.80 2.80
R33 0.04 0.16 0.16
R27 0.17 0.26 0.26
R28 0.83 3.32 3.32
R32 0.96 3.84 3.84
R37 0.04 0.16 0.16
R2 0.28 0.42 0.42
R3 0.16 0.24 0.24
R27 0.28 1.12 1.12
R28 0.72 2.88 2.88
R27 0.90 1.35 1.35
R32 0.10 0.40 0.40
R27 0.17 0.26 0.26
R28 0.04 0.16 0.16
R32 0.83 3.32 3.32
R33 0.04 0.16 0.16
R32 1.00 4.00 4.00
R27 0.30 0.45 0.45
R28 0.04 0.16 0.16
R32 0.70 2.80 2.80
R33 0.70 2.80 2.80
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 0.96 1.44 1.44
R28 0.04 0.16 0.16
R27 0.96 1.44 1.44
R28 0.04 0.16 0.16
R27 0.10 0.15 0.15
R28 0.10 0.40 0.40
R32 0.48 1.92 1.92
R33 0.52 2.08 2.08
R52 0.10 0.40 0.40
R53 0.10 0.40 0.40
R57 0.12 0.48 0.48
R58 0.12 0.48 0.48
R27 0.08 0.12 0.12
R28 0.92 3.68 3.68
R52 0.04 0.16 0.16
R53 0.04 0.16 0.16
R27 0.80 1.20 1.20
R28 0.20 0.80 0.80
R27 0.48 0.72 0.72
R28 0.52 2.08 2.08
R27 0.17 0.26 0.26
R28 0.17 0.68 0.68
R32 0.64 2.56 2.56
R33 0.36 1.44 1.44
R27 0.17 0.26 0.26
R28 0.17 0.68 0.68
R32 0.28 1.12 1.12
R33 0.72 2.88 2.88
R28 0.88 1.32 1.32
R53 0.12 0.48 0.48
R38 0.87 6.09 6.09
R43 0.13 0.91 0.91
R63 0.04 0.28 0.28
R68 0.04 0.28 0.28
R43 1.00 7.00 7.00
R43 0.01 0.07 0.07
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Table 7.14 Sub-System Risk Level – Separator 2 
Minor Tolerable Major Intolerable
1.50 4.00 7.00 9.00
R27 0.30 0.45 0.45
R28 0.70 2.80 2.80
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 0.30 0.45 0.45
R28 0.70 2.80 2.80
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 0.96 1.44 1.44
R28 0.04 0.16 0.16
R37 0.55 2.20 2.20
R42 0.45 1.80 1.80
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R37 0.64 2.56 2.56
R38 0.36 2.52 2.52
R62 0.04 0.16 0.16
R63 0.04 0.28 0.28
R42 0.48 1.92 1.92
R43 0.52 2.08 2.08
R47 0.40 1.60 1.60
R48 0.60 4.20 4.20
R72 0.04 0.16 0.16
R73 0.04 0.28 0.28
R32 0.21 0.84 0.84
R33 0.21 0.84 0.84
R37 0.48 1.92 1.92
R38 0.48 3.36 3.36
R57 0.21 0.84 0.84
R58 0.21 0.84 0.84
R62 0.52 2.08 2.08
R63 0.36 2.52 2.52
R27 0.48 0.72 0.72
R28 0.48 1.92 1.92
R32 0.10 0.40 0.40
R33 0.10 0.40 0.40
R52 0.48 1.92 1.92
R53 0.52 2.08 2.08
R57 0.48 1.92 1.92
R58 0.10 0.40 0.40
R42 0.32 1.28 1.28
R43 0.68 4.76 4.76
R67 0.20 0.80 0.80
R68 0.20 1.40 1.40
R47 0.48 1.92 1.92
R48 0.52 3.64 3.64
R72 0.20 0.80 0.80














SystemSub   
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Table 7.15 Sub-System Risk Level - Compressors 
Minor Tolerable Major Intolerable
1.50 4.00 7.00 9.00
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R32 0.58 2.32 2.32
R37 0.42 1.68 1.68
R32 1.00 4.00 4.00
R27 0.29 0.44 0.44
R32 0.71 2.84 2.84
R27 0.10 0.15 0.15
R32 0.90 3.60 3.60
R37 1.00 4.00 4.00
R32 0.21 0.84 0.84
R37 0.79 3.16 3.16
R32 1.00 4.00 4.00
R27 1.00 4.00 4.00
R32 1.00 4.00 4.00
R37 1.00 4.00 4.00
R42 0.96 3.84 3.84
R43 0.04 0.28 0.28
R37 0.56 2.24 2.24
R38 0.44 3.08 3.08
R62 0.12 0.48 0.48
R63 0.12 0.84 0.84
R42 0.72 2.88 2.88
R43 0.28 1.96 1.96
R67 0.12 0.48 0.48
R68 0.12 0.84 0.84
R47 0.72 2.88 2.88
R48 0.28 1.96 1.96
R27 0.72 1.08 1.08
R28 0.20 0.80 0.80
R52 0.28 1.12 1.12
R53 0.20 0.80 0.80
R27 0.56 0.84 0.84
R28 0.44 1.76 1.76
R52 0.20 0.80 0.80
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Table 7.16 Sub-System Risk Level – Flash Drum 
Minor Tolerable Major Intolerable
1.50 4.00 7.00 9.00
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 0.29 0.44 0.44
R32 0.71 2.84 2.84
R27 0.72 1.08 1.08
R28 0.28 1.12 1.12
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R32 1.00 4.00 4.00
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R37 0.64 2.56 2.56
R38 0.36 2.52 2.52
R62 0.04 0.16 0.16
R63 0.04 0.28 0.28
R42 0.40 1.60 1.60
R43 0.60 4.20 4.20
R47 0.40 1.60 1.60
R48 0.60 4.20 4.20
R37 0.40 1.60 1.60
R38 0.60 4.20 4.20
R42 0.60 2.40 2.40
R43 0.40 2.80 2.80
R67 0.04 0.16 0.16
R68 0.04 0.28 0.28
R37 1.00 4.00 4.00
R27 0.10 0.15 0.15
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Table 7.17 Sub-System Risk Level - Drier 
Minor Tolerable Major Intolerable
1.50 4.00 7.00 9.00
R2 0.08 0.12 0.12
R27 0.92 1.38 1.38
R27 0.92 1.38 1.38
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R37 1.00 4.00 4.00
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 0.40 0.60 0.60
R28 0.20 0.80 0.80
R52 0.60 2.40 2.40
R53 0.20 0.80 0.80
R27 0.40 0.60 0.60
R28 0.36 1.44 1.44
R52 0.60 2.40 2.40
R53 0.36 1.44 1.44
R42 0.56 2.24 2.24
R43 0.36 2.52 2.52
R67 0.44 1.76 1.76
R68 0.36 2.52 2.52
R47 0.56 2.24 2.24
R48 0.36 2.52 2.52
R72 0.44 1.76 1.76
R73 0.36 2.52 2.52
R37 0.48 1.92 1.92
R38 0.44 3.08 3.08
R67 0.52 2.08 2.08
R68 0.44 3.08 3.08
R42 0.48 1.92 1.92
R43 0.36 2.52 2.52
R67 0.52 2.08 2.08
R68 0.36 2.52 2.52
R27 0.10 0.15 0.15
R28 0.10 0.40 0.40
R32 0.64 2.56 2.56
R33 0.12 0.48 0.48
R52 0.10 0.40 0.40
R53 0.10 0.40 0.40
R57 0.12 0.48 0.48
R58 0.12 0.48 0.48
R32 0.21 0.84 0.84
R33 0.12 0.48 0.48
R37 0.64 2.56 2.56
R38 0.12 0.84 0.84
R57 0.21 0.84 0.84
R58 0.12 0.48 0.48
R61 0.36 1.44 1.44
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Fig.7.10: Risk level (RL) results at Sub-System Level 
7.3.7.7  Results at overall system level 
Computing the risk score at the overall system level is achieved by substituting systemsub  with 
system  and considering n  being total number of all the fired rules from the six sub-systems, and 
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applying same in Equation (7-1) to obtain the value given in Table 7.18 as shown in the 
following pages. 
This computation gave the overall risk level (RL) of an offshore processing unit (OPU) system as 
3.55 belonging to risk category of tolerable with belief of 100 per cent. As mentioned in the 
previous section there are six identified hazard groups which contribute to the overall RL 
estimation for OPU system. 
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Table 7.18 System Risk Level - OPU 
Minor Tolerable Major Intolerable
1.50 4.00 7.00 9.00
R27 0.30 0.45 0.45
R28 0.04 0.16 0.16
R32 0.70 2.80 2.80
R33 0.04 0.16 0.16
R27 0.17 0.26 0.26
R28 0.83 3.32 3.32
R32 0.96 3.84 3.84
R37 0.04 0.16 0.16
R2 0.28 0.42 0.42
R3 0.16 0.24 0.24
R27 0.28 1.12 1.12
R28 0.72 2.88 2.88
R27 0.90 1.35 1.35
R32 0.10 0.40 0.40
R27 0.17 0.26 0.26
R28 0.04 0.16 0.16
R32 0.83 3.32 3.32
R33 0.04 0.16 0.16
R32 1.00 4.00 4.00
R27 0.30 0.45 0.45
R28 0.04 0.16 0.16
R32 0.70 2.80 2.80
R33 0.70 2.80 2.80
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 0.96 1.44 1.44
R28 0.04 0.16 0.16
R27 0.96 1.44 1.44
R28 0.04 0.16 0.16
R27 0.10 0.15 0.15
R28 0.10 0.40 0.40
R32 0.48 1.92 1.92
R33 0.52 2.08 2.08
R52 0.10 0.40 0.40
R53 0.10 0.40 0.40
R57 0.12 0.48 0.48
R58 0.12 0.48 0.48
R27 0.08 0.12 0.12
R28 0.92 3.68 3.68
R52 0.04 0.16 0.16
R53 0.04 0.16 0.16
R27 0.80 1.20 1.20
R28 0.20 0.80 0.80
R27 0.48 0.72 0.72
R28 0.52 2.08 2.08
R27 0.17 0.26 0.26
R28 0.17 0.68 0.68
R32 0.64 2.56 2.56
R33 0.36 1.44 1.44
R27 0.17 0.26 0.26
R28 0.17 0.68 0.68
R32 0.28 1.12 1.12
R33 0.72 2.88 2.88
R28 0.88 1.32 1.32
Offshore Processing Unit
Fired Rule Firing strength Rule Output -  RL MF Implication
iiR )(yiBi
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Table 7.18 Continue 
Minor Tolerable Major Intolerable
1.50 4.00 7.00 9.00
Offshore Processing Unit
Fired Rule Firing strength Rule Output -  RL MF Implication
iiR )(yiBi
 
R53 0.12 0.48 0.48
R38 0.87 6.09 6.09
R43 0.13 0.91 0.91
R63 0.04 0.28 0.28
R68 0.04 0.28 0.28
R43 1.00 7.00 7.00
R43 0.01 0.07 0.07
R48 0.99 6.93 6.93
R27 0.30 0.45 0.45
R28 0.70 2.80 2.80
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 0.30 0.45 0.45
R28 0.70 2.80 2.80
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 0.96 1.44 1.44
R28 0.04 0.16 0.16
R37 0.55 2.20 2.20
R42 0.45 1.80 1.80
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R37 0.64 2.56 2.56
R38 0.36 2.52 2.52
R62 0.04 0.16 0.16
R63 0.04 0.28 0.28
R42 0.48 1.92 1.92
R43 0.52 2.08 2.08
R47 0.40 1.60 1.60
R48 0.60 4.20 4.20
R72 0.04 0.16 0.16
R73 0.04 0.28 0.28
R32 0.21 0.84 0.84
R33 0.21 0.84 0.84
R37 0.48 1.92 1.92
R38 0.48 3.36 3.36
R57 0.21 0.84 0.84
R58 0.21 0.84 0.84
R62 0.52 2.08 2.08
R63 0.36 2.52 2.52
R27 0.48 0.72 0.72
R28 0.48 1.92 1.92
R32 0.10 0.40 0.40
R33 0.10 0.40 0.40
R52 0.48 1.92 1.92
R53 0.52 2.08 2.08
R57 0.48 1.92 1.92
R58 0.10 0.40 0.40
R42 0.32 1.28 1.28
R43 0.68 4.76 4.76
R67 0.20 0.80 0.80
R68 0.20 1.40 1.40
R47 0.48 1.92 1.92
R48 0.52 3.64 3.64
R72 0.20 0.80 0.80  
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Table 7.18 Continue 
Minor Tolerable Major Intolerable
1.50 4.00 7.00 9.00
Offshore Processing Unit
Fired Rule Firing strength Rule Output -  RL MF Implication
iiR )(yiBi
 
R73 0.20 1.40 1.40
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R32 0.58 2.32 2.32
R37 0.42 1.68 1.68
R32 1.00 4.00 4.00
R27 0.29 0.44 0.44
R32 0.71 2.84 2.84
R27 0.10 0.15 0.15
R32 0.90 3.60 3.60
R37 1.00 4.00 4.00
R32 0.21 0.84 0.84
R37 0.79 3.16 3.16
R32 1.00 4.00 4.00
R27 1.00 4.00 4.00
R32 1.00 4.00 4.00
R37 1.00 4.00 4.00
R42 0.96 3.84 3.84
R43 0.04 0.28 0.28
R37 0.56 2.24 2.24
R38 0.44 3.08 3.08
R62 0.12 0.48 0.48
R63 0.12 0.84 0.84
R42 0.72 2.88 2.88
R43 0.28 1.96 1.96
R67 0.12 0.48 0.48
R68 0.12 0.84 0.84
R47 0.72 2.88 2.88
R48 0.28 1.96 1.96
R27 0.72 1.08 1.08
R28 0.20 0.80 0.80
R52 0.28 1.12 1.12
R53 0.20 0.80 0.80
R27 0.56 0.84 0.84
R28 0.44 1.76 1.76
R52 0.20 0.80 0.80
R53 0.20 0.80 0.80
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 0.29 0.44 0.44
R32 0.71 2.84 2.84
R27 0.72 1.08 1.08
R28 0.28 1.12 1.12
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R32 1.00 4.00 4.00
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R37 0.64 2.56 2.56
R38 0.36 2.52 2.52
R62 0.04 0.16 0.16
R63 0.04 0.28 0.28
R42 0.40 1.60 1.60
R43 0.60 4.20 4.20
R47 0.40 1.60 1.60
R48 0.60 4.20 4.20
R37 0.40 1.60 1.60
R38 0.60 4.20 4.20
R42 0.60 2.40 2.40
R43 0.40 2.80 2.80
R67 0.04 0.16 0.16  
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Table 7.18 Continue 
Minor Tolerable Major Intolerable
1.50 4.00 7.00 9.00
Offshore Processing Unit
Fired Rule Firing strength Rule Output -  RL MF Implication
iiR )(yiBi
 
R68 0.04 0.28 0.28
R37 1.00 4.00 4.00
R27 0.10 0.15 0.70 0.85
R32 0.90 3.60 3.60
R2 0.08 0.12 0.12
R27 0.92 1.38 1.38
R27 0.92 1.38 1.38
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R37 1.00 4.00 4.00
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 1.00 1.50 1.50
R27 0.40 0.60 0.60
R28 0.20 0.80 0.80
R52 0.60 2.40 2.40
R53 0.20 0.80 0.80
R27 0.40 0.60 0.60
R28 0.36 1.44 1.44
R52 0.60 2.40 2.40
R53 0.36 1.44 1.44
R42 0.56 2.24 2.24
R43 0.36 2.52 2.52
R67 0.44 1.76 1.76
R68 0.36 2.52 2.52
R47 0.56 2.24 2.24
R48 0.36 2.52 2.52
R72 0.44 1.76 1.76
R73 0.36 2.52 2.52
R37 0.48 1.92 1.92
R38 0.44 3.08 3.08
R67 0.52 2.08 2.08
R68 0.44 3.08 3.08
R42 0.48 1.92 1.92
R43 0.36 2.52 2.52
R67 0.52 2.08 2.08
R68 0.36 2.52 2.52
R27 0.10 0.15 0.15
R28 0.10 0.40 0.40
R32 0.64 2.56 2.56
R33 0.12 0.48 0.48
R52 0.10 0.40 0.40
R53 0.10 0.40 0.40
R57 0.12 0.48 0.48
R58 0.12 0.48 0.48
R32 0.21 0.84 0.84
R33 0.12 0.48 0.48
R37 0.64 2.56 2.56
R38 0.12 0.84 0.84
R57 0.21 0.84 0.84
R58 0.12 0.48 0.48
R61 0.36 1.44 1.44
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Fig.7.10: Risk level (RL) result at Overall System Level 
7.3.7.8  Summary of risk level results at both sub-system and system levels 
The risk levels of all the contributing sub-systems and the overall system are summarised in 
Table 7.19 as shown below for ease of reference. 
Table 7.19 Sub-System/ System Risk Levels - Summary 
Assigned
Code
Minor Tolerable Major Intolerable
Separator 1 SP-1 3.56 100%
Separator 2 SP-2 3.23 100%
Compressors CP 3.84 100%
Flash Drum FD 3.51 100%
Drier DR 3.65 100%











Rule Output -  RL
MF
 
7.3.8 Risk Response for Offshore Processing Unit 
This is a safety control stage where decisions would be needed in order to proceed with 
implementation of safety recommendations based on the results of risk assessment. These 
controls must however, be guided by standard guidelines based on industry regulatory 
requirement and management policies. 
It is important to note that each of the above referred hazard group contributes a different weight 
value to the overall RL at the system level. The major contributions are from the hazard groups of 
compressors, flash drum and drier, which contributed to the overall RL of system failure 35, 17 
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and 17 per cents respectively. Each of these groups consists of a number of hazardous events, for 
instance, each compressor has seventeen main hazardous or component failure events as listed in 
Table 7.2 and any of these events could lead to failure of the sub-system, and by extension to the 
overall system. The documentation on accident and incident reports, and statistics, indicates that 
significant number of failure events can be traced to design and installation errors such as 
defective or improper pipes, vessels and jointing. Therefore, in order to make the system safer, it 
is necessary to reduce risk levels (RLs) of compressor failures which the safety analysts, 
designers and engineers must harmonise their expertise in order to ensure proper and adequate 
specifications are incorporated in the designs, and installations are strictly supervised to 
guarantee compliance with standard. 
Further to the above, the operatives must be provided with comprehensive training to enable them 
interpret as-built drawings and, operational and maintenance manuals in order to be more 
proactive in dealing with happenings such as leaks, ignition etc. The other potential control 
measures required to reduce such risks include pipeline maintenance, inspection training of field 
staff for reducing pipelines related faults, conduct of routine inspection to ensure vessels coming 
to the terminal are in compliance with safety standard requirements to ensure risk of leaks are 
controlled, also training of field staff for pipeline maintenance and inspection to further ensure 
the entire field is covered. Additional security measures will include the provision of access and 
or egress surveillance system to cover the entire offshore platform, pipeline network to put check 
on sabotage and/or malicious activities. Also recommended to the industry are additional control 
measures to reduce other hazardous events in other hazard groups as well as the proposal for a 
strategy for each additional control. Although the hazard groups of separator 1 and separator 2 
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contributions of 16 and 15 per cents respectively combined together is still lower than the 
compressor group mentioned above. However despite the groups‟ minor contributions to the 
overall risk level (RL) of offshore processing system, the control measures are still recommended 
to reduce those hazardous events if considered to be cost effective. Result analysis has shown that 
the major compressor related hazardous event is the releases from impeller leading to hazard 
posed through the release of chemicals and thus suggest control measures to include provision of 
periodic maintenance and inspection of impeller, training operational staff and conduct of regular 
environmental monitoring. 
The case study of offshore processing system has demonstrated that there are potential benefits 
brought by the application of proposed knowledge-based risk assessment method (KBRAM). 
KBRAM proved to have the ability to process expert knowledge, engineering judgments, and 
historical data for the offshore oil and gas safety, and risk assessment in a consistent manner. It 
has been demonstrated that the proposed method can assess risks directly using the qualitative 
descriptions that are considered more expressive and natural in describing the risk matters. Also 
the application of expert contribution factor using the principles of fuzzy reasoning approach will 
further enhance the treatment of the problems of uncertainties or vagueness in the risk data. As 
mentioned earlier this procedure of risk assessment is applied progressively to enable the process 
to progress from hazardous (component) event level to the overall system level. 
The case study results which are presented in Tables 7.10, 7.11 & 7.12 have demonstrated that 
the proposed KBRA Method offers some benefits in the assessment of risk for offshore 
processing facilities. This result will provide offshore oil and gas safety analysts, operators, 
engineers, and managers with an additional tool needed to improve safety management and set 
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safety standards. The advantages or merits of this method will encourage safety cost evaluation 
and facilitate decision making from the design stage of offshore oil and gas platform. 
7.4 Summary 
This Chapter presents a case study on risk assessment of an offshore processing unit and 
demonstrates how the proposed modified fuzzy reasoning approach method (KBRAM) can be 
used to analyse associated risk through a systematic assessment modeling. As stated earlier fuzzy 
reasoning approach offers a great potential in risk assessment modeling of offshore oil and gas 
systems, especially in dealing with the risk data which is incomplete or has high level of 
uncertainty. It was also mentioned in Chapter 6 that risk analysis using fuzzy reasoning approach 
allows the flexibility required to formulate and incorporate experts‟ experience and knowledge of 
risk management in their areas of operation to determine the likelihood of failure and its possible 
consequences. In addition this flexibility encourages the use of information from various sources 
to be transformed into knowledge base such as qualitative descriptions, membership functions 
(MFs) and fuzzy rules as used in the fuzzy inference process. 
The process illustrates how the application of the various knowledge acquisition techniques could 
be deployed to develop fuzzy qualitative descriptions and corresponding MFs to qualify RLs. 
This prototype model is tested in the current work through a case study to assess the risks 
associated with a typical offshore processing plant. 
The benefit of additional parameter FCP (failure consequence probability) was demonstrated 
through the comparison of the results from typical two parameter fuzzy reasoning approach based 
risk assessment method (TPRAM) and the proposed knowledge-based risk assessment method 
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(KBRAM) for application in the risk assessment of offshore platform for the purposes validation 
the new model. The breakdown of the result presented in Table 7.9 shows that, the proposed 
KBRAM is seen to have returned more efficient results compared with those produced by 
TPRAM as demonstrated in subsequent sections. Table 7.10 is produced to further demonstrate 
the effect of FCP on the result as shown in the section 7.3.5. This Table shows that when the third 
parameter FCP (failure consequence probability) is constant the results from both methods are the 
same. 
Internal validation of experts score extracted from the raw data was used to confirm the 
consistency of fuzzy knowledge-based method (KBRAM) thus deomstarting the reliability of the 
model as shown in Tables 7.7 & 7.8and Figures 7.7 & 7.8 using typical and disperse expert 
scores respectively. 
The offshore processing unit risk assessment has been conducted to evaluate and validate the 
performance of the proposed model especially when compared with the results obtained from 
industry HAZOPS using the same data as shown in Table 7.12. It is important to note that the 
results obtained using HAZOPS generally expressed higher level of risk compared to those 
returned by the KBRAM. These results therefore, confirmed that there is an improved efficiency 
achieved through modification of HAZOPS to develop KBRAM. Considering the reliability of 
HAZOPS especially in dealing with the uncertainties this modification will even make the result 
of KBRAM much more reliable and acceptable by offshore oil and gas, and other related 
industries that have already validated the HAZOPS.  




Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.1 Background 
As stated in the introduction, this research is about the need for further examination of risks 
associated with offshore oil and gas facilities and their possible causes. This effort is to enable the 
development of proposed risk assessment method design to compliment other existing methods in 
the improvement of safety and its management within industrial settings with particular interest 
in offshore oil and gas platform. 
Major inherent risks in the oil and gas industry directly affect people, property and environment 
as a result of occurrence of any major accident or incident. Previous hazard identification works 
within the industry confirmed the high-risk scenarios of these types of accidents (Khan et al, 
2002b). 
Review of some previous accidents and incidents related to the offshore operations over the 
years, revealed the need for continuous improvement in safety management. To assess how this 
can be effectively achieved, it is pertinent to note the vital roles of knowledge on the nature and 
causes of these accidents, thus, making risk analysis process very necessary means of ensuring 
compliance with statutory requirements and related regulatory standards. 
It is important to note the need to summarise major highlights of the entire report in the 
background section of this Chapter before going to the general conclusions, recommendations 
and future works. 
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8.1.1 Offshore Platform Safety 
Offshore platform safety is a very complicated subject characterised by several factors including 
operational, human and environmental. As mentioned earlier in this report risk assessment 
techniques currently being used in the industry are comparatively mature tools, but in many 
instances, their applications may not give satisfactory results due to incomplete risk information 
and its associated high level of uncertainty. However, to deal effectively with uncertainties and 
other related problems, this project proposed a risk assessment methodology for conducting 
systematic risk assessment using a combination of concept of design for safety and principles of 
fuzzy reasoning approach (FRA). As enumerated in Chapters 6 & 7 this method employed 
qualitative descriptors to describe likelihood of failure, consequence severity, consequence 
probability and risk level. The proposed risk assessment method was applied to evaluate both 
qualitative and quantitative risk data, and information associated with offshore platform operation 
efficiently and effectively. The outcomes of risk assessment are represented as the risk degrees 
and the defined risk categories of risk levels (RLs) with a belief of percentage, which provides 
very useful risk information to decision makers. This information also provides risk analysts, 
managers, and engineers with additional technique for the improvement of safety management 
and set safety standards. In Chapter 7 a case study of risk assessment of offshore processing unit 
is used to illustrate the application of the proposed methodology. 
8.1.2 Assessment of Offshore Platform Risk 
The highlights above have been applied in the development of risk assessment process conducted 
to determine the risk magnitude in order to facilitate safety decision-making. As stated earlier, 
several oil & gas risk assessment techniques currently used are comparatively mature tools. The 
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results of using these tools highly rely on the availability and accuracy of the risk data (An et al, 
2006). However, oil & gas safety analysts are often confronted with situation where the risk data 
is incomplete or is associated with a high level of uncertainty. Furthermore, there are numerous 
variables interacting in a complex manner that due to the vast amount of data available cannot be 
explicitly described by a set of equations or a set of rules. There may also be shortage of key 
information and/or excess of other information. In many instances, it may be extremely difficult 
to conduct probabilistic risk assessment to assess the occurrence likelihood of hazards and the 
magnitudes of their possible consequences due to the uncertainty with risk data. It therefore, 
becomes necessary to develop new risk analysis methods for the identification and assessment of 
their associated risks in an acceptable way in situations where such mature tools cannot be 
effectively or efficiently applied (An et al, 2007). At this point, the offshore platform safety 
problem is deemed appropriate for examination using the concept of design for safety combined 
with fuzzy reasoning approach (FRA).  
8.1.3 Application of Fuzzy Reasoning Approach (FRA) 
As stated earlier in this report, it may be extremely difficult to conduct probabilistic risk 
assessment to analyse and estimate the occurrence likelihood of hazards and the magnitudes of 
their possible consequences because of the uncertainty in the risk data. However, the application 
of FRA in risk assessment may fill the gap created by other methods due to the following 
advantages (An, 2007). 
(a)  the risk can be evaluated directly by using qualitative descriptors; 
(b)  it is tolerant of imprecise data and ambiguous information; 
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(c)  it gives a more flexible structure for combining qualitative as well as quantitative 
information. 
(d)  it focuses on qualitative descriptors in natural language and aims to provide fundamentals 
for approximate reasoning with imprecise propositions. 
Qualitative descriptors are used to represent the condition of risk factor at a given interval. For 
details of fundamentals of fuzzy reasoning approach (FRA) the reader is referred to Chapter 5. 
However, it is important to state that the proposed risk assessment model benefits from the 
combine advantages of concept of design for safety and FRA. 
The reason for considering FRA is due to great advantages of enabling effective treatment of data 
imprecision or approximate information in risk assessment process to produce reliable results. 
This method deploys; 
(a)  a membership function (MF) which is regarded as a possibility distribution based on a 
proposed theory; and 
(b)  an apparent possibility distribution expressed by fuzzy set theory which is transformed 
into a possibility measure distribution. 
FRA method provides a useful tool for modeling risks and other risk parameters for risk analysis 
involving the risks with incomplete or redundant safety information (An, 2006). The approach 
ensures that the contribution of each hazardous event to the overall safety of the offshore 
platform is taken into consideration in order to represent its relative contribution to the risk level 
(RL) of the system. This involves the development of fuzzy qualitative descriptors and 
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membership functions (MFs) for describing failure likelihood (FLH), failure consequence 
severity (FCS), failure consequence probability (FCP) and risk level (RL) expressions, as detailed 
in Chapter 6. 
It is also important to note that definitions of the fuzzy set of RL are generally similar to those 
described in EN50129, (1998). IEC62278, (2002) BS EN ISO 12100-1 (2003), BS EN ISO 
14121-1 (2007) and BS EN ISO 20815 (2008). As detailed in chapter 6, the risk score is defined 
in such a manner that the lowest score is 0, whereas the highest score is 10. For example, RL 
qualitative descriptor, „Minor‟, is defined on the basis of the risk score ranging from 0 to 3 as 
shown in Figure 6.5. Similarly, the result of RLs can be expressed either as risk score located in 
the range from 0 to 10 or as risk category with a belief of percentage as demonstrated in Chapter 
6. 
8.1.4 Summary on the Knowledge-based Risk Assessment Method (KBRAM) 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, the proposed KBRAM comprises of five phases: problem definition 
phase, data collection and analysis phase, hazard identification phase, risk estimation phase and 
risk response phase. The process provides a systematic approach to the identification and control 
of high-risk areas. This framework is considered to be generally applicable to most risk analysis 
processes of offshore platform but adaptable to different systems with some variation in the 
process depending on system requirements. The detail discussions on the KBRAM are 
enumerated in Chapter 6, however, some major highlights are enumerated in the following 
sections for ease of reference. 
Problem definition involves identifying the need for safety, i.e. specific safety requirements. The 
requirements regarding safety have been specified at different level, e.g. component (hazardous 
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event) level, sub-system (hazard group) level and the overall system (offshore processing unit) 
level. The following typical items have also been specified in the problem definition phase. 
1.  Sets of rules and regulation made by the national authorities and classification societies, 
e.g. Health & Safety Executive, BS Standards, etc. 
2.  Deterministic requirements for safety, reliability, availability, maintainability, etc. 
3.  Criteria referring to probability of occurrence of serious hazardous events and the possible 
consequences. 
It is pertinent to note that, KBRAM was specifically designed to effectively process all risk 
information including uncertainties such as data from oil and gas industry which involves; 
(a)  operation in a very unique and restrictive environment as is the case with offshore 
platform; 
(b)  human error which is considered as a major contributor to possible accidents; 
(c)  lack of detailed risk information, and 
(d)  inadequate database provision 
Therefore, in such circumstances, a risk analyst may have to describe a given event in vague and 
imprecise terms such as „Tolerable‟ and „Definite‟. Such judgements are obviously subjective and 
hence the proposed KBRAM has been adequately equipped to support the risks assessment for 
offshore platform even with the incomplete risk information. 
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In concluding this section it is believed that, this research work has demonstrated the value of 
systematic and structured approach deployed in KBRAM to provide a very viable tool for the 
implementation of safety. 
8.2 Conclusions 
This work enumerated the concept of design for safety to align with various accidents and 
incident reports notably the Lord Cullen (1990) which recommended its adoption for offshore 
facilities development. In the light of this development the current work explores options that 
could strengthen the concept to deal effectively with the uncertainties in the risk information.  In 
view of this need the proposed model integrated the principles of fuzzy reasoning approach 
within the concept of design for safety as a way of having a holistic approach developed to deal 
with the uncertainties in the risk information for the assessment of offshore platform associated 
risks. 
In order to have a broad understanding of the safety need  for offshore platform, reviews were 
conducted on the evolution of safety literature and practices, and the evolution of safety thinking 
which at the beginning concentrated on technological failures and operator errors. This thinking 
soon transformed to a more dynamic process progressing to a modest level leading to the 
development of modern safety theories. Accordingly, this modest improvement facilitated the 
establishment regulatory agencies like Health & Safety Executives in the UK, OSHA in America 
thereby promoting the development of safety management system models. 
The next step of this report discussed some historical perspectives of safety analysis approaches 
ranging from earlier tools for identifying hazards and technical risks, to modern tools for 
A. A. UMAR      Ph. D     2010 
 
177 
assessing failures. Some of the most popular methods used for identifying hazards and assessing 
risks associated with technical systems have also been reviewed and, their advantages and 
limitations also enumerated. It was also observed that in certain situations risk assessment need 
be conducted using a combination of some methods in order to achieve the desired result. 
However, it was also noted that most of these theories and methods were developed to deal with 
high-tech industry risk but only a few can be applied effectively in complex design processes 
with high level of uncertainty such as the offshore installations. 
Following observations mentioned above, concepts like design for safety have to be introduced at 
some stage in order to extend the frontiers of safety management. As mentioned earlier, this 
concept is found to be suitable for adoption in the current work for the achievement of its aim and 
objectives of delivering safe offshore platform project. This consideration provided basis for 
proper alignment of research aim and objectives of achieving a safe design approach as 
demonstrated through the various part of this report summarised in the subsequent sections of this 
Chapter. It must also be noted that the need for dealing with uncertainties associated risk 
information necessitated the search for most suitable methods to be integrated with the concept of 
design for safety like fuzzy reasoning approach. 
Sequel to the above, the fundamentals of fuzzy reasoning approach have been discussed, its 
advantages enumerated which further reinforced the basis for the development of a combine 
framework with the concept of design for safety was established. This framework combines the 
advantages of the concept of design for safety with that of the fuzzy reasoning approach which 
ensured more effective risk identification and risk estimation. This composite framework was 
used as the foundation for the development of a new knowledge-based model for the risk 
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assessment for offshore platform. Accordingly, illustrations have also been used all through 
various sections of this report to demonstrate the procedure of application of the proposed model 
for assessment of offshore platform associated risks. Specifically the proposed knowledge-based 
risk assessment method (KBRAM) has also been use to demonstrate the application in a case 
study scenario. 
A case study in Chapter 7 on risk assessment of an offshore processing unit has been conducted 
to demonstrate how the proposed KBRAM is used to assess the associated risks through a 
systematic assessment modeling. KBRAM enables experts‟ experience and knowledge to be 
processed using some mathematical operations‟ to compute and generate the necessary inputs 
required to conduct effective assessment of offshore platform associated risks. 
The process illustrated how the application of the various knowledge acquisition techniques 
could be deployed to develop fuzzy qualitative descriptions and corresponding membership 
functions (MFs) to qualify risk levels (RLs). This prototype model is tested in the current work 
through a case study to assess the risks associated with a typical offshore processing unit. 
The results obtained using KBRAM are compared with the ones obtained using typical two input 
parameter fuzzy-based risk assessment method (TPRAM). In the process of this comparison the 
same industry data was applied through both methods based on same principles of fuzzy 
reasoning approach with only difference being the additional third input parameter in the case of 
KBRAM. The final results showed an improved ability by the KBRAM to process data and turn 
out much more definitive risk levels thereby satisfying the aim of delivering a more cost effective 
assessment result. This result therefore, demonstrated that the proposed KBRAM has successfully 
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achieved the objectives of this research of facilitating safety decision-making based on cost 
benefit evaluation of offshore oil and gas platform associated risk. 
8.3 Recommendations 
This section is intended to highlight the major areas requiring necessary improvements needed to 
encourage more research activities related to offshore platforms safety decisions. Therefore to 
achieve safety improvement and cost effective decision making will require stakeholder 
commitments from early stages of project development. However, it must be noted that this 
combined requirements can never be fully achieved without some level of research efforts. 
Accordingly, the following recommendations are summarised in the section below; 
 All major stakeholders must engage in collaborative effort to guaranty all possible risks, 
their causes and impacts on offshore platforms are effectively identified and properly 
recorded. 
 There must be proper guarantees for researchers to have access to the above mentioned 
records in order to facilitate safety and decision making. 
 Operators are to further establish more acceptable ways of improving management of safety 
information in conjunction with regulatory bodies and researchers. 
 The major stakeholders within the industry and regulatory agencies need to have better 
collaboration and corporation and come up with programmes design to attract researchers 
to participate in efforts to achieve a more efficient safety management. These programmes 
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may also involve enforcement agencies to ensure that researchers have some level of 
unrestricted and timely access to industry safety data for research purposes. 
 The operators need to create an enabling environment to guarantee improved data 
management as well as access to such information for research purposes. 
 Risk information still require further efforts by both the operators and regulators in order to 
achieve harmonise system of recording safety and other related information for the 
industry. This will be achieved if all the major stakeholders including regulatory agencies 
must to be involved in kind of joint-partnership for the purpose of establishing necessary 
programmes specifically for this. 
 Researchers require solid support from the industry regulators to guarantee them the right 
to preserve the independence of their findings. 
 Inherent risks still remain major impediments to the safety of offshore oil and gas industry. 
Therefore, the need to increase efforts towards mitigation of these safety challenges must 
be accorded high priority and all the major industry stakeholders must remain committed 
and support these efforts in order to achieve improved safety within the industry. 
8.4 Further works 
1. The focus in this work is on offshore development project but it will be useful to describe 
how the model can be applied in the development processes in other industries than 
offshore, railways etc. 
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2. To conduct investigation for other method which has the ability to deal with uncertainties 
associated with expert judgements 
3. To continue further efforts of fine tuning the fuzzy reasoning approach based methods in 
order to improve its acceptability  
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OFFSHORE PLATFORMS: FAILURE DATA UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT 
QUERSTIONNAIRE 
My name is Abubakar Umar and I am currently in 3
rd
 year of my PhD studying in school of 
Engineering at the University of Birmingham. My research project is “Design Safety for Offshore 
Oil & Gas Platforms”. 
Offshore oil and gas installation is associated with several inherent risks which could result in 
loss of lives, degradation of the environment, and damage to property or capital assets. However 
fire and explosion have been rated as the top two risks. Failures of the processing system 
equipments such as Separators, Compressors, Flash drums and Driers are generally believed to 
be associated with this. 
This questionnaire is designed to collect information on failure consequence severity and failure 
consequence probability for the above listed equipments to help in suggesting safety 
improvements. Your help and time is greatly appreciated and extremely useful. 
The questionnaire is simple to complete and is totally confidential, the results will be summarised 
in my PhD thesis as such individual questionnaires will not be shown. It can be completed 
electronically by clicking in the box (es) under the relevant to score (s). If you are completing the 
Questionnaire manually you can also mark (X) as appropriate. It should not take more than 10 
minutes to complete.  
Many thanks. 
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1. Failure consequence severity (FCS) 
Failure consequence severity describes the magnitude of possible consequences of failure event. 
Please use this scale to allocate score 
1               10 
Negligible       Catastrophic 




S/No Element Score 























Flow control valve  
Leak indicator failed 
Excess flow at upstream 
Impurities causing exothermic reaction  
Sudden change in pressure 
Temperature controller failed 
High pressure upstream line 
Upstream pressure controller failed 
Condensate line choked 
Oil pipeline or valve choked 
Gas pipeline or valve choke 
Safety valve undersize 
Safety/pressure valve choked or could not function 
on demand 
External heating 
Exothermic reaction in vessel 
Temperature controller failed 
Pressure controller system of separator failed 
Pressure or safety release failed 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to heat from surrounding 
Electric spark as source of ignition 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   





S/No Element Score 
























Leak from joints 
Leak from main pipeline 
Leak from joints 
Leak from main pipeline 
Leak from vessel 
Leak from fracture, joints or crack 
Leak from the pipe connection 
Leak from safety valve 
Leak from pressure release valve 
Leak from control valves 
Outlet pipe choked 
High pressure upstream line 
Sudden phase change 
External heat absorption causing increase in 
pressure 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
Ignition due to electric spark 
Release from pipe after explosion 
Release from vessel aftermath of explosion 
Ignition due to external explosion energy 
Ignition due to fire heat load 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   




























Leak from compressor downstream pipeline 
Leak from compressor downstream pipeline 
joints 
Leak from compressor upstream pipeline 
Leak from joints of compressor upstream 
pipeline 
Release from casing of compressor 
Leaking of seal 
Release from impeller 
Compressor completely failed causing 
release of chemical 
Leak from junction of pump and pipeline 
Leak from rotor 
Pump failed to operate and caused release 
of chemical 
Leak from casing 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
                   
 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   






Ignition due to electric spark 
Fire caused by failure of pipeline 
Fire caused vessel to fail and release of 
chemical from vessel 
                   
                   
 
                   
 
Flash drum 
S/No Element Score 




















Leak from upstream pipeline 
Leak from upstream pipeline joints 
High-pressure in vessel causing rupture of 
vessel and release of gas  
Leak from joints or flange 
Leak from downstream pipeline 
Leak from joints of downstream pipeline 
Leak from joint of gas pipeline 
Leak from gas pipeline 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
Ignition due to electric spark  
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
VCE causes pipeline to fail and release 
chemical 
VCE causes vessel to fail and release 
chemical 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
 
                   
 
                   
 
Drier 
S/No Element Score 


















Impurities in feed line 
Control system failed 
Sudden phase change 
Temperature controller failed 
Heating due to external heat source 
Drier outlet line choked 
Outlet valve choked 
Safety valve failed to operate on demand 
Pressure relief failed to operate on demand 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surroundings 
Ignition due to electric spark  
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surroundings 
BLEVE causes vessel to fail and release 
chemical 
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15 BLEVE causes pipeline to fail and release 
chemical 
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2. Failure consequence probability (FCP) 
Failure consequence probability is defined as probability that effects will happen given the 
occurrence of the failure. 
Please use this scale to allocate score 
1                    10 
Highly unlikely        Definite 




S/No Element Score 























Flow control valve  
Leak indicator failed 
Excess flow at upstream 
Impurities causing exothermic reaction  
Sudden change in pressure 
Temperature controller failed 
High pressure upstream line 
Upstream pressure controller failed 
Condensate line choked 
Oil pipeline or valve choked 
Gas pipeline or valve choke 
Safety valve undersize 
Safety/pressure valve choked or could not function 
on demand 
External heating 
Exothermic reaction in vessel 
Temperature controller failed 
Pressure controller system of separator failed 
Pressure or safety release failed 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to heat from surrounding 
Electric spark as source of ignition 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   





S/No Element Score 
























Leak from joints 
Leak from main pipeline 
Leak from joints 
Leak from main pipeline 
Leak from vessel 
Leak from fracture, joints or crack 
Leak from the pipe connection 
Leak from safety valve 
Leak from pressure release valve 
Leak from control valves 
Outlet pipe choked 
High pressure upstream line 
Sudden phase change 
External heat absorption causing increase in 
pressure 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
Ignition due to electric spark 
Release from pipe after explosion 
Release from vessel aftermath of explosion 
Ignition due to external explosion energy 
Ignition due to fire heat load 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   


























Leak from compressor downstream pipeline 
Leak from compressor downstream pipeline 
joints 
Leak from compressor upstream pipeline 
Leak from joints of compressor upstream 
pipeline 
Release from casing of compressor 
Leaking of seal 
Release from impeller 
Compressor completely failed causing 
release of chemical 
Leak from junction of pump and pipeline 
Leak from rotor 
Pump failed to operate and caused release 
of chemical 
Leak from casing 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
                   
 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 








Ignition due to electric spark 
Fire caused by failure of pipeline 
Fire caused vessel to fail and release of 
chemical from vessel 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
 
Flash drum 
S/No Element Score 




















Leak from upstream pipeline 
Leak from upstream pipeline joints 
High-pressure in vessel causing rupture of 
vessel and release of gas 
Leak from joints or flange 
Leak from downstream pipeline 
Leak from joints of downstream pipeline 
Leak from joint of gas pipeline 
Leak from gas pipeline 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
Ignition due to electric spark  
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
VCE causes pipeline to fail and release 
chemical 
VCE causes vessel to fail and release 
chemical 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
 
                   
 
                   
 
Drier 
S/No Element Score 

















Impurities in feed line 
Control system failed 
Sudden phase change 
Temperature controller failed 
Heating due to external heat source 
Drier outlet line choked 
Outlet valve choked 
Safety valve failed to operate on demand 
Pressure relief failed to operate on demand 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surroundings 
Ignition due to electric spark  
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surroundings 
BLEVE causes vessel to fail and release 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
 






BLEVE causes pipeline to fail and release 
chemical 
                   
 
                   
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING TIME TO COMPLETE THIS 
QUESTIONNAIRE, YOUR HELP IS HIGHLY APPRECIATED. 
 







Sample of completed 
Questionnaire  









Response From Expert E-1 
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OFFSHORE PLATFORMS: FAILURE DATA UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT 
QUERSTIONNAIRE 
My name is Abubakar Umar and I am currently in 3
rd
 year of my PhD studying in school of 
Engineering at the University of Birmingham. My research project is “Safety for management in 
the design of offshore platforms”. 
Offshore oil and gas installation is associated with several inherent risks which could result in 
loss of lives, degradation of the environment, and damage to property or capital assets. However 
fire and explosion have been rated as the top two risks. Failures of the processing system 
equipments such as Separators, Compressors, Flash drums and Driers are generally believed to 
be associated with this. 
This questionnaire is designed to collect information on failure consequence severity and failure 
consequence probability for the above listed equipments to help in suggesting safety 
improvements. Your help and time is greatly appreciated and extremely useful. 
The questionnaire is simple to complete and is totally confidential, the results will be summarised 
in my PhD thesis as such individual questionnaires will not be shown. It can be completed 
electronically by clicking in the box (es) under the relevant to score (s). If you are completing the 
Questionnaire manually you can also mark (X) as appropriate. It should not take more than 10 
minutes to complete.  
Many thanks. 
A. A. UMAR      Ph. D     2010 
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1. Failure consequence severity 
Failure consequence severity describes the magnitude of possible consequences of failure event. 
Please use this scale to allocate score 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 10 
Negligible         Extreme 




S/No Element Score 























Flow control valve  
Leak indicator failed 
Excess flow at upstream 
Impurities causing exothermic reaction  
Sudden change in pressure 
Temperature controller failed 
High pressure upstream line 
Upstream pressure controller failed 
Condensate line choked 
Oil pipeline or valve choked 
Gas pipeline or valve choke 
Safety valve undersize 
Safety/pressure valve choked or could not function 
on demand 
External heating 
Exothermic reaction in vessel 
Temperature controller failed 
Pressure controller system of separator failed 
Pressure or safety release failed 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to heat from surrounding 
Electric spark as source of ignition 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   





S/No Element Score 
























Leak from joints 
Leak from main pipeline 
Leak from joints 
Leak from main pipeline 
Leak from vessel 
Leak from fracture, joints or crack 
Leak from the pipe connection 
Leak from safety valve 
Leak from pressure release valve 
Leak from control valves 
Outlet pipe choked 
High pressure upstream line 
Sudden phase change 
External heat absorption causing increase in 
pressure 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
Ignition due to electric spark 
Release from pipe after explosion 
Release from vessel aftermath of explosion 
Ignition due to external explosion energy 
Ignition due to fire heat load 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   





























Leak from compressor downstream pipeline 
Leak from compressor downstream pipeline 
joints 
Leak from compressor upstream pipeline 
Leak from joints of compressor upstream 
pipeline 
Release from casing of compressor 
Leaking of seal 
Release from impeller 
Compressor completely failed causing 
release of chemical 
Leak from junction of pump and pipeline 
Leak from rotor 
Pump failed to operate and caused release 
of chemical 
Leak from casing 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
                   
 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   






Ignition due to electric spark 
Fire caused by failure of pipeline 
Fire caused vessel to fail and release of 
chemical from vessel 
                   
                   
 
                   
 
Flash drum 
S/No Element Score 




















Leak from upstream pipeline 
Leak from upstream pipeline joints 
High-pressure in vessel causing rupture of 
vessel and release of gas  
Leak from joints or flange 
Leak from downstream pipeline 
Leak from joints of downstream pipeline 
Leak from joint of gas pipeline 
Leak from gas pipeline 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
Ignition due to electric spark  
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
VCE causes pipeline to fail and release 
chemical 
VCE causes vessel to fail and release 
chemical 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
 
                   
 





S/No Element Score 
















Impurities in feed line 
Control system failed 
Sudden phase change 
Temperature controller failed 
Heating due to external heat source 
Drier outlet line choked 
Outlet valve choked 
Safety valve failed to operate on demand 
Pressure relief failed to operate on demand 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surroundings 
Ignition due to electric spark  
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surroundings 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   






BLEVE causes vessel to fail and release 
chemical 
BLEVE causes pipeline to fail and release 
chemical 
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2. Failure consequence probability 
Failure consequence probability is defined as probability that effects will happen given the 
occurrence of the failure. 
Please use this scale to allocate score 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 10 
Highly unlikely          Definite 




S/No Element Score 























Flow control valve  
Leak indicator failed 
Excess flow at upstream 
Impurities causing exothermic reaction  
Sudden change in pressure 
Temperature controller failed 
High pressure upstream line 
Upstream pressure controller failed 
Condensate line choked 
Oil pipeline or valve choked 
Gas pipeline or valve choke 
Safety valve undersize 
Safety/pressure valve choked or could not function 
on demand 
External heating 
Exothermic reaction in vessel 
Temperature controller failed 
Pressure controller system of separator failed 
Pressure or safety release failed 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to heat from surrounding 
Electric spark as source of ignition 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   





S/No Element Score 
























Leak from joints 
Leak from main pipeline 
Leak from joints 
Leak from main pipeline 
Leak from vessel 
Leak from fracture, joints or crack 
Leak from the pipe connection 
Leak from safety valve 
Leak from pressure release valve 
Leak from control valves 
Outlet pipe choked 
High pressure upstream line 
Sudden phase change 
External heat absorption causing increase in 
pressure 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
Ignition due to electric spark 
Release from pipe after explosion 
Release from vessel aftermath of explosion 
Ignition due to external explosion energy 
Ignition due to fire heat load 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   




























Leak from compressor downstream pipeline 
Leak from compressor downstream pipeline 
joints 
Leak from compressor upstream pipeline 
Leak from joints of compressor upstream 
pipeline 
Release from casing of compressor 
Leaking of seal 
Release from impeller 
Compressor completely failed causing 
release of chemical 
Leak from junction of pump and pipeline 
Leak from rotor 
Pump failed to operate and caused release 
of chemical 
Leak from casing 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
                   
 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   






Ignition due to electric spark 
Fire caused by failure of pipeline 
Fire caused vessel to fail and release of 
chemical from vessel 
                   
                   
 
                   
 
Flash drum 
S/No Element Score 




















Leak from upstream pipeline 
Leak from upstream pipeline joints 
High-pressure in vessel causing rupture of 
vessel and release of gas 
Leak from joints or flange 
Leak from downstream pipeline 
Leak from joints of downstream pipeline 
Leak from joint of gas pipeline 
Leak from gas pipeline 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
Ignition due to electric spark  
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
VCE causes pipeline to fail and release 
chemical 
VCE causes vessel to fail and release 
chemical 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
 
                   
 
                   
 
Drier 
S/No Element Score 


















Impurities in feed line 
Control system failed 
Sudden phase change 
Temperature controller failed 
Heating due to external heat source 
Drier outlet line choked 
Outlet valve choked 
Safety valve failed to operate on demand 
Pressure relief failed to operate on demand 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surroundings 
Ignition due to electric spark  
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surroundings 
BLEVE causes vessel to fail and release 
chemical 
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15 BLEVE causes pipeline to fail and release 
chemical 
 
                   
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING TIME TO COMPLETE THIS 
QUESTIONNAIRE, YOUR HELP IS HIGHLY APPRECIATED. 
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OFFSHORE PLATFORMS: FAILURE DATA UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT 
QUERSTIONNAIRE 
My name is Abubakar Umar and I am currently in 3
rd
 year of my PhD studying in school of 
Engineering at the University of Birmingham. My research project is “Safety for management in 
the design of offshore platforms”. 
Offshore oil and gas installation is associated with several inherent risks which could result in 
loss of lives, degradation of the environment, and damage to property or capital assets. However 
fire and explosion have been rated as the top two risks. Failures of the processing system 
equipments such as Separators, Compressors, Flash drums and Driers are generally believed to 
be associated with this. 
This questionnaire is designed to collect information on failure consequence severity and failure 
consequence probability for the above listed equipments to help in suggesting safety 
improvements. Your help and time is greatly appreciated and extremely useful. 
The questionnaire is simple to complete and is totally confidential, the results will be summarised 
in my PhD thesis as such individual questionnaires will not be shown. It can be completed 
electronically by clicking in the box (es) under the relevant to score (s). If you are completing the 
Questionnaire manually you can also mark (X) as appropriate. It should not take more than 10 
minutes to complete.   
Many thanks. 
A. A. UMAR      Ph. D     2010 
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1. Failure consequence severity 
Failure consequence severity describes the magnitude of possible consequences of failure event. 
Please use this scale to allocate score 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 10 
Negligible         Extreme 




S/No Element Score 























Flow control valve  
Leak indicator failed 
Excess flow at upstream 
Impurities causing exothermic reaction  
Sudden change in pressure 
Temperature controller failed 
High pressure upstream line 
Upstream pressure controller failed 
Condensate line choked 
Oil pipeline or valve choked 
Gas pipeline or valve choke 
Safety valve undersize 
Safety/pressure valve choked or could not function 
on demand 
External heating 
Exothermic reaction in vessel 
Temperature controller failed 
Pressure controller system of separator failed 
Pressure or safety release failed 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to heat from surrounding 
Electric spark as source of ignition 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   





S/No Element Score 
























Leak from joints 
Leak from main pipeline 
Leak from joints 
Leak from main pipeline 
Leak from vessel 
Leak from fracture, joints or crack 
Leak from the pipe connection 
Leak from safety valve 
Leak from pressure release valve 
Leak from control valves 
Outlet pipe choked 
High pressure upstream line 
Sudden phase change 
External heat absorption causing increase in 
pressure 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
Ignition due to electric spark 
Release from pipe after explosion 
Release from vessel aftermath of explosion 
Ignition due to external explosion energy 
Ignition due to fire heat load 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   





























Leak from compressor downstream pipeline 
Leak from compressor downstream pipeline 
joints 
Leak from compressor upstream pipeline 
Leak from joints of compressor upstream 
pipeline 
Release from casing of compressor 
Leaking of seal 
Release from impeller 
Compressor completely failed causing 
release of chemical 
Leak from junction of pump and pipeline 
Leak from rotor 
Pump failed to operate and caused release 
of chemical 
Leak from casing 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
                   
 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   






Ignition due to electric spark 
Fire caused by failure of pipeline 
Fire caused vessel to fail and release of 
chemical from vessel 
                   
                   
 
                   
 
Flash drum 
S/No Element Score 




















Leak from upstream pipeline 
Leak from upstream pipeline joints 
High-pressure in vessel causing rupture of 
vessel and release of gas  
Leak from joints or flange 
Leak from downstream pipeline 
Leak from joints of downstream pipeline 
Leak from joint of gas pipeline 
Leak from gas pipeline 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
Ignition due to electric spark  
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
VCE causes pipeline to fail and release 
chemical 
VCE causes vessel to fail and release 
chemical 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
 
                   
 
                   
 
Drier 
S/No Element Score 


















Impurities in feed line 
Control system failed 
Sudden phase change 
Temperature controller failed 
Heating due to external heat source 
Drier outlet line choked 
Outlet valve choked 
Safety valve failed to operate on demand 
Pressure relief failed to operate on demand 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surroundings 
Ignition due to electric spark  
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surroundings 
BLEVE causes vessel to fail and release 
chemical 
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15 BLEVE causes pipeline to fail and release 
chemical 
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2. Failure consequence probability 
Failure consequence probability is defined as probability that effects will happen given the 
occurrence of the failure. 
Please use this scale to allocate score 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 10 
Highly unlikely          Definite 




S/No Element Score 























Flow control valve  
Leak indicator failed 
Excess flow at upstream 
Impurities causing exothermic reaction  
Sudden change in pressure 
Temperature controller failed 
High pressure upstream line 
Upstream pressure controller failed 
Condensate line choked 
Oil pipeline or valve choked 
Gas pipeline or valve choke 
Safety valve undersize 
Safety/pressure valve choked or could not function 
on demand 
External heating 
Exothermic reaction in vessel 
Temperature controller failed 
Pressure controller system of separator failed 
Pressure or safety release failed 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to heat from surrounding 
Electric spark as source of ignition 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   





S/No Element Score 
























Leak from joints 
Leak from main pipeline 
Leak from joints 
Leak from main pipeline 
Leak from vessel 
Leak from fracture, joints or crack 
Leak from the pipe connection 
Leak from safety valve 
Leak from pressure release valve 
Leak from control valves 
Outlet pipe choked 
High pressure upstream line 
Sudden phase change 
External heat absorption causing increase in 
pressure 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
Ignition due to electric spark 
Release from pipe after explosion 
Release from vessel aftermath of explosion 
Ignition due to external explosion energy 
Ignition due to fire heat load 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   




























Leak from compressor downstream pipeline 
Leak from compressor downstream pipeline 
joints 
Leak from compressor upstream pipeline 
Leak from joints of compressor upstream 
pipeline 
Release from casing of compressor 
Leaking of seal 
Release from impeller 
Compressor completely failed causing 
release of chemical 
Leak from junction of pump and pipeline 
Leak from rotor 
Pump failed to operate and caused release 
of chemical 
Leak from casing 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
                   
 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   






Ignition due to electric spark 
Fire caused by failure of pipeline 
Fire caused vessel to fail and release of 
chemical from vessel 
                   
                   
 
                   
 
Flash drum 
S/No Element Score 




















Leak from upstream pipeline 
Leak from upstream pipeline joints 
High-pressure in vessel causing rupture of 
vessel and release of gas 
Leak from joints or flange 
Leak from downstream pipeline 
Leak from joints of downstream pipeline 
Leak from joint of gas pipeline 
Leak from gas pipeline 
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
Ignition due to electric spark  
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surrounding 
VCE causes pipeline to fail and release 
chemical 
VCE causes vessel to fail and release 
chemical 
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
                   
                   
 
                   
 
                   
 
                   
 
Drier 
S/No Element Score 


















Impurities in feed line 
Control system failed 
Sudden phase change 
Temperature controller failed 
Heating due to external heat source 
Drier outlet line choked 
Outlet valve choked 
Safety valve failed to operate on demand 
Pressure relief failed to operate on demand 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surroundings 
Ignition due to electric spark  
Ignition due to explosion energy 
Ignition due to external heat from 
surroundings 
BLEVE causes vessel to fail and release 
chemical 
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15 BLEVE causes pipeline to fail and release 
chemical 
 
                   
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING TIME TO COMPLETE THIS 
QUESTIONNAIRE, YOUR HELP IS HIGHLY APPRECIATED. 
 







Paper Presented at ESREL Conference 
Lisbon, Portugal 
September, 2006 
A. A. UMAR      Ph. D     2010 
 
220 
Application of principles of inherently safe design methodology into the 
development of offshore platforms 
A. Umar, M. An & J.B. Odoki 
The University of Birmingham, UK 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Offshore platform installation is associated with several inherent risks arising from major 
critical safety challenges such as fires, explosions, blowouts, falling objects, earthquake, extreme weather, 
and impact from moving objects such as helicopters or ships. These critical problems are due largely to design 
errors or inadequacies, and poor maintenance. The safety challenges highlighted above could result in loss of 
lives, degradation of the environment, and damage to property or capital assets. 
The traditional safe design concept for an offshore platform is based mainly on provision of redundant 
levels of prevention barriers and other mitigation systems which themselves may introduce additional 
hazards. The concept of “design for safety” to be deployed is to investigate critical risks on the offshore 
platforms which require proper attention in the design process, in particular, at the early design stages. The 
concept envisaged in this paper is to utilise the proactive approach aimed at avoiding or minimising the need 
to incorporate extensive safety systems for the control and mitigation of hazards. This approach involves the 
enlargement of the design team to accommodate wider participation of both the designers and operation 
personnel to help create more opportunities aimed at achieving reduction in the hazard likelihood, severity 
and consequences at the early stages of the design. In conclusion this paper seeks to highlight the problems in 
the design process with a view to address critical hazards of fire and explosion on offshore platforms. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Offshore oil and gas platform main features can 
usually be divided into a number of operational 
modules such as water injection, high-compression, 
sea water de-aeration and other modules include 
local power and main electrical rooms and an 
accommodation blocks. These operational areas are 
most often crowded by or congested with various 
obstacles such as pipelines and other operational 
safety equipments. 
The platforms have high standard of inherent 
risks associated with the design errors in the 
offshore development projects that necessitates the 
need for continuous work in the areas of managing 
such risks. These inherent risks sometimes result in 
loss of live to people, degrade the environment and 
or damage to the property or economic assets. The 
safety management approach in this context is to 
establish appropriate risk elimination or reduction 
measures through design. This approach will require 
detailed hazard identification and risk assessment of 
errors at various stages (Raftery, 1993). 
The Danish Energy Department (DEA, 2006) and 
UK Health and Safety Executive  (HSE, 2005) 
review safety guidelines based on the performance 
of offshore oil & gas industry over the years which 
indicate that about 80% of the risks to personnel are 
related to the process and structural failures. The 
most critical risks offshore include blowouts, fires, 
explosions, collision with moving objects (e.g. 
Vessels), falling objects, extreme weather condition 
and earthquakes. It is essential that review of some 
major accidents such as Piper Alpha, Bhopal and 
Phillips accidents revealed that most of the accidents 
are process related and the consequences could be 
minimized if proper considerations is given to 
details during the design process. 
2 A REVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY 
PRACTICES 
2.1 Offshore platform development phases 
This section is intended to highlight the hazards 
associated with the various development phases of  




an offshore platform project with a view to  
incorporating safety features through the design  
from inception. This process is usually referred to as  
“desig n for safety”.   
An offshore project development may be  
classified into three broad stages of design,  
construction and operation (Pappas, 1994). These  
stages can be further divided into a sequence  
including, for instance, planning/feasibility design  
phase, c onceptual design phase, pre - engineering  
phase, detailed engineering phase, construction  
phase, commissioning and start up phase. However,  
a design of an offshore platform at the early stage  
usually involves planning/feasibility phase and  
conceptual phase.  The level of insufficiency of data  
and high level uncertainty associated with offshore  
installation may not allow the use of traditional  
methods early enough to enable safety decision  
making. In this case, the research activities will  
therefore focus on th e integration of safety features  
through design process at the early stage i.e.  
planning/feasibility and conceptual studies.   
2.1.1   Planning/feasibility phase   
The objective of the studies in the  
planning/feasibility design phase is to evaluate  
whether or not furt her development of a field is  
technically feasible and commercially favourable.  
The safety evaluation within this phase usually plays  
a relatively subordinate role regarding whether to  
develop a field or not. Therefore, the risk estimation  
will be aimed at   comparing different factors with  
respect to safety. The results should therefore be  
given as a ranking of the alternatives rather than to  
estimate absolute levels of risk. Safe design usually  
consists of i) identification of relevant hazards, ii)  
estimati on of the probability of each accident, and  
iii) estimation of the possible consequences.   
Estimation of probabilities and consequences  
should be used in order to compare different types of  
fields and offshore platform design. In general, safe  
design in the   planning/feasibility design phase is  
aimed at specifying one or more design alternatives  
for offshore platforms (An, et al, 2000a & b).   
As described earlier on this paper, at this stage,  
safety information or data is not sufficient for the  
performance of  extensive risk evaluation. Therefore,  
assumptions have to be made so that an offshore  
platform may be designed in accordance with  
standard requirements and acceptance criteria.  
However, the risks associated with an offshore  
platform which are residual in n ature, can be  
considered for preliminary evaluation while the  
design basis risks would be dealt with in the  
subsequent design phases using comprehensive  
design methods based on accidental specifications  
(Pappas, 1994).   
Feasibility risk evaluation is mainly   devoted to  
comparison of different platform alternatives thereby  
reducing the importance of significant uncertainties.  
It was suggested that, quantitative comparison rather  
than qualitative one will provide more reliable input  
into the decision making pro cess (Uher & Toakley,  
1999).   
2.1.2   Conceptual study phase   
The objective of conceptual design phase is to  
provide safety - related input in the process of  
developing and selecting an offshore platform. The  
conceptual design shall satisfy both the operator, and  
regu latory and company‟s requirements for a safe  
and economically attractive solution. The  
acceptability of the design concept shall be  
documented through evaluation of safety case that  
will accompany the field development plan. The  
major activities in this ph ase are confirmation of the  
recommendations in the previous phase and decision  
making on platform installation based on  
commercial, technical and other considerations  
relevant to such a project as well as definition of the  
main features of the selected fie ld.   
As stated above, the main objective of this phase  
is concerned with the definition of commercial  
viability of the project and optimisation of the entire  
installation. However, from the point of view of  
safety, other aspects are also considered to be of   
significant importance in the decision process  
including orientation, overall layout, support  
structure, transport system, riser locations, drilling  
and production schedules and so on.  The hazards  
associated with the platform such as fires,  
explosions, sh ip and helicopter collisions,  
environmental damage and falling objects can be  
used to conduct some level of risk analyses.   
It should be noted that platform design has not  
commenced at this stage and therefore, the  
computation of system reliability will not   be  
possible, but consequence analysis dealing with the  
fire and explosions can be performed with some  
level of precision (Vinnem & Hope, 1986). It is  
therefore,  desirable to conduct some level of  
quantitative risk analyses at this stage in order to  
synchr onise the activities with the subsequent phases  
where quantitative data will be more available. It  
was suggested that the safety requirements should be  
defined through risk assessment based on functional  
needs rather than specific design details.   
 





2.1.3   Detailed  design phase 
phase 
  
This phase starts following the decision on all  
conceptual design aspects of the platform, which is  
concern with detailed specification required for  
fixing all engineering system and equipments. The  
main objective at this stage is to produce  
e ngineering details needed for the fabrication,  
construction, installation and commissioning for  
platform operation. It is also important to ensure that  
safety recommendations produced at the concept  
phase are incorporated into the activities in this  
phase  in order to ascertain that all necessary safety  
precautions are taken with regard to start - up and  
operation. There is therefore, the need at this stage to  
conduct some level of risk analysis as it is still  
possible to modify the design details.   
Hazard and  Operability Analysis (HAZOP) can  
be conducted at this early stage of engineering phase  
to:   
a)   evaluate the design process in details regarding  
drilling and support system,   
b)   provide input for the detailed hazard  
identification for final risk analysis.   
The risk  analysis to be performed will serve as a  
basis for the compilation of all information or data  
required for:   
   identification of all possible risk reduction  
measures,   
   identification of platform risk level,   
   analysis of future platform extensions,   
   analysis of f uture platform modifications,   
   Design of future platforms.   
To achieve the above, all necessary conditions for  
risk analysis including that uncertainty estimations  
and assumptions must be clearly provided.   
2.2   A Review of the design for safety methodology   
“Desig n for safety” is a process of minimising injury  
or death of personnel, damages to offshore products  
and pollution to the environment (Lois, P. et al  
2002). It involves a concept of incorporating safety  
into the design process from the early stages, which  
i s achieved through a systematic approach to the  
identification and control of high - risk areas.   
The constraints associated with the “design for  
safety” process need to be highlighted in order to  
achieve the desired integration. The constraints or  
difficulti es associated with “design for safety”  
include the problems of getting sufficient data, effect  
of multiple factors or processes, complicated  
decision making process etc (Wang, 1996; An, et al.  
2000a & b).   
The development of safety model through the  
design  of such a structure like offshore platform can  
be difficult and will thus require approximations and  
judgements of operative with the thorough  
knowledge of the operation of the installation (How,  
et al 2001; Wang & Ruxton, 1998).  This may require  
applicati on of safety analysis methods either  
individually or in combination to conduct a  
qualitative or a quantitative safety analysis. The  
problem with application of these methods is a lack  
of specification of where and how to apply them or  
how they interrelate.   Application of these methods  
will therefore require good knowledge of qualitative  
and quantitative analysis techniques.   
2.3   Principles of inherently safe design   
  An inherently safe approach to fire and explosion   
hazard management involves application of  
measu res to avoid or eliminate hazards or reduce  
their magnitude, severity, or likelihood of  
occurrence by careful attention to the fundamental  
design or layout. General notion of inherent safety is  
delivering normally unattended installations (NUI)  
and pipelin e that does not leak, collapse or sink and  
has no one on it to be killed over the life of the  
facility. Both operators and designers are to be  
engaged in a single team with the former group  
assisting in the design process. The inherently safe  
design was fi rst introduced 1976 following the  
Flixborough accident in 1974. It was used to refine  
the concept and practice in subsequent publications.  
These principles include minimisation (or  
intensification), substitution, moderation (or  
attenuation) and simplificat ion. Inherently safe  
design does not guarantee absolute safety but  
compared to inherently unsafe design where  
problems are likely to escalate more catastrophically  
case such as Piper Alpha and Bhopal disasters that  
provide the best examples of inherently u nsafe  
designs.   
In offshore development, the associated risks can  
never be completely eliminated, but some degree of  
inherent safety can be achieved through the various  
phases of design. The residual risk elements are  
considered for preliminary evaluation a t the  
feasibility study phase while design based risks are  
to be dealt with in the subsequent design phases.   
Risk evaluation performed at feasibility design  
stage is concern with the comparison of different  
platform alternatives in order to reduce the  
sign ificant uncertainties.   
The design optimization involves the process of  
selection of various alternatives in attempt to reduce    
 





the risks to „As Low As Reasonably Practicable‟  
(ALARP). This process involves elimination of the  
provision of redundant levels of   prevention barriers  
and other mitigation systems, which themselves may  
contribute to additional risk problems. The process  
will however, require the identification and  
assessment of major risk contributors which could  
be achieved early in the project by t he use of  
quantitative risk assessment techniques.   
Identification of major risks by engineering  
judgement will not achieve the desired result if a  
structured approach is not adopted at the early stages  
thereby necessitating the use of costly remedial  
measu re rather than the desired loss prevention  
(Vinnem & Hope, 1998). However, the general  
principles of inherently safe design approach as  
applied in the process industry can be employed in  
the offshore domain, which are described as below:   
a) Minimisation/in tensification is the process of  
elimination or reduction in the large inventory of  
raw materials, intermediate products and/or  
reduction in the volume of equipment or storage  
facilities.   
b) Substitution is the process of substituting  
hazardous substances w ith the less hazardous ones.   
c) Simplification is to simplify parts of the complex  
plant design and revise ambiguous operating  
instructions to reduce wrong actions.   
d) Limitation is to produce hazardous substances at  
different sites to eliminate transporta tion of such  
material within one site and reduce inventory  
reactors at such place by:   
   Moving the building to a greater distance  
away from hazardous production facilities.    
   Build a dyke to contain the released materials  
due to loss of primary containment    
   M aking use of the magnetically coupled  
pumps where possible to eliminate leaks  
from seals.    
   Mounting the LPG tanks to minimize the  
consequences of BLEVE (Boiling Liquid  
Expanding Vapour Explosion).   
The offshore industry is one of the few that made  
extensive   use of inherently safe design through the  
adoption of some of the principles and related  
specifics. Gupta  et al   (2002) observed that offshore  
industry leads others in targeting hazards using the  
concept of inherently safe design. In the offshore oil  
and g as industry the application of principle of  
inherently safe design has been achieved through:   
a) The use of intensification to simplify the  
production process and plant design.   
b) Simplifying overall layout to reduce the hazards  
associated with complex set ting.   
c) Isolating highly hazardous materials where  
possible.    
d) Moderating high pressure and temperature  
through changes in the process chemistry and/or  
catalyst.   
e) Reducing the number of valves and small  
connection for instrument.   
f) Involving operator s at the early stage of the design  
process in order to obtain proper insight into the  
common errors associated with the operations  
that need to be targeted for control or elimination.   
In recent years, design engineers and safety  
researchers have continued  to develop and apply  
various safety techniques for identification of all  
potential hazardous events, and respective causes  
and possible consequences. The various traditional  
safety analysis methods can be incorporated into the  
design process either individ ually or in combination  
to identify the potential risks associated with the  
system, and these safety analysis methods include:   
   Preliminary hazard analysis  (PHA),   
   Fault tree analysis (FTA),   
   Event tree analysis (ETA),   
   Failure mode, effects and criticality a nalysis  
(FMECA),   
   Cause consequence analysis (CCA),   
   Hazard and operability method (HAZOP),   
   Boolean representation method (BRM),   
   Simulation analysis.   
However, these techniques employ top - down and  
bottom - up safety assessment approaches.   
1.4 2 Top - down safety assess ment approach   
A typical top - down process starts with the  
identification of the top events which can be  
obtained from previous accident and incident reports  
of similar systems. Once the top events required to  
be studied further are determined, the causes le ading  
to them can be identified deductively with increasing  
detail until all the causes are identified at the  
required level of resolution. Either qualitative or  
quantitative analysis can be carried out to estimate  
and evaluate risks. A Design review can t hen be  




For offshore engineering systems with  
comparatively simple layout design, the top - down  
approach may prove convenient and efficient as it  
only deals with the failure path leading to the t op  
events. It is obvious that the experience and good  
understanding of the engineering system is very    
 




important for the efficient application of this  
method.   
However, offshore system with a complicated  
layout, there may be a lack in the knowledge or  
experi ence regarding the design solution and its  
possible effects on system safety. For such systems,  
the top - down approach may have the following  
problems:   
   Failure data may not be available from  
previous accidents and incident reports of  
similar systems.   
   There  may be uncertainties about the  
identification of all failure causes associated  
with the top events.   
   Deductive characteristics in a top - down  
safety assessment process may not address  
the complex interaction present in a complex  
system in a rigorous way.   
2.5     Bo ttom - up safety assessment approach   
In this approach, an offshore system may be divided  
into subsystems which can be further broken down  
into the constituent parts or component level in order  
to identify all possible hazards. The hazard  
identification can b e initiated from the component  
level, then progress up to the subsystem level and  
finally to the system level. The combinations of all  
possible failure events at both the component and  
the subsystem levels may be studied to identify the  
possible serious fa ilure events, before conducting  
risk evaluation and design review.   
The bottom - up safety assessment approach can be  
used inductively to eliminate some level of  
uncertainties on all failure events of a system and  
their respective causes. Therefore, compared  with  
the top - down approach the bottom - up approach has  
the following advantages (Wang, et al, 1998, &  
1996):   
   .Omission of system failure events and their  
respective causes is likely.   
   It may be more convenient to be incorporated  
into a computer package.   
   It m ay be more suitable to be applied to the  
design of complex offshore engineering  
systems.   
However, both the top - down and bottom - up  
approaches can be integrated into the design for  
safety process. The top - down approach is used to  
focus on areas of special co ncern while the bottom - 
up is used to explore the areas in detail. Once the top  
events of the system have been identified,  
consequence analysis can be carried out to study the  
possible effects caused by the occurrence of each  
identified top event. They may  be quantified by  
experts regarding the particular operating situations.   
2.6   Inherently safe design method   
Adoption and/or application of principle of  
inherently safe design from the early stages of the  
design process of offshore installation became  
necessary f ollowing recommendations contained in  
the Cullen report (Department of Energy, 1990). The  
design for safety framework has been proposed to  
incorporate the application of the safety assessment  
methods using the information generated with  
increase in details   as the design process progress.  
This increase in information will facilitate the safety  
assessment to progress from the qualitative to  
quantitative basis and from assessment function to a  
decision - making function and eventual movement to  
a verification fu nction in order to ensure that the  
final design is in conformity with the desired level of  
safety.   
The proposed inherently safe design methodology  
for offshore installation made up of the following;   
   Problem definition   
   Risk identification   
   Risk estimation   
   Ri sk evaluation   
   Design review   
Inherently safe design concept is an iterative process  
where for example the information generated from  
the design review may be used to conduct the task of  
risk identification alongside the design goals  
defined in the problem  definition phase. The various  
phases for offshore installation will be described in  
details in relation to the general inherently safe  
design principles.   
2.7   Inherently safe design Constraints     
In the design of offshore engineering oil & gas  
platforms, there  are still some problems associated  
with the application of inherently safe design  
techniques to achieve ultimate solutions to safety  
based decisions during the design process .  Some  
constraints or difficulties associated with the  
application of these techni ques in the design process  
are highlighted as follows (Wang and Ruxton,  
1998):   
   Insufficient data is available in most cases while  
in some cases it is difficult to obtain such data,  
this result in having very poor statistical  
accuracy.   
It is extremely diffi cult to carry out “design for  
safety” or produce mathematical model for a    
 




   project which is affected by many factors such as  
design, manufacturing, installation  
commissioning, operations and maintenance.   
   The decision making process is made so difficult  
due  to the combination of the difficult task of  
defining the scope or extent of “design for  
safety” at the beginning,  and the enormity of  
work and the associated cost of process of  
quantifying safety.   
   The high level of uncertainty associated with the  
quantifi cation of effects and consequences of  
hazard constitute some difficulties to the “design  
for safety” process.   
   The quantification of risks involves significant  
number of assumptions, estimations, judgements  
and opinions which are often subjective thereby  
re quiring the involvement of a very skilful safety  
analyst to interpret the results.   
   It is extremely difficult to set up absolute criteria  
for safety acceptability as safety is only a part of  
the important requirement for the appraisal of the  
acceptability o f an industrial activity.   
3   LESSON LEARNT FROM A N OFFSHORE  
PLATFORM DISASTER   
The worst accident in the history of offshore oil  
exploration occurred in the North Sea on July 6,  
1988, when the Piper Alpha oil drilling and  
production platform exploded and was c onsumed by  
fire. One hundred and sixty - seven workers perished.  
Oil production in the field was resumed in February  
1993 after having been suspended for 5years. The  
accident was a result of combination of human and  
design errors which could have been minimi sed if  
operators were involved at the early design stage and  
the conceptual layout eliminated the risk of input  
from other platforms in such situations.   
The level of destruction and loss of lives will  
have been minimised if the design has integrated a  
syst em which will isolate the distressed platform..   
Several factors were found to have caused the  
explosion on Piper Alpha, and many other factors  
exacerbated the damage and loss of life that  
followed. Among the deficiencies which could have  
been eliminated or   reduced through the design  
process are as follows:   
a) Lack of an in built system in place to tag or lock  
out valves consistently, except during major  
shutdowns.   
b) The design team may not have adequate  
information needed to deal with certain human  
errors  at the early stage of the design process.   
Investigation revealed that the work permit system  
“put too high a premium on informal  
communications” and that the explosion “can well  
be understood against the background of informal  
and unsafe practices” on the  Piper Alpha platform.   
The Piper Alpha accident clearly indicates the need  
for a comprehensive system based on the principles  
of inherently safe design to deal with all possible  
safety issues from human to operations.    
The design of BP ETAP platform against   gas  
explosion has addressed some of the design based  
problems highlighted in the Piper Alpha case.   
4   AN EXAMPLE   
The design of BP platform in the Eastern Trough  
Area Project (ETAP) against gas explosion  
demonstrates a typical example of practical  
application   of principles of inherently safe design  
using top - down risk assessment methodology. This  
example deals with the worst case scenario where  
hazardous situation can escalate to explosion  
following a fire as was the case in Piper Alpha.   
The design approach fo r the project was to  
minimise gas explosion risk at an early stage or  
reducing the risk to ALARP. This project was built  
on the experiences of BP Andrew project.  
Accordingly the BP ETAP project was found to be  
successful in meeting the project objectives  
( Peterson  et.al , 2000).   
The design in general started with the  
enlargement of the design team to include safety  
specialist. The first deign activity is the „concept  
selection‟ where a number of design alternatives or  
options are studied. Following the selec tion of the  
desired option was the commencement of front - end  
engineering design (FEED). The FEED was used in  
this project to further develop the design to  
sufficient level to produce cost estimate within  
acceptable limits. The detailed design stage was  
whe re the specifications were produced for  
fabrication and construction of the platform.   
During the design process, the safety specialist  
made significant contribution which facilitated the  
application of advance explosion modeling tools in  
the selection of t he appropriate concept and some  
early activities of FEED. This process is in contrast  
with the traditional approach where conventional  
safety methods are applied at the early stage of the  
design while safety specialists and advance  
modeling tools are consi dered at the later design  
stages. The principles of design for safety applied in  
ETAP project against gas explosion are described in  
the follows sections (Peterson  et.al, 2000 ).   
 





4.1   Conceptual design phase   
At this stage the following design actions were  
carrie d out.   
4.1.1   Concept definition   
Definition of the general shape of platforms where  
various concepts options were evaluated for their  
explosion risk potentials and possible design  
modification needed to contain these potentials  
within the project set target.   
In t he case of ETAP project the concept selection  
was based on four deck process modules with  
separate accommodation module connected by two  
bridges. The explosion over – pressure loading is the  
main determinant factor in both the layout and  
overall structural c onfiguration of the large process  
modules. In order to comply with this requirement  
each process deck was divided into three  
compartments using blast walls. The concept of  
minimum width for each of the flame travel was  
used to determine the sizes of each c ompartment  
while aspects ratio parameter was used to determine  
the decks height.   
The BP Andrew project (Tam, 1996) established  
that the ratio for a three open - sided volume area  
should be less than 3 in order to effectively manage  
gas explosion over - pressur e. In attempt to achieve  
optimum efficiency a maximum ratio 2.5 was used  
in the case of BP ETAP project   
Sizes of compartment were determined at the  
conceptual design phase of the project to which  
resulted in the effective establishment of an  
optimum arrang ement of topside facility. The  
minimum width concept was used to achieve solid  
arrangement needed to ensure structural support  
with adequate strength and ductility properties for  
blast conditions.   
4.1.2   Project explosion control target   
The BP ETAP project explos ion over - pressure target  
was set at a maximum of 1.5 bar based on the results  
and experiences gained in the previous projects, and  
a number of simulations. This target was used by the  
design team to ensure that all disciplines were  
focused on design optimi zation. The designers based  
their experiences to suggest possible use of  
technology available to control aver - pressure to less  
than 1 bar for the theoretical worst case in all areas  
of the platform.   
4.1.3   Selection of concept options   
Appropriate expertise and to ols were used to  
conduct the process of selection of various options  
based on judgement of the explosion experts and  
previous project experience without any calculation  
involve. However, some level of calculations was  
conducted in order to ensure that targ et is exceeded.   
4.2   Front - end engineering design (FEED) phase   
At the early stages of FEED, major optimisation of  
the equipment layout and structural definition were  
carried out. In contrast with the traditional approach,  
the design team used computational flui d dynamics  
(CFD) explosion called Flame ACcelerator  
Simulator (FLACS) which they successfully  
integrated into the design process.   
The problem of escalation as witnessed in the  
Piper Alpha case was targeted for control in this  
project. Some level of control   of explosion over - 
pressure was achieved by ensuring that both the  
processes of minimisation and design were  
simultaneously carried out. This approach facilitated  
the optimisation process through the modeling at  
every stage from compartment shape, major  
eq uipment alignment and location, major pipe - work  
to minor pipe - work layout and so on. The project  
team attributed successes achieved at this stage to an  
enlarged and integrated design team.   
4.3   Detailed design phase   
Much of the efforts at this phase were devote d to  
minimising the impact of late design installations,  
such as heating, ventilation and air conditioning  
(HVAC), ducting, cable trays and electrical panels  
even though the requirements for them were  
approximated during FEED. The efforts were to  
ensure im plementation of design specifications made  
at FEED. The details at this stage were packaged in  
a computer aided design model (PDMS) which was  
used for gas explosion modeling work for the ETAP  
project.   
The result achieved by using  inherently safe  
design met hod   can be summarized as follows:   
4.3.1   Control of explosion - over pressure and risks   
The final calculations showed that the maximum gas  
explosion over pressure on key structural surfaces in  
all areas were well within the project target of less  
than 1.5 bar. In m ost of the areas, they were  
substantially lower. This process resulted in low  
individual risks as segregation by compartment  
reduced the percentage of people to be affected by  
any major gas explosion. A combination of  
controlled gas explosion size and larg e separation  
distance between potential explosion sites and the  
temporary refuge (TR) ensure that the TR  
impairment is zero.   
 





4.3.2   Verification of as - built design   
For final verification, a site survey was carried out  
on the modules just before they were floated  out. It  
was found that the geometric models constructed  
from the project PDMS (Plant Design Management  
System} computer database gave a good  
representation of the as - built platform. This provided  
assurance that calculations carried out during the  
detailed  design were valid. The    
5     CONCLUSIONS   
I n the design process of complex offshore  
installation, it is necessary to examine the  
application of principles of inherently safe design to  
identify and assess potentially hazardous situations  
and associated risks in  order to provide rational basis  
for determining where risk reduction measures are  
required. In such a process, either a top - down or a  
bottom - up safety assessment approach can be used  
either separately or in combination to study serious  
failure events and t heir scenarios. The decision as to  
which kind of analysis is more appropriate is  
dependent on the availability of failure data, the  
degree of interrelationships of the design and the  
level of innovation in the design.   
A safety management framework has been   proposed  
to provide a basis for development of design for  
safety methodology and modeling for the assessment  
of safety of offshore oil & gas platforms. An  
example is used to demonstrate the proposed  
management framework in the application of  
inherently sa fe design techniques on BP platform in  
the Eastern Trough Area Project (ETAP).   
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